Decision Making Styles and Adaptive Algorithms for Human Action

Mauro Maldonato, Silvia Dell’ Orco

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DOI: 10.4236/psych.2011.28124                

Abstract

Without human beings’ ability to choose – and in such a way give order to a universe which, in the beginning, must have presented itself as a chaotic mass of data without clear structures and regularity – evolution would have been unthinkable, even more inconceivable if one considers the fact that the adaptation to that universe must have taken place on the basis of incomplete, fragmentary information and above all starting from limited cognitive capacities and restricted time limits. In order to respond to the challenges of the environment, an individual had to first of all be quick: quick in the reaction to the attack of a predator and in the gaining of an escape route, in deciding how to pursue pray, in obtaining gains from territory that others were using at that same moment, in the selection of a partner and of a place in which to take refuge and so forth. Therefore, if it is true that evolutionary pressure urged the human mind to accumulate information by means of a significant quota of rational decisions, the vast majority of human choices have been favoured by ecological decision making strategies.

Keywords

Naturalistic Decision Making, Ecological Rationality, Fast and Frugal Heuristics, Decision Making Styles

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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