



# On Standardizing Philanthropy

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Received 20 February 2015; accepted 7 March 2015; published 11 March 2015

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## Abstract

**Philanthropies and governments traditionally share power relations. While governments exercise their power to rule by regulations, philanthropies, on the other hand, perceive government involvement, through regulation, as a way to reduce their power. In order to bridge these two forces that don't necessarily share similar interests, a third party is needed. This external agency should set guiding standards for philanthropies to follow as well as for the cooperation between the government and the philanthropists. This paper is an attempt to understand in depth the knowledge base of this relationship, and the standards that should be determined.**

## Keywords

**Philanthropy, Government, Israel**

**Subject Areas: Law, Politics, Sociology**

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## 1. Introduction

Philanthropies and governments traditionally share power relations. Harriman (1909) in Limor (2010) [1] argues that one of the ways governments exercise their power to rule is by regulations. Assuming that if they don't use their power to regulate, another "social agent" will take the initiative and use the legal vacuum to make decisions in his favor, and therefore, will rule de-facto. Philanthropies, on the other hand, perceive government involvement, through regulation, as a way to reduce philanthropists' power (Anheier and Leat, 2006) [2].

Even though the interrelationship between philanthropies and the Israeli government is very similar to the interaction between these two bodies in North America and the Western European countries, the Israeli model has unique characteristics, given the geographical factors and socio-culture climate.

In order to bridge these two forces that don't necessarily share similar interests, a third party is needed who will be responsible for balancing the power relation and serving the public's best interests. This external agency should set guiding standards for philanthropies to follow as well as for the cooperation between the government and the philanthropists. These standards will be determined both by government's and philanthropy's representatives whose activities should be encoed by law.

This paper is an attempt to understand the relationships between the government and philanthropic organiza-

tions. In the balance of this paper, I provide a definition of philanthropy followed by a theoretical exploration of the relationship between philanthropies and the government. I characterize the Israeli case in relation to the interaction by providing recent examples. Drawing upon the examples, I seek to fill the gap by suggesting core standards that will shed light on the nature of government-philanthropies cooperation and bridge limitations and difficulties.

## 2. What Is Philanthropy?

Philanthropy is mostly defined in social terms. It is considered as the act of giving, motivated by altruism and caring for the other with no expectation for a reward. The goal of philanthropy is an enhanced well-being of members of the society (Katz, Levinson and Gidron, 2006) [3]. It is further viewed as a mutual responsibility of the society and the government which is reflected by encouraging people to promote social goals (Limor, 2008) [4]. It is noteworthy that philanthropy is usually associated with specific social classes being defined as an institution of the social and economic elite that relates to the formal donation of money, assets and volunteering which is directed towards supporting organizations (Rudich, 2007) [5].

Beyond the basic definition, philanthropy is also defined in economic and political terms. From this point of view, foundations are perceived as private assets that do more than serving social needs. Rather, these organizations work to increase financial profits and political power (Anheier and Leat, 2006 [2]; Roelofs, 2003 [6]).

Anheier and Leat (2006) [2] explain that historically there are three major types of philanthropies. The first type is called Charity, and it aims at dealing with poverty, health-care and social services for those individuals who are unable to support themselves. Charity is argued to be a complimentary service along with the government social security support (Anheier, 2006 [7]; Karl and Karl, 1999 [8]; Sealander, 1997 [9]; Lagemann, 1999 [10]).

A further point to consider is that the second type of philanthropy that Anheier and Leat (2006) [2] describe is an improved version of Charity that aims at dealing and solving the causes to poverty rather than the symptoms of it. This type is being referred to as philanthropic/science foundation approach (Anheier and Toepler, 1999 [11]; Smith and Borgmann, 2001 [12]; Bulmer, 1995 [13], 1999 [14]; Karl, 1997 [15]). According to this approach philanthropic foundations become engineering of social solutions which support long term goals such as education and research rather than immediate solutions.

