
Development of a General-Purpose E-Voting Server
OPEN ACCESS JCC
with the name of a trusted control center. Management
Center will not look at the contents of the votes with the
name, ownership may conduct a check of double voting,
signing back with a ticket if they pass the Administration
Center. Voters, the Center sent an anonymous aggregate
vote signed center aggregation to aggregate and verify
the signature [5].
To require anonymous communication channel, it can-
not be used without the normal communication channels
like the Internet. Configuration has the disadvantage of
increasing the instrument [7].
Blind signature of anonymity because the electronic
voting system constructed blind voters vote centre the
identity of a blind signature is an important application.
In 1992, Fujioka proposed a blind signature based voting
program, which the algorithm is easy to implement, low
network traffic, in the non-governmental sector has been
widely used. However, this solution in terms of safety
there are some shortcomings:
1) The lack of voter control. In this way, a malicious
voter may send a large number of anonymous votes, the
electoral process interference and damage.
2) Fails to effectively prevent the issuer's fraud. Since
the legitimacy of the voting phase of the signature en-
tirely by the issuer to verify, so people can forge a valid
visa votes if voters abstained, so he can be someone
else's vote.
3) No effective supervision of tellers, tellers failed to
prevent the intermediate results of the vote disclosure,
thus affecting the elections.
Currently, many papers and programs on the electronic
voting program Fujioka has been improved, but the safe-
ty and efficiency to varying degrees, still there are some
problems. This departure from the practicality and safety,
the use of blind signatures, put forward an electronic
election scheme, which can effectively address the issue.
Models of blind signature scheme have the following
five:
Sensus scheme.
EVS scheme.
SEAS scheme.
DynaVote scheme.
Receipt-free scheme.
The above model using the blind signature scheme can
effectively protect the privacy of voters.
4.2. Mixnet Scheme
I will not be able to vote by correspondence with the
content and the close vote in the first ciphertext by mak-
ing a mixnet that guarantees the anonymity of the vote.
This method, however, to increase the accuracy to
prevent unauthorized centers, it is necessary to increase
the number of centers and to increase the number of sys-
tem components, to achieve fairness and tallied after the
deadline for voting, aggregate you must have a problem
on the ballot may essentials.
Mixnet system model has the following three:
Clarke Tax scheme
Voter -Resolved scheme.
Model Mixnet-based scheme.
4.3. Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Voters sent to administrators and the public key to en-
crypt the contents of the votes. Administrator to aggre-
gate the votes without looking at the contents of the table,
send their votes to the ballot and then aggregated. The
ballot will be announced at a private key to decrypt the
votes. But look what’s on ballot for each vote. The ano-
nymity of the vote is guaranteed.
It puts only 1 or 0 in this method the contents of the
table is a small range of applications.
Homomorphic encryption scheme model has the fol-
lowing two:
Re-encryption scheme
Secret-ballot scheme
4.4. A Case Study of DynaVote
We make a case study to illustrate the feasibility of our
serv er . We choose DynaVote [9] as a target, because this
scheme is often discussed in the world. We make a table
to proof our components can achieve this scheme. How
our components can achieve DynaVote shows in Table 1.
DynaVote has the following actors: Voter, Ballot Ge-
nerator, Key Generator, Counter, and PVID Authority.
5. Concluding Remarks
An E-voting system for general-purpose can be developed.
Table 1. Components in dynaVote.
Process Component DynaVote
Prepare
Stage
AMC Voter registration
AMC Voter applies PVID authority
to obtain a PVID-list by using
his real registration identity.
VMC Voter obtain a secret key
Voting
Stage
VMC In voting stage voter obtains a
dynamic ballot and casts his
candidate selection with the PVID.
VC
Verifier verifies that the PVID
belongs to a registered voter who
has not yet voted. If the ballot is
valid, the verifier signs the ballot
and returns it to the voter.
VMC
The voter then sends the signed
ballot to the counter
Opening
Stage VOC The counter checks the signature
on the ballot, The counter then
add the ballot to the tally.