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Tribalism and Fundamentalism: The Two Fundamental Hurdles of Democracy after 2001 in Afghanistan

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Abstract

This paper elucidates the two ideologies that fundamentally lead to the failure of the regimes and often weakened the state: tribalism and religious fundamentalism. Both its social bed is the same and have a key role in returning of the Taliban after 2001. Except for the external supportive factors of the Taliban, the internal factors, the tribalism and fundamentalism and fund hegemonic resources such as Mullahs (clergies) and Madrasas are extremely rooted in the society and in the government that functioned actively to expand the Taliban ideology in the country since the formation of the modern state in Afghanistan (1880). This study also illustrates the return of the Taliban after 20 years of efforts for state-building in the country which proved still that fundamentalism and tribalism consider the main challenge versus state and nation-building in Afghanistan.

Keywords

Tribalism, Fundamentalism, Fatwa, Democracy, Multi-Ethnic

1. Introduction

The society of Afghanistan has been governed by two ideologies as well as considered the big hurdle in the state and nation-building process. First, the political Islam that was supported by religious radical circles under the name of Mullahs (clergies) never had the exact determination of making such a system in Afghanistan, nor exist such an Islamic regime precisely follow Sharia law as the social principle. The second ideology has been tribalism in the context of (Pashtunwali) as the honor code of Pashtuns in Afghanistan. One of the exact examples of tribal perception toward a democratic regime in Afghanistan has been the way as

much as regimes get democratic and pluralistic, the Pashtun elites felt marginalized and threatened by the rest of the ethnicities, and Pashtuns feel in danger lest Pashtuns not lose authority through a free democratic regime in the country. This is a constant delusion of Pashtun elites toward Democracy and democratic regimes to give authority to the people or any regime to recognize multiculturalism (Anwar-ul-Haq, 1995). These two ideologies one way or another challenged institutionalizing of Democracy, and modern phenomena in the country. From tribalism and fundamentalism perspectives, Democracy and democratic values are at odds and can never be in coordination with each other. Pashtuns are living based on tribal values and do not easily accept modern values either if it does not influence and harm their cultural values or consider a threat to their tribal hegemony, thereby they prefer the way of life that their ancestors lived. The fundamentalist perspective also has roots in the tribalistic notion that Islam emerged in Saudi Arabia and Arabs have lived in tribal mechanisms and just have sacred their cultural values codified in under the name of Sharia. Tribalism and religious institutions have been the intertwined hegemonic resources of fundamentalism that the Taliban predominantly represent in Afghanistan and strengthened radical movements. Taliban have always embedded their cultural and tribal codes and totalitarian demand behind Islamic verses and conceptualized them in Islamic values. The utopia of the Taliban has been the formation of Political Islam, the same as the other terrorist organizations desired in Iraq and Syria or Bok haram in Nigeria. All these terrorist organizations sip from the same cup, there is no tangible difference among them in both ideological and approach, however, in Afghanistan Taliban carry tribal weight too. Religious institutions, Mullah/ clergies, tribal leaders, and ethnic elders together attempt the institutionalization of the "Islamic" regime what the Taliban desired in the chart of the Emirate centralized system that in previous chapters precisely the unitary system prose and its cons have been discussed. Even society one way or another unconsciously changed into the hegemonic resource of the Taliban through Mullahs that religious pupils fiscally and daily fed by the mass they are following the fundamentalist principles. Tribal leaders (*bozorg Qawm*) in history had social authority and were considered a quiz-governor in the rural areas that often settle down the tumults and even legal issues through the traditional way of assembly (Jirga) which has been embedded in the constitution. Jirga is the Pashtun tribal way of conflict settlement; however, the Taliban consider it a scholarly gathering that only codifies what is suitable for preserving their ethnic values and tribal hegemony (Ibrahimi, 2019).

2. The Radical Institutions and Their Influence

Darul Ullom, *Darul Hefaz*, *Darul Madrassa*, and *Haqqani schools* stand out as the nation-builder institutions for the Taliban, and *Deobandi schools* direct or indirect these schools were supported by the Taliban, where studied radical "Islam" in Pakistan. The most influential hegemonic resources of the Taliban are

the schools they have been brainwashed there and all these institutions have been at odds with any regimes that put forward the human rights values and the phenomena, Democracy, freedom of speech, women's rights, and election.

