On Gale and Shapley “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”

Jean J. Gabszewicz; Filomena Garcia; Joana Pais; Joana Resende

doi:10.4236/tel.2012.23054

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On Gale and Shapley “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2012.23054 4,899 Downloads 8,810 Views Citations

Author(s)

Jean J. Gabszewicz, Filomena Garcia, Joana Pais, Joana Resende

Affiliation(s)

CEF.UP,University of Porto, Porto, Portugal.
CORE, Universitécatholique de Louvain, Louvain, Belgium.
Indiana University, Bloomington, USA.
UECE/ISEG, Lisbon, Portugal.

ABSTRACT

In this note, we start to claim that established marriages can be heavilydestabilized when the population of existing couples is enriched by thearrival of new candidates to marriage. Afterwards, we discuss briefly howstability concepts can be extended to account for entry and exit phenomenaaffecting the composition of the marriage market.

KEYWORDS

Matching; Stability; Marriage Model; Divorce Cascades

Cite this paper

J. Gabszewicz, F. Garcia, J. Pais and J. Resende, "On Gale and Shapley “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage”," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 3, 2012, pp. 291-293. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.23054.

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