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Title: |
The Analysis on the Principal-Agency Problem of Professional Liability Insurance for Supervising Engineers |
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Source: |
International Conference on Engineering and Business Management 2012(Part 3 Engineering and Project Management)
(pp 2036-2039)
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Author(s): |
Baolong Li, The Engineering Management Department of Luoyang Institute of Science and Technology, Luoyang, China, 471023;The Engineering Management Department of Management School of Tianjin University, Tianjin, China, 300072 |
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Abstract: |
In China, supervising liability insurance is a brand-new insurance business, and has some characteristics that are different from other insurance business. Due to the information asymmetry in this field, there is principal-agency relation in the development of supervising liability insurance, so there is a need to study the principal-agency problem of supervising liability insurance. However, different from other principal-agency problem, the principal-agency problem of supervising liability insurance is involved with multi-side participation. Also, due to high standard professional skill of supervising engineers, the analysis on the principal-agency problem of professional liability insurance for supervising engineers becomes very difficult. Because project owners play leading role in influencing the behavior selection of supervising engineers, insurance company can only guide the behavior selection of supervising engineers through the feedback of incentive and constraint process.
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