The third approach of philanthropy has embraced business approaches to block criticism of ineffectiveness of the existing philanthropies. These foundations are called strategic philanthropies or venture philanthropies. Anheier and Leat (2006) [2] portray them as the new-scientific philanthropy. The assumption for the approach was increasing the efficiency of these organizations in financial terms. Yet, one of the clear drawbacks of such a model is a lack of understanding of their role in democratic systems (Emerson, 2004 [16]; Carrington, 2002 [17]; Reis and Clohesy, 2001 [18]; Breiteneicher and Marble, 2001 [19]).

The characteristics of the third type of philanthropy are based on utilizing the principals, values and definitions of business practices. The goal of applying business practices to philanthropic projects is ensuring effective use of the money and high return of investment. These philanthropists do not function according to the charity model as they don't see themselves as fundraisers of the government whose job is to raise money for governmental initiatives. Rather, they would like to be involved in managing the funds, supervising the process and designing social policy (Rudich, 2007 [5]; Hess, 2005 [20]; Shimoni, 2008 [21]).

Simply stated, the most prevalent idea behind the activities of foundations is increasing social pluralism. Therefore, their most pursued goals are: reducing social, economic, and educational gaps, economic gaps, helping people in need, and developing innovative ideas.

Yet, foundations are not to be generalized as they have many manifestations that vary in sizes, goals and activities. Hence, due to the plenitude of versions very little is known about them. Despite the variation in these organizations, many have shared characteristics such as their financial assets, grant making and the fact that they support projects that are sometimes expected to be supported by others or to be profitable in the short run. In this context, the desirable line of action should be supporting projects in the long run and practices of marathon runners rather than rally sprinters.

## 3. The Relationship between Philanthropies and Governments

The naïve way to perceive the philanthropies-government relationship is that philanthropies provide additional

resources, such as funds, expertise, or direct services that supplement governmental resources. There is a commonly held assumption that this interaction creates a more optimal use of both public and private funds, and that as a result government policy is indirectly promoted. However, a more reasoned attitude reveals that foundations interfere with democratic processes as they are involved in governmental activities, social activities as well as in business activities. By being deeply involved in different domains of the public sphere, and supplementing governmental funds, when insufficient, they assume the role of the government, what causes instable relationships between these two forces, mainly because of the lack of systematic communication (Anheier and Toepler, 1999 [11]; Anheier and Leat, 2002 [22]; Klijn and Teisman, 2004 [23]; Bryson *et al.*, 2006) [24].

To frame the discussion, the power relationship between the governmental and foundation systems can be sort out into four paradigms that represent ideal types. The first, the government is being perceived as having the primary responsibility on social issues. The second, the foundations are part of the governmental system. According to the third, the state shares the social services with the foundations, and finally, liberal paradigm such as in the US where the foundation system is parallel to the government but funds stream to the main government projects (Anheier and Toepler, 1999) [11].

What's more, it is often assumed that philanthropic organizations do not understand their role in democratic society and that they don't have the resources or the mandate to fill in the gaps that government cannot provide (Anheier and Leat, 2002) [22]. This misperception creates problems in the relationship. Conflicts may also arise when the government is being asked to fund a project in which it was not a partner in choosing the innovation, when a government is partly funding a project and the foundation is a contractor, or when the government is a partner but has no control over the implementation of the project.

To better the interaction, some suggestions are made in the literature. Ylvisaker (1987) [25] posits that the interaction between foundations and the government should include funding programs regardless the participation of the government in the venture, funding programs and use the foundation's influence to promote the plan to execute them by using government approvals, and even promoting projects independently from the government.

Another pragmatic solution is that philanthropic organizations alter their priorities to be able to support with money and time projects that have the promise of changing how an issue is viewed or handled. They refer to this as "creative grant-making" (Anheier and Leat, 2002, 2006). They believe that foundations need to rely less on governmental responsibilities and allocates more space of private institutions serving the public benefit.

Governments, on the other hand, are expected to enhance the philanthropic activities as they get money, political power, and innovative projects. (Gidron *et al.*, 2006) [26]. The most common method of enhancing these activities is by reducing tax and restrictions. Nevertheless, this kind of exemption is perceived as another benefit to the foundations. Foundations fall into the category of tax-inefficient means of achieving public benefits, and their tax-exempt status seems difficult to justify unless they meet clearly specified public needs and conform to government programs (Roelofs, 2003) [6].