> "Islam in Afghanistan is a mix of formal, scholarly Islam, Sufi practice, and traditional and customary practices. 25 The religious landscape was dominated by various traditional expressions of Islam until the 1950s, when, inspired by the growth of Islamist thinking in Pakistan and Egypt, new ideological currents emerged in Afghanistan. These were reinforced by the Afghan resistance to the Soviet-backed communist regime, which—framed in the language of jihad—provided an impetus to the radicalization of the religiopolitical parties in both Afghanistan and Pakistan" (Borchgrevink, 2010).

The religious areas have been in the hands of Mullahs (clergies') that steered the mass and tabooed their perception of religion for the traditional society. The religious area has never been reformed institutionally in the country except for Amanullah Khan's abrupt social reform that *mullahs* stood up and dismantled the reform and his regime, the rest of the regimes in Afghanistan did not have schemes for the religious area to incline the society toward the government that unconsciously exist rivalries between Mullah as the religious segment and the government as the Democracy supporter. Supremacy of customary law in Afghanistan society has been inevitable. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Hazar, Pashtuns, Aimaqs, Ismailis, and Gujar obey the customary law in the Northern part of Afghanistan and have the same approach regarding, murder, adultery, abduction, and theft, the rules come from elders gathering in lite of Sharia law and being obeyed by the rural. According to the International Commission of Jurists, "The formal legal system is simply not the norm governing the lives of the majority of the population. According to the Jurists' report, "the bifurcation of the legal system into an official law and unofficial law has been a hallmark of Afghan legal history ever since attempts were made to introduce statutory laws." The Jurists' report concludes by stating "with some confidence that past experience would suggest that any attempt to implement and enforce secular statutory laws which depart from customary and/or Islamic law is liable to be met with protest and civil unrest." (International Legal Foundation, 2004).

3. Methodology

The research has been conducted based on the qualitative method. Regarding tribalism and fundamentalism as the two predominant hurdles of Democracy often discussed in African state studies, books, articles, and pamphlets clearly illustrate the hegemony of tribes and fundamentalism in general. However, in Afghanistan convergence of Radical groups under the name of Islam and tribalism in multicultural societies uprooted the regimes and empowered tyrannic regimes. Both primary and secondary resources have been used; however, the primary resources collections challenge the research, though most of the primary

resources have been non-English sources.

Tribalism and fundamentalism from two perspectives have been discussed. First, from its incompatibility with the modern phenomenon such as Democracy, and second, the state with tribal values coexistence in the society that clearly illustrated the roots of basic hurdles versus state and reason for state fragility in Afghanistan which often most authors consider and affiliated to external factors, however, in order to prove the hypothesis, the article disused first convergency and interdependence of fundamentalism with the Pashtun tribalism, as well as the concepts which supported both tribalism and fundamentalism.

4. Fundamentalism and Democracy

The religious areas remained unreformed and rough just in hands of clergies/mullahs who in rural areas have extremely admired position as well as their commands has a credibility for the people rather than the government rules and principles. Clergies as the subordinate class of fundamentalism struggled for the monopoly of religion in society and campaigned for the settling of an "Islamic government" in the country, where they have the wrong perception of Political Islam and Islamic values. From the perspective of rule of law, religious institutions as the hegemonic resources of the Taliban with no exception have changed the law obedience in the society. The mullahs' persuaded the mass against the law and the regime often called "the west puppet regime" prioritized the customary law in the society. Persuading the mass for obeying the customary law, making it sacred as well as dissuading them of civil law caused die away the government authority in the rural areas. The regime's negligence in controlling the religious areas in Afghanistan has been an evident shortage of the whole regime. Clergies more than the government have had their influence on society, rather the government must have an on the religious areas. The split of society in the hands of religion and government with tribal and fundamental parameters has been the basic challenge of state-building in the country; however, most authors assume the fragility and collapse of the state have roots in external factors (Borchgrevink, 2010). This argument often comes from the British (1842), the Soviet (1979), and the US interventions by 2001 as well as the regional hegemonic countries' interference in Afghanistan. However, society's mindset throughout the history of war has been under the manipulation of the mullahs. The government was a separate segment that just emphasized polity and political issues.

