On Gale and Shapley “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”

DOI: 10.4236/tel.2012.23054   PDF   HTML     5,050 Downloads   9,236 Views   Citations


In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavilydestabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by thearrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly howstability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomenaaffecting the composition of the marriage market.

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J. Gabszewicz, F. Garcia, J. Pais and J. Resende, "On Gale and Shapley “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 3, 2012, pp. 291-293. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.23054.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.


[1] D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1962, pp. 9-15. doi:10.2307/2312726
[2] Y. Blum, A. E. Roth and U. G. Rothblum, “Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets,” Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 76, No. 2, 1997, pp. 362-411. doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2307

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