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http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/364056a0

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Lattice Gas Model for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: Emergency of Altruism in a Company

  AUTHORS: Hiroki Yokoi, Ayako Morishita, Yasuo Tateoka, Keiichi Tainaka

  KEYWORDS: Long-Lived Companies, Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Intra-Cellular Interaction, Error Level, Altruism, Happiness of Employees

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.6 No.2, April 28, 2016

  ABSTRACT: In Japan, there exist many sustainable companies. Their distinctive feature is mutualism; they often take altruistic behaviors. To explain such behaviors, we carry out iterated prisoner’s dilemma games by lattice gas model. Each lattice point is regarded as a company which contains m + 1 players with an identical strategy. Simulations reveal that All Cooperation wins, when m takes a value larger than a threshold. We obtain a power law depending on error level. This law implies altruism may prevail in a company which has many employees or high error level.