The modern phenomena such as human rights, Democracy, justice, and patterns that the developed societies are based on architected have never been accepted by the religious circle and tribal areas in Afghanistan, fundamentally in Pashtuns areas. Though these concepts are not in the holy books of the Muslims *Quran*, thus, mullahs frequently have defamed such concepts and called them alien phenomena in society. The clash between fundamentalism and modernism has never been solved nor attempted to settle conflict institutionally by any re-

gime in the country. Modern phenomena and the rational system in the political or social area face two dominant ideologies: fundamentalism and tribalism. Sharia before it has been codified as a social norm in Islam, it was Arabs tribal values, later on, codified and recognized as the whole of Islamic law. On the one hand, this clash exacerbated radicalism, on the other hand sociologically isolated society that fundamentally abrupted any process of state-building not only in Afghanistan as well as in the rest of Islamic countries. The clash between the two civilizations Islam and the West would stay until Islam remains on its retrogressive narrations of social and political form as well as the West too. The clash between civilizations has been warned by Samuel Huntington. The end of the Cold War is undoubtedly one of the most important developments that changed international politics at the end of the 20th century. To understand and analyse the world situation after the Cold War or the "New World Order" in the West, two major theories are optimistic, and the other is alarming. The "end of history" is the end of ideological contradictions and the supremacy of liberal Western Democracy in the whole world. The second theory sees the happy days of the West as fleeting and warns about the danger of an imaginary enemy in the form of a confrontation between the two civilizations of Islam and the West. Francis Fukuyama, the founder of the "end of history" theory, believes that "liberal Democracy" is the final form of government in human societies (Fukuyama, 2012). The history of humanity is also a coherent complex that leads a large part of human society toward liberal Democracy. Fukuyama expresses; the end of history is when the man finds a form of human society and in that the deepest and most basic human needs are fulfilled. Humanity today has reached a point where it cannot imagine a world fundamentally different from the current world because there is no sign of the possibility of fundamentally improving the current order. During the last few years, along with the victory of liberal Democracy over its ideological rivals such as hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism, an important consensus has emerged around the world about the legitimacy of liberal Democracy as the only successful government system. But in addition to that, liberal Democracy may be "the end point of the ideological evolution of humanity" and "the last form of human government" and in this position, constitute the "end of history". In fact, the defeat of communism is the reason for the victory of Western liberal values and the end of ideological conflicts. According to Huntington, the confrontation of civilizations forms the dominant world politics and the last stage of the evolution of the conflicts of the new age. The 1400-year-old enmity between Islam and the West is increasing, and the relations between the two civilizations of Islam and the West are pregnant with bloody incidents. In his book, he states that as long as Islam remains Islam (which it will remain) and as long as the West If the West remains (which seems unlikely), the only factor determining the existing relations between these two huge cultural circles and two different lifestyles will be the fundamental conflict between them. The conflict has determined the relationship between these two cultures for 1400 years. Huntington published the results of a

poll conducted in America to prove the "danger of Islam". In the survey during which the majority of the respondents believed that there is a danger called the danger of Islam. Since the publication of the results of this survey, apparently many people have come to believe it. In response to Mr. Huntington's question, which country is the biggest threat to the United States, Iran, China, and Iraq have taken the top three positions. Huntington divides today's world into different cultural parts and believes that the part of the world that has Islamic culture will be the main potential enemy of the West?! Huntington claims that the Christian-Jewish West in the 21st century politically and economically will be a victim of the imperialist ambitions of the followers of Islam and Confucianism. In short, the main focus of conflicts in the future will be between Western civilization and the union of Confucian societies of the Islamic world, and civilizational conflicts are the last stage of the evolution of conflicts in the modern world. Huntington continues to emphasize his pessimistic view about the future of relations between civilizations and talks about the failure of the nation-state as the main unit of international relations, the intensification of nationalist tensions, the increasing tendency to conflict, the increase of weapons of mass destruction, and the growth of disorder in the world. There will be domestic politics, ethnic politics, and global politics, but all of them will be a function of "civilizational politics". Huntington also states:

> In the post-Cold War world, the main and central countries of every civilization will replace the superpowers of the Cold War era. "World power" has no meaning anymore. The formation of the future world based on civilizations is certain and there is no escape from it. According to Huntington, Muslims believe that Western culture is a materialistic and corrupt culture, and ultimately a degree of decadence and immorality, and they also believe that this corrupt civilization has characteristics that, taking those characteristics into account, should be resisted as much as possible against the changes that this culture brings (Huntington, 1997: pp. 109-120).

