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Title: A Study on Incentive Mechanism of Agent under Uncertain Risk Preference
Source: International Conference on Engineering and Business Management 2012(Part 3 Engineering and Project Management) (pp 1846-1849)
Author(s): Sen Yan, Ningbo Institute of Technology, Ningbo, China, 315211
Jing Peng, Ningbo Institute of Technology, Ningbo, China, 315211
Abstract: Principal-agent theory is essential to establish a scientific incentive mechanism and prevent opportunism behavior. Opportunism behavior of agent closely related to his risk preference. Incentive model with fuzzy degree of risk aversion is brought forward based on the analysis upon uncertainty of the manager’s risk preference, and interval numbers is used to get the solution. Compared with study based on certain models, the model with fuzzy degree of risk aversion reflects uncertainty of risk aversion and adapt to management practice. Finally, some measures to prevent opportunism behaviors of the agent are put forward based on the analysis of the model.
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