#### 4. The Israeli Case

Historically, the Israeli governments tended to channel philanthropic resources according to their agenda and needs, limiting the direct streaming of funds from the philanthropists to their destination for taxation and control. Recently a change of attitude in the level of governmental control has started to take place. The change is reflected in three regulation processes (Limor, 2008 [4]; Limor, 2010; Katz, Levinson and Gidron, 2007) [3], all of which symbolize a change of priorities towards a more socially just society.

The first process includes the separation of the government from issues it was traditionally involved, enabling the market to function according to the capitalistic model of Western countries. This policy resulted in widening the social gaps due to limited governmental subsidized welfare and increased privatization of public assets. The second process was strengthening the rule of law. The legal system which was forced to be involved in the relationship between the individual, the corporation and government served as a drive to revised and increased regulatory procedures. The first two processes brought about a third change—the establishment of government agencies and committee who served under the law with the goal of supervising and guarding the best interest of the government, who regained the power to manage public resources and services for the benefit of the public.

Nonetheless, overregulation can also pose a threat that derives from the self interests of the bureaucracy to justify its own presence and cost. In that case inefficient regulation may cause more damage than not using it at all. For example, one of the identifying characteristic of bureaucracy is form filling which is time and money

consuming, and is not an efficient tool in preventing corruption (Eisner, 2000) [27]. As a result, it may jeopardize competitiveness and discourage entrepreneurship (Meier, 1985 [28]; Meier and Keiser, 1997 [29]).

A distinction should be made between internal and external regulation. While internal regulation is done by the philanthropic organization itself based on standards set by the government, external regulation is carried out by an external body or committee that aims at increasing the transparency of philanthropies and third sector organizations. In this context, “Guidestar” is an important organization to mention as it serves as a mediator that publishes financial reports of philanthropies, making them available to the public. Still, the mediating job does not include making reports comprehensible to the ones interested in its meaning.

## 5. Exemplifying the Israeli Case

Tracking the activities of philanthropies in Israel is difficult since the legal status of philanthropies is regulated in “clause 46” of the Israel Internal Revenue command 1996. The clause is a general clause for all non-profit organizations, and therefore, does not specify the status of foundations and its activities. This legal status created a situation in which philanthropic activities in Israel are mostly private endeavors. For example, Mr. Nuchi Dankner, the owner of I.D.B., is involved in large-scale philanthropic projects. According to news reports, he funded the distribution of food boxes to IDF soldiers during the Lebanon war. He was involved in establishing the trauma center in Rambam Hospital, and some other projects in Northern Israel such as funding youth centers, computer laboratories, grants for students and more (according to the Arie Avineri’s blog). Sherry Arison, and Arkady Geedemiack were reported in the news as taking part in philanthropic activities as well.

More importantly, these activities are examples to the third model of philanthropy described earlier, which is also known as the business model philanthropy. Researchers (Anheire and Leat, 2006) have named this kind of philanthropy as “New Philanthropy”. New Philanthropy mostly refers to philanthropists who earned their wealth in high-tech business (Shimoni, 2008 [21]; Colvin, 2005 [30]), and therefore have the perception that the management of social project should be rooted in the business models of giving. To illustrate, according to The-Marker (June, 2011) [31] during the year of 2001, business people; Dov Dovrat, Arik Ben-Chemo, Benie Levin, Itzik Denzinger, and Nir Barkat, established a fund named IVN whose mission was to promote education and social entrepreneurship using business models. Another example is Avi Naor. According to The-Marker (June, 2011) [31], Naor is active in “Green Light” (an organization that is working towards preventing car accidents in Israel) and “Oren” (an organization which is helping high-risk teenagers). In both organizations Naor is both a leading funder and involved in the evaluating the effective use of the donations. In addition, the family fund of “Gandir”. Under this capacity, she both contributes money and takes part in the efforts of the fund.

