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Emotion Interference Solves Social Dilemma

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2012.25083    4,427 Downloads   7,102 Views   Citations
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ABSTRACT

Roles of emotion in decision-making have been attracting attention in neuroeconomics and behavioral game theory. We mathematically demonstrate that “emotion interference”, a recently-discovered psychological phenomenon [1] helps to solve social dilemma in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. Furthermore, the present theory also accounts for the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle in the prisoner’s dilemma [2]. Furthermore, it is also explained that why people in the society with higher social mobility are more cooperative. Relations of the present work to recently evolving fields of neuroeconomics and quantum decision theory are discussed.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

T. Takahashi, "Emotion Interference Solves Social Dilemma," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 5, 2012, pp. 446-449. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.25083.

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