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Analysis of the 2007-2008 Writer’s Guild Strike with Game Theory

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DOI: 10.4236/am.2015.612187    1,908 Downloads   2,213 Views  
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ABSTRACT

In 2007-2008, the writer’s guild of America went on strike in order to receive a better outcome from management. We built a game to analyze the situation. The Nash equilibrium of that game says that the writers should not strike and that management should maintain the status quo. The equilibrium is quite unattractive to the writers leading to a strike and forcing management to negotiate. We illustrate the results in order to gain insights into the process. We demonstrate finding the Nash equilibrium with both ordinal and then cardinal values. We demonstrate a method to find the cardinal values using the analytical hierarchy processes to measure the utility for the strategies. We show finding the prudential strategies and security levels as well as finding threat levels in this example. We show using the threat level in Nash arbitration leads to a better solution for the writers than using the security levels.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

Fox, W. (2015) Analysis of the 2007-2008 Writer’s Guild Strike with Game Theory. Applied Mathematics, 6, 2132-2141. doi: 10.4236/am.2015.612187.

References

[1] Wikipedia (2007) The Writer’s Guild Strike.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Writers_Guild_of_America_strike
[2] “Who Won the Writers’ Strike?” The New York Times.
[3] (2007) “WGA Contract 2007 Proposals”. Writers Guild of America.
[4] Fox, W.P. (2015) An Alternative Approach to the Lottery Method in Utility Theory for Game Theory. American Journal of Operations Research, 5, Article ID: 56610.
[5] Straffin, P. (2004) Game Theory and Strategy. Mathematical Association of America, Washington DC.
[6] von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (2004) Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 60th Anniversary Edition, In: Princeton, N.J., Ed., Princeton University Press, Woodstock.
[7] Satty, T. (1980) The Analytical Hierarchy Process. McGraw Hill, USA.
[8] Nash, J.F. (1950) Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
[9] Nash, J.F. (1950) The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18.
[10] Barron, E.N. (2013) Game Theory: An Introduction. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118547168
[11] Fox, W. (2008) Mathematical Modeling of Conflict and Decision Making: The Writers’ Guild Strike 2007-2008. Computers in Education Journal, 18, 2-11.
[12] Giordano, F., Fox, W. and Horton, S. (2013) A First Course in Mathematical Modeling. 5th Edition, Brooks-Cole, Boston.

  
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