Muhtasibs is the circle that oversees the morale of society. Along with Amir Abdul Rahman (1880-1901) came to power, found himself in conflict with the religious establishment that issued a *fatwa* (religious order) *against* him to raise people against the king though according to religious circles Abdul Rahman was the nominee of the British, as well as the aristocrats also support the "Mullahs" Fatwa versus Abdul Rahman and his regime as the British puppet regime. The rebellion against the regime originated from religious establishments against the King that caused Abdul Rahman to control the religious area and limit the aristocrats at the same time religious circle that hitherto were exempted from taxation and other privileges that they imposed somewhat on masses through religious weapons (Ghani, 1978: p. 276). The second measure against the religious establishment that could lead the country toward modernity and today might not happen that Afghanistan came under the control of a retrogressive group the Taliban was establishing a committee to consider the knowledge and competen-

cy of clergies based on a platform they could pass an exam to get *Awqaf* (religious endowment). Reform by the Amani regime regarding religious establishment was a kind of expansion of autonomy and rule of law in the country that then has been considered a crucial challenge against government and modernity, however, the regime after 2001 did not realize and considered as a hurdle against the government or as the main factor of regimes collapses in the country (Shahrani, 2005).

Tribal aristocracy and religious establishments both had close ties with each other throughout history, and both have been in support of each other predominantly leading the national revolt against regimes both aristocrats or tribal leaders and religious establishments enjoyed extensive economic and moral power in the society. Abdul Rahman (1880-1901) at the beginning of his throne faced aristocrats and religious establishments that had authority over the society, challenged the king's authority, and issued a fatwa against the king that led to conflict between religious establishment plus aristocrats and the king in Kandahar southern part of Afghanistan. After the execution of the rebels who were raised based on cleric the fatwa, the king proved his authority and inclined the society toward his regime. Tribal leaders among Pashtuns still enjoy power and honor in the society that Pashtun community without Pashtunwali culture is not an ideal society for a Pashtun. Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan lived with a mixture of tribal and fundamental Islam species and Sharia as the cultural code of Arab as well as the sacred social norm has been in support of each other. The Taliban as a fundamentalist group and tyrant regime misuses the Sharia law, whereas wholly what the Taliban are representing is Pashtun tribal values that do not relate precisely to Islamic law (Sharia). Banning girls' schools, strict restrictions against women, hanging the detainees, and avoiding modernity is coming from the tribal notion of Pashtuns in Afghanistan[1], although the Quran and Hadith both explicitly discussed women's rights and learning knowledge as the key and fundamental rights of women in Islam has been incumbent to all women and man, however, Pashtuns in a tribal form never allow women to have activity in the society as the Taliban today function in Afghanistan (Allen & Vanda, 2020). "The Afghan tribal leaders, and influential personalities in the tribes, subtribes, clans, and villages more generally, who support the Taliban in the south and the east. The strongest supporters of the Taliban in these areas are individuals affiliated with the tribes belonging to the Ghilzai confederation, although some members of the smaller deprived Durrani tribes such as the Alizai, Ishaqzai, and Noorzai support the Taliban strongly as well" (Tellis, 2009: p. 17). The "brotherhood" concept has been emphasized in Islamic knowledge that comes from Arab tribalism and at the same time it is prevalent in Pashtunwali too (the cultural code of Pashtuns). Taliban after 2001 were called brothers by Hamid Karzai and Ghani lastly released from the dungeon which indicates a deep tribal eye to the Taliban. From Abdul Rahman to Ashraf Ghani's last col-

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[1]Munir Akram's speech Pakistan represents in United Nation
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AjVayxdgy9Y.

lapsed administration by 15ᵗʰ August 2021 in Afghanistan has had the same approach toward religious establishments and Pashtun tribal figures that either challenged the regimes or steered the mass against regimes. The hegemony of tribal aristocrats and religious establishments in Afghanistan has been tabooed by the government itself. The authoritarian and democratic regimes, in general, plead for the aristocrats who had natural social support in society, and the regimes to use them to the favor of the government preserved these circles' delusive dignity in society. However, by exchange Tribal aristocrats infiltrated the government and used their social position in it (Ghani, 1978).

