R. T. Boylan, “What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from Careers of US Attorneys,” American Law Economics Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, pp. 379-402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi016

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining

  AUTHORS: Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Bryan C. McCannon

  KEYWORDS: Plea Bargaining; Re-Election; Prosecutor

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.5B, September 30, 2013

  ABSTRACT: In this note, we provide a new explanation for the “failure” of plea bargaining. We show in a model of asymmetric information that a public prosecutor facing re-election takes cases to the courtroom to signal quality even when her welfare (absent retention motivation) is always higher from plea bargaining.