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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: The Affective Moral Judgment

  AUTHORS: Victor Hugo Robles Francia

  KEYWORDS: Moral Judgment, Intuitionist Cognitivism, Moral Emotions

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Philosophy, Vol.8 No.3, May 22, 2018

  ABSTRACT: The affective though and the intuition in moral judgment has been discovered lately (Haidt, 2001). This article analyzes the Moral Judgment theory (Kohlberg, 1964) and the basic logical operations (Piaget, 1950). The rational stages with a few intervention of emotion have been historically assumed by moral judgment theory, which judges the affective as a mistaken notion and as a simple cognitive extension (Greene & Haidt, 2002). This paper demonstrates that the Piagetian basic operations, seriation and categorization are applicable to an affective system. In addition, the intuition is a moral determinant and finally, that neuronal activity confirms an intuitional cognition for the resolution of social problems. It is expected that the present deliberation guides and stimuli researches on the intuition and emotion in moral judgment.