Vaillant, N.G. and Harrant, V. (2008) Determinants of the Likelihood of Finding the Right Partner in an Arranged Marriage: Evidence from a French Matchmaking Agency. Journal of Socio-Economics, 37, 657-671.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.055

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

  AUTHORS: Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Seung Jick Yoo

  KEYWORDS: Arranged Marriage, Effort, Net Utility, Static Game, Strategic Complements

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.7 No.1, December 31, 2016

  ABSTRACT: In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1 and 2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function of individual i as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied by individual j,i ≠ j , in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual’s best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first (second) nation, arranged marriages are uncommon (common) and hence it is relatively difficult (straightforward) for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the second nation.