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Discretionary Fiscal Policy and the European Monetary Union

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DOI: 10.4236/me.2012.36095    4,960 Downloads   7,007 Views   Citations
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A model of circumstances that can lead to changes in the way a fiscal authority conducts policy after joining a monetary union is presented and empirically tested for the euro area. According to the model consolidation fatigue, shock asymmetry, or differences in the relative weight placed on output/price stabilization between the new and old monetary authority can lead to greater reliance on fiscal policy. Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a change in the conduct of fiscal policy in the euro area which is most likely due to consolidation fatigue and a stronger emphasis on price stabilization by the European Central Bank.

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The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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J. Jones, "Discretionary Fiscal Policy and the European Monetary Union," Modern Economy, Vol. 3 No. 6, 2012, pp. 742-751. doi: 10.4236/me.2012.36095.


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