Theoretical Economics Letters

Vol.7 No.5(2017), Paper ID 78077, 11 pages

DOI:10.4236/tel.2017.75084

 

Passively-Strictly Strong Nash Equilibrium in a Preference Revelation Game under the Student-Optimal Deferred Acceptance Algorithm

 

Chengyue Li, Takehiro Inohara, Masahito Kitamura

 

Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan
Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo, Japan
Department of Risk Science in Finance and Management, Chiba Institute of Technology, Chiba, Japan

 

Copyright © 2017 Chengyue Li, Takehiro Inohara, Masahito Kitamura et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

 

How to Cite this Article


Li, C. , Inohara, T. and Kitamura, M. (2017) Passively-Strictly Strong Nash Equilibrium in a Preference Revelation Game under the Student-Optimal Deferred Acceptance Algorithm. Theoretical Economics Letters, 7, 1244-1254. doi: 10.4236/tel.2017.75084.

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