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Game Analysis of Institutional Investors Participating in Corporate Governance

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DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2013.31008    8,240 Downloads   10,816 Views   Citations

ABSTRACT

By building a game model between the institutional investors and the management, an analysis has been conducted to uncover the influential factors that are crucial to the role switching of institutional investors when confronting tunneling behaviors of the management: supervision cost, shareholding ratio, invisible income, fines and patience. In cases of lower supervision cost, higher shareholding ratios, less invisible income, larger amount of fines, more patience and pursuing long-term gains, institutional investors will tend to play an active role in corporate governance. They will act as an active supervisor to restrain the tunneling behavior of the management.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

Y. Li and Z. Li, "Game Analysis of Institutional Investors Participating in Corporate Governance," American Journal of Industrial and Business Management, Vol. 3 No. 1, 2013, pp. 64-68. doi: 10.4236/ajibm.2013.31008.

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