The previous chapter discussed political regime failure in Afghanistan since the formation of the modern state that tribal views with a mixture of Islamic fundamentalism annihilated the regimes whether the regimes were democratic or non-democratic. However, after 2001 the introduced Democracy of the United States in Afghanistan faced the same challenge the regimes by 1960. Sympathy with the Taliban within the last 20 years specific affiliate with the tribal calculation in the country that even technocrats who had been integrated into western society and aware of pluralism and Democratic values, however, they used the ethnic card in the political arena broaden the ethnic cleavage and rifts, whereas the diaspora expected to pave the ground for the institutionalization of Democracy and fair statecraft in Afghanistan. This chapter going to illustrate the roots of tribalism in Afghan political history and regimes and fundamentalism hegemonic sources that both concepts have one way or another kept at bay the society from the government and consider the basic social and political hurdle.

5. Religious order (Fatwa) and Political Legitimacy

With due attention to social manners and political culture in Afghanistan, Mullahs/clergies seem to have been in convergence and dependency with the politicians and leaders. In most political cases politicians often used the Mullah's *Fatwa* (religious order) for manipulating the mass. Instantly, mullahs in the elections campaign often brought to convey and hold speeches on the religious aspects of elections and strengthen the position of the candidates. Furthermore, Fatwa and the sector giving religious order often did not officially have a role in the government, however, after 2001 the government established Mullah's council (*Ulama Shura*) in the government for strengthening the government policies and in order to open liaison with the religious sector. The *Ulama Shura* (council) was established in 2002 for the cohesion of religious circles as well as Jihadist figures to represent the nondemocrat segment. The council had representatives in 34 provinces' top-down way of management and the main task of the council was to enlighten the rules based on Sharia law and responsibly serve the society of the religious area. The composition of the council predominantly is Sunnis and sizable Shiites who both consider a customary law observer and rules which are aligned to Sharia.

6. Tribalism and Democracy

Tribalism is often affiliated with Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Except for Pashtuns the rest of the nationalities are not living according to tribal lines and rules. Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek, and other ethnicities urbanized and devoid of tribal mindsets, however, Pashtuns are living based on tribal codes and principles that took the chance of any development and entering the rational system into the community. For clarification of the concept as well as its influence on state-building and nation-building processes in Afghanistan, first, need to define Tribalism.

What is tribalism and how does it threaten Democracy? and how it has been a hurdle for development and modern phenomena? Tribalism in most of the multicultural and modern states assumed an evil concept that has been inimical to progress and development. The term originally stems from the Latin *Tribus and* did not refer to a group of people with a common interest, rather the term has been used in the political area of Public Administration in ancient Rome. However, the uses of the terms in modern era "tribe" and "tribalism" particularly traced back to European colonialism anthropology (Ojiaku, 1972; Rogers, 2019).

Although in other chapters ethnic rivalry as a predominant hurdle of state-building and nation-building has been discussed, however, of another angle tribalism from both religious and ethnic perspectives matters in Afghanistan. A responsible government never found the chance to build a nation-state based on Democratic values in the country. Most authors link this question to external phenomena and hegemonies involved in competition in Afghanistan and the region. However, what has fundamentally threatened the nation-state in Afghanistan has been a single ethnic totalitarian demand and it's a vehement attempt for gaining political power in the country and define themselves as superior ethnicity to the rest of other ethnicities.

The incompatibility of Democracy and Tribalism according to Frances Fukuyama begins with the way and method of living Democracy qualifies the living way and decision-making for their political life, however, "tribalism" undermines democratic attitudes in general. The contestable argument is which attitudes are considered democratic. Democracy of Greek origin and its focal point is the political arrangement that people matter. Aristotle defined Democracy "rule of the people" and that justice and equal share is a core principle of Democracy.

"What is held to be Democracy or rule of the people above all is what results from the sort of justice that is agreed to be democratic, which is all having equal share on the basis of number. "Under a democratic system, there is "election to all offices from among all," with most offices "of short duration"; governance is based upon the "rule of all over each, and of each overall in turn"; and "the assembly," not specific individuals, have "authority over all matters or the greatest" (Davis, 2020: p. 44).