In fact, the consequences of the interrelationship between the business approach to philanthropy and the governmental approach lead to power relationship between the philanthropists and the government. One the one hand, government officials, who are ready to cooperate and invest in social projects, assume that they have the ability to see the big picture while philanthropists observe the local needs of specific populations in specific regions. Government officials also feel that it is not the role of the philanthropy to be involved in policy making processes. For them, philanthropists are arrogant and patronizing.

Two striking examples demonstrate the way the business approach is rooted values of philanthropies. The first is the “Yaniv” venture that started in 2003 when funders first approached high ranked politicians such as the Prime Minister and Ministers in the Cabinet, expecting that their informal relationship with government officials will promote the goals of the venture and make this initiative a national project. The funders made a commitment to raise 250 million dollars within five years. However, despite the sympathy of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and members of the Cabinet, when no practical step was taken by the government, the philanthropists decided to minimize the development of the project in 2004 and finally stop it in 2007. On another occasion, with “Avnei Rosh” which is a social initial that started in 2008 to promote the Israeli educational system by focusing on training schools principles won more than just the sympathy of the government. In this case, because this venture was brought to the knowledge of the government in very advanced stages of planning, the government co-financed the project and approved it. These examples elucidate how the business model both assists and limit the interaction between philanthropies and the government.

On the other hand, new philanthropists, who are able to informally access politicians and government officials, have their own point of view. They presume that their money should be invested in projects that can be supervised and evaluate by them using the business models of efficacy. Philanthropists are aware of government criti-

cism claiming that rather than replacing the government, their job is to be change making agents and catalysts for transforming the public system. For example, the Ofer family whose annual donations reach 10 million dollars established a foundation along with 80 businessmen with the intent to promote the peace process. Another example is the Vertheimer family which donates a dozen million dollars per year for different causes and whose key figure serves as the head of the advising committee to the minister of commerce and industry. Dov Lautman is another example for the philanthropists imposing goals and policy directing his resources to promoting the equality between Jews and Arabs.

To wrap this subsection, in essence, the power relationship between these two forces represents a philosophical perception between the charity model and the business model of philanthropy. While philanthropists are depicted by government officials as charity givers who should give away their money without the involvement in managing it, new philanthropists insists on cooperating with the government under the business model of having control over planning, assessing and implementing the goals of the project.

## 6. The Standards

The ability of the philanthropies to take a central part in designing social policy has changed the attitude toward them from a private player who is giving an individual donation to an actor whose altruistic efforts should be subjected to study and examination as in any other public affairs (Hess, 2005) [20]. Because government officials perceive philanthropists as trespassing into government policy making, standards are needed in the government-philanthropist interaction (Almog-Bar-Bar and Zichlinzky, 2010) [32] to help set specific guidelines to be followed thoroughly.

Generally speaking, any strategic partnership between philanthropies and the government should include all the players in the arena. Therefore, determining the appropriate standards should be a mutual endeavor based on the standards which will be specified further in the paper. To illustrate, in the “Yaniv” initiative that focused on at-risk kids a strategic committee was formed in which many representatives from different government offices took part (welfare, education, health, absorption, treasury, homeland security, and defense), in addition to health and psychology professionals specializing in at risk adolescence, and key business and public figures. Together they all agreed on the precise rules to be followed in the project.

Still, it is necessary to ensure that the social project is synchronized with the priorities and the general policy of the leading governmental partner which will assume responsibility for continuing the project and services (Tamir, 2003) [33] and preventing a situation in which the philanthropists deviate from the main focus and the guiding principles (Gidron *et al.*, 2006) [26].

Thus, the goal of standardizing the partnership between the government and philanthropy is working together while maximizing the advantages of each sector (Gidron *et al.*, 2006 [26]; Tamir 2003, Almog-Bar and Zichlinzky, 2010). In order to make the interaction more effective, an elucidation of the gaps between the ideological perceptions of the government and the philanthropy is required that will set the dynamics for the development of the partnership between these two entities. For example, the idea of establishing thinking tanks (also known as Round Tables), offers a basic platform for a multi-sectorial discussion about the relationship between the government and various actors in the third and business sector side by side regularizing the interaction with foundations and funders with the intent of developing a mutual exchange of ideas.

