|
Author(s): |
Huixuan Lan, School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, SWJTU, Chengdu, China
Yong Ye, School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, SWJTU, Chengdu, China
Xuhui Zhang, School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, SWJTU, Chengdu, China
Xuqian Wen, School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, SWJTU, Chengdu, China |
|
Abstract: |
The domestic and international research show that the principal contradiction of modern corporate is the profit distribution problems of large- minority shareholders or of investors under concentrated ownership structure, not the agency problems of the owner - manager under dispersed ownership structure. With the consecutive victory of minority shareholders in the event of Gome in 2008, people began to focus on the benefit struggle between large and minority shareholders. Under the gradually perfect market system in China, whether second large shareholders exert their function or maintain corporate value. This paper constructs a theoretical model of second large shareholders with the presence of multi-large shareholders. By using the cross-sectional data of over200 A-share listed companies in 2009, this paper makes multi-linear regression analysis on corporate growth model, corporate value model and corporate performance model. The empirical results show: (1) Second large shareholders have significant influence on corporate value. (2)The state-owned nature of second large shareholders has no effect on the corporate value and corporate performance, but has a negative effect on corporate growth. (3)The different character between the largest and second large shareholders has no effect on corporate value.
|