The theory of "social contract" is the philosophical basis of the modern state and the rational foundation of the establishment of the state. According to this

theory, humans have lived in a hypothetical state called a "natural state" in a disorderly and free state in nature, then with rational knowledge and considering the benefits of order and law, they obey the government and sacrifice their "natural liberties". And step into the range of "individual freedoms" that the government's power and order are limiting and at the same time guaranteeing. Therefore, the "social contract" is an unwritten compromise between the members of a society and is based on the "will of all" to act with mutual responsibility in their relations under the rule of the government, and it is based on this implicit "contract" that the government emerges. It should be kept in mind that the will of all, in the beginning, meant the will of all property owners or taxpayers, which usually did not include women, the unemployed, and the poor. Tribalism often acts against the social contract, unlike preferring ethnic or tribal values and ignoring rules, and principles. This social contract which is the core discussion of Democracy that the options are in the hand of the people to legitimize and delegitimize the government in democratic societies, however according to Francis Fukuyama Tribalism threaten Democracy and democratic values as well as threatens the way of living in democratic societies. According to Fukuyama, the birthplace and cradle of pluralism in Europe are fracturing into segments which all rift origin of tribalism by the right-wing parties in Europe and the United States as the Democracy and its values patron state. The right-wing in Europe intimidates the tribal visionary in the society, this caused nationalities and minorities to redefine their identity and pay attention to the phenomenon that has been discussed already. The redefinition and paying attention to the US minorities happened in the United States and blacks and Indians feel like a separate segment and marginalized tribe that according to (Fukuyama) "Identity politics is no longer a minor phenomenon, playing out only in the rarified confines of university campuses or providing a backdrop to low-stakes skirmishes in "culture wars" promoted by the mass media. Instead, identity politics has become a master concept that explains much of what is going on in global affairs" (Fukuyama, 2018). Afghanistan and Afghan identity is a historical debate that still considers a fundamental key issue for nation-state-building. The response regarding identity in Afghanistan, unlike Fukuyama, explains and calls tribalism a threat to liberal Democracy and public administration in the West, however, the Pashtun tribalism in Afghanistan on the one hand, ignored the rest of the minorities' rights, on the other hand, considered a formidable challenge versus state and democratic regimes in the country throughout history. The Democratic regimes and autocratic regimes overall in Afghanistan throughout history refrained from recognizing a multicultural society, though the wrong delusion regarding a multicultural society still exists as the term that threat "Afghan" nationalism. Recognition of Afghanistan as a multicultural society has two fundamental enemies: first centrality of power transaction forms an ideal multicultural society by its real meaning in the country, though always power and tribal vision regarding gaining power has been ethnic, either transaction of power been through the election, however, still tribal visionary influenced upon the power.

Conflict and miserably of Democracy and elections in Afghanistan have not been due to external as often authors claim, thereby, taking the chance of a multicultural and Democratic society such as Indian society with numerous sects, religions, and ethnicity living peacefully together. Secondly, the ethnicities' worldview differences in the account of the development and state, the Tajiks, Hazara, and Uzbek welcomed Democracy, Development, and modern patterns for reforming and evolution of their society, however, on the one hand, regional and global hegemonies harbored the Pashtuns and considered them as the dominant ethnicity in Afghanistan, by Pashtun diaspora instantly the United States of America. The U.S. Democratization in Afghanistan was based on the wrong calculation of precise information that Pashtuns are the major ethnicity of Afghanistan, apparently, they ought to be in the power, with this perception supported by a centralized regime handled with Afghan American Diaspora Hamed Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. Both presidents Afghan American diaspora despite their academic background and living based on Democratic values in Democratic countries did not plan to build a state to embed all ethnicities to live in tranquility and unity in Afghanistan, and vice-versa, the stressed on *Afghani-yat*, (Afghan-ness) which ended wrong among a multiethnic society. The second point which negatively created stereotypes among ethnicity by diaspora raised tribal autocracy in the chart of Democracy imposed on the non-Pashtun ethnicity and even marginalized the Uzbek, Hazara, and Tajik leaders (Sadat, 2008).

