The Principal-Agent Approach to Politics: Policy Implementation and Public Policy-Making ()
Abstract
The principal-agent models may be employed to elucidate central problems in interaction between principals and agents in both policy implementation and public policy-making concerning performance and remuneration. One then hits upon the double principal-agent relationships that are typical of the policy cycle, from policy-making to policy implementation and back: 1) government as principal for agents in public service delivery; 2) the population as principal for political agents under various forms of rulership.
Share and Cite:
Lane, J. (2013) The Principal-Agent Approach to Politics: Policy Implementation and Public Policy-Making.
Open Journal of Political Science,
3, 85-89. doi:
10.4236/ojps.2013.32012.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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