TUP: A New eCK-Secure AKE Protocol under the CDH Assumption

Qinglei Zhou, Zengfu Yang

School of Information and Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou, China.

DOI: 10.4236/ijcns.2012.56043                

Abstract

The design and analysis of authenticated key exchange protocol is an important problem in information security area. At present, extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model provides the strongest definition of security for two party key agreement protocol, however most of the current secure protocols can not be prove to secure without Gap assumption. To avoid this phenomenon, by using twinning key technology we propose a new two party key agreement protocol TUP which is obtained by modifying the UP protocol, then in conjunction with the trapdoor test, we prove strictly that the new protocol is secure in eCK model. Compared with previous protocols, the security assumption of new proposal is more standard and weaker, and it also solves an open problem in ProvSec'09.

Keywords

Authenticated Key Exchange; Provable Security; eCK Model; Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption; Trapdoor Test

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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