7. Taliban and Tribalism

On fifteen August 2001, the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan after a long period of a 20-year battle with the "Democratic regime" supported by the world community. The collapse of power into the Taliban hand in Afghanistan brought the attention of most political science scholars regarding modern state-building in Afghanistan. The fragility and collapsing of the state in Afghanistan are considered a tribal challenge that restricted Afghanistan's progress toward a developed state by others saying modern nation-state (Li, Geng, & Zhang, 2022). Roughly fifty ethnicities have been recognized in Afghanistan however, fourteen one recognized officially by the constitutions, and the four ethnicities are the major ethnics in the country, Hazara, Uzbek, Tajik, and Pashtuns which all are the most active groups in the political arena, the Pashtuns preserved their tribal values officially in the county, however, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara's left behind their tribal values and attitudes toward government and however the Pashtuns preserved tribal values in both political and social way of life. In the Pashtun Tribal form, Khan, the one who is landlord, and *Malik* who is one step further than Khan is a privileged circle that leads Jirgas' "gathering" however, among Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara do not exist tribal values and rules both in the social a political arena (Shahrani, 2005: pp. 24-26; Glatzer, 2002: pp. 5-9). Religious values come after tribal values in the political dialogue, though the politic of Afghanistan, in general, has been influenced by ethnic and tribal perceptions as well as ethnicity comprise the stable pillar of political competition in the

country. The Khan and by Pashtu called *Spinger* the elder of the tribe plays an official role in the society. All regimes throughout history in order to solve the conflict and exert official rule leaned on tribal elders. Since the formation of modern Afghanistan, Abdul Rahman by 1983 to stabilize its authority paid for the men and women of tribal leaders. According to Faiz Mohamad Katib, Afghanistan was in awful economic circumstances that Abdul Rahman took decisions regarding tribal leaders' and aristocrats' monthly payments (BBC, Ayub Arwin, 2013).

The state-building process of 2001 by the Americans in Afghanistan showed that the government introduced a system that recognized the tribe elders or *Spinger* (white beard) as the official sources. The tribal elders have had a considerable role in the management of the fundamental project in rural areas. They have the ability to mass cohesion in their sub-region, as well as a traditional society considers them as the admired circle. The elders of the tribe and aristocrats can hold Jirga for conflict resolution. This role has been preserved by the government throughout history, at the same time, the tribes have a tangible role in terms of state-building in the failed states, precisely in Afghanistan "Although tribal leadership is decentralized and diffuse, tribal identities can still be mobilized by charismatic leaders. It is often the case, however, that those individuals who are able to mobilize tribes into cohesive political movements gain positions in strictly non-tribal organizations. Such leaders emerge as heads of political parties, business groups, or armed factions." (Dininio, Murtazshvili, & Carter, 2010).

Taliban are representing the pure tribal segment of Pashtun society in Afghanistan that follow up the fundamental tribal principles of Pashtunwali: *Nang, Melmastia, badal, Turburwali, Jirga, and nanawati* these principles are not written principles rather it is an unwritten law that the elder by word of mouth preserves the Pashtunwali principles, however, these principles embodied in the chart of Sharia and Islamic principal "Jirga" "Shura Olama" means religious leaders' decisions concerning the nation fate and political issue (Mohiuddin, 2016). "There are no permanently fixed places on the Pashtun genealogical tree and no eternal unchanging tribal institutions. Much of what is told about them are myths idealized versions of a golden past that probably never existed in a pure form and definitely not across the Pashtun areas in the same way. Versions of Pashtunwali differ by locale. They are locally called *nirkh* which means price and refers to the different prices used to settle blood feuds, i.e., Badal, which means exchange" (Ruttig, 2010). The Taliban on the one hand accommodates single ethnic principles or tribal values in the country, on the other hand, they accommodate the "Sharia" law and called the "Islamic Emirate system" or the Emirate political system of Islam, whereas the abhorrent and nonhumanitarian approach of the Taliban against the non-Pashtun ethnicities shows an ethnic rift in the country, rather affiliate it to the fundamental Islam or Islamic radicalism. In tribal visionary of the Taliban ethnicities of Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara somehow are condemned for being an open society that they are more enlightened

than the closed society of Pashtun. Taliban and their governance are based on two values; tribal values and considering themselves superior to the rest of ethnicities, as throughout history the Pashtun leaders enslaved Hazaras and suppressed ethnicities.

