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has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Administrative Talk to Environmental Supervision in China

  AUTHORS: Ya Chen, Yankun Zhou

  KEYWORDS: Administrative Talk of Environmental Protection, Government Environmental Responsibility, Environmental Law-Enforcing Supervision

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Business and Management, Vol.4 No.4, October 7, 2016

  ABSTRACT: The system of the administrative talk to environmental supervision is one of the internal supervision systems of the new Environmental Protection Law. The ministry of environmental protection has had administrative talks with the main government principals of about thirty cities since 2014 in which year China put forward the concept of new environmental normality. Through analyzing information of administrative talks and environmental data, we find out that the ministry of environmental protection achieved its goals in a mild way by having talks with the main government principals like their mayors without too much direct administrative intervention. Administrative talk of environmental protection has positive influence on solving major environmental problems and strengthening environmental law-enforcing supervision in short term. But practice in establishing the system of executive environmental responsibility and the system of environmental accountability are still needed.