Afghanistan ethnicities except for Shia predominantly Hazara, the Sunnis are following the Hanafi sect the Taliban either is Sunnie, however' their governance system and approach with other ethnicities are at odds with the Hanafi sect rules, though, tribal vision upon the rest of ethnicities enough strong that ignore their willing's and rarely seems what Imam Abu Hanifa advice about Islamic manner, however, Taliban purposefully wants to embed a single ethnic tribal value in Sharia to make sacred until people accept it.

In a recent book by Abdul Hakim Haqqani, one of the Taliban officials wrote regarding the Taliban ideology their battle against the post-Taliban regime, and the characteristics of Talib soldiers. He emphasizes Pashtun culture and defines "real Pashtun as the one who strictly fights and never accepts surround, never letting others get superior to them, ultimately they are very offensive". These are the elements that exist in Pashtunwali the cultural code of Pashtuns, however, Haqani affiliates with good Muslim characteristics or Mujahid. Taliban after taking power commit numerous atrocities and killings of innocent people based on ethnic calculation. The society of Afghanistan and ethnicities unconsciously categorized, that Pashtuns possess the Talib, and tribal identity, while mentioning Pashtun, everyone reminds Taliban, at the same time when words come to Hazara, people think of an enlightened ethnic. The society of Afghanistan according to the Taliban is inclined society to Paganism and wrong Western social manner though, in the twenty years of Western allies' countries' presence in Afghanistan, the society's manner changed to a Western manner. Thereby the society manner Afghanistan people ought to be changed to Islamic and steer the people toward an Islamic manner. This argument rather relies on a more precise point of view of the Sharia than any other rational sources; it relies on a tribal perspective regarding women.

The closed society and open society differences in Afghanistan relate to ethnicities and the worldview of each ethnicity Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara, and Uzbek varying from each other, though, they belong to different cultures, and each gets their own worldview toward modern Phenomena. Tajiks, Hazara, and Uzbeks also use the same method as Pashtuns hold gathering for conflict resolution in rural areas, however, there is no precise cultural code to be observed in and named Jirga as Pashtuns do. *Begs*, *Arbabs*, *and Khan* are common words for those who locally have natural authority in the sub-regions and hold gatherings and these concepts are common almost in all ethnicities, however, with different approaches and visions (International Legal Foundation, 2004). The feature of the closed society that the Taliban are representing is "A herd or a tribe in being a semi-organic unit whose members are held together by semi-biological ties—kinship, living together, sharing common efforts, common dangers, common joys, and common distress" (Balcerczyk, 2018; Ibrahimi, 2019: p. 47).

8. Conclusion

Tribalism and fundamentalism as the two predominant phenomena in Afghanistan society have been influential hurdles against the state and development throughout history. Fragility and collapse of the state have had social and political aspects that in both realms a compound of tribal and fundamental Islam was changed into an influential norm that changed the society in favor of radical Islam. Albeit external factors have increased the radical and tribal notions in the country that lead to a bottom-up change in the society. The bottom-up radicalization from a religious perspective begins with Madaras which Mullahs lead these institutions often in the country and recruit poor families' young boys and girls to educate "Islamic knowledge". Poverty and lack of awareness of rural people of Islamic Knowledge caused to religious agents recruit them easily and radicalize the rural areas. Most of the religious institutions hence 2001 were established in rural areas to manipulate the major segment of society that nearly seventy percent of Afghanistan's people are living in rural areas. However, the demand for the religious establishment and "Islamic education" is varying. The Southern part of Afghanistan which dominantly are Pashtuns, different than the central parts of Afghanistan are the Hazaras, by another saying the Tajik and Uzbek community are not willing of religious schools' establishment as Pashtuns are.

The convergence between tribalism and fundamentalism in Afghanistan seems that both phenomena support each other's and there is no rift among these values. In other definitions, tribalism and fundamentalism have had permanent affiliations that according to findings tribalism and fundamentalism are the two fundamental and rooted challenges in Afghanistan that both nurtured each other values versus modern values such as Democracy, secularism, and the state as a rational mechanism. From the political perspective that leadership in a centralized political system has been under the control of Pashtuns as a tribal community that lives based on tribal values preserved officially in the country the norms which could strengthen radical patterns. Secularism as a rational concept was a condemned concept that from both perspectives radicalism and tribalism considered an alien phenomenon too. These concepts of believers increased in society by the political figures and populism as well as both have been an object for external factors too.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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