One rudimentary concept essential for creating a partnership is the principle of Matching. Matching means that each side matches the amount or part of the amount given by the other side to support a project. Matching includes situations where philanthropies ask government to match their investment in a specific project to promote a mutual cause. Sometimes the government is the initiator of the project and philanthropies are asked to join in. The literature describes different interactions between philanthropy and the government (Coston, 1998 [34]; Najam, 2000 [35]; Proulx, Bourque and Savard, 2007 [36]; Young, 2000 [37]; Young, 2006 [38]). These interactions result from philanthropies being the funding source (Gidron *et al.*, 2000) [39] and wishing to be involved in designing policies rather than paying for governmental initiatives (Hess, 2005 [20]; Leat, 2005 [40]).

This leads to another distinction to mention that is made between reactive relationship and proactive relationship (Frumkin, 2006) [41]. In reactive relationship philanthropies respond to governmental decision making, while in proactive relationship they independently identify needs that are not met and make decisions according to their on preferences and values. There is a possibility that further down the road the relationship will have reactive features, but choices will be made based on the interests of the philanthropy as in proactive relationship



the focus is on maintaining the autonomy of the philanthropies. Reactive relationship can be further divided into three sub-categories: supplementary (philanthropy co-fund governmental projects), complementary (philanthropy provides products and services which are not given by the government in a specific project), and rivalry (philanthropy uses its power and resources to act against governmental policy (Young, 2000) [37]).

## Advantages and Disadvantages

Setting standards for government-philanthropies interactions has both benefits and drawbacks. Considering the power relationship mentioned earlier in the paper, the motivation of philanthropies is minimizing bureaucracy and restrictions set by the government. The government's tendency is increasing the rule of law both for effectiveness and exercising its power. It is helpful, then, to use standards a balancing point between these two integrated forces.

Often times, there may be a situation where the government and philanthropies work on a similar project without knowing or communicating (Harris, 2013) [42]. For that reason, among the main benefits are: the ability to handle social problems more effectively, eliminating strategic and economic uncertainty, saving costs, preventing overlaps, utilizing resources, organizational study, creating high quality products and services, accessibility to skills, strengthening communal and social identity, promoting public responsibility, and decreasing the risk of failing.

Essentially, a partnership between philanthropies and governments has some costs or disadvantages. Among the costs are blurring the differences between the sectors, limiting their autonomy, investing time and financial resources, funding maintenance mechanisms, supervising the responsibility of the government (Person *et al.*, 2009; Gazley and Brudney, 2007 [43]; Hess, 2005 [20]).

Based on a review of several case studies where cooperation of government and philanthropy took place in an attempt to promote a social issue, the following standards are recommended. These standards recurred in government-philanthropies interactions, and therefore constitute the basics of an effective change making interaction between governmental and philanthropic entities.

## 7. The Core Standards

### 7.1. Coordination of Goals, Roles and Vision

Defining goals, roles and vision is crucial to establishing effective interaction between philanthropies and governments. Goals refer to the objective of the project, roles relate to the definition and space of action for each player, and vision refers to the identification of few important matters and the measurement of the success of the specific strategic efforts aimed at solving them.

However, the more thorough the preliminary research, the better the interaction. Preliminary research includes all the initial field work of collecting information, running a pilot study evaluating alternatives from different contexts, focusing the problem statement and demonstrating the unique contribution of the suggested solution. It also refers to developing networking and informal relationship with representatives of governmental offices before making a formal action. All this will ensure that discussions will resolve around a mutual strategic plan of action towards a satisfying agreement.

A variable that is salient to the interaction is an inclusive agenda among philanthropies. In other words, the society will benefit from contributions which are systematically allocated to different causes. Therefore, a specific body composed of representatives of philanthropies is required. This body will document philanthropic activities and make recommendations regarding what to support next in order to balance the needs of the society.

This standard also includes the establishment of a coordinating agency to which philanthropies will report. The coordinating agency will illuminate on fields that receive less attention by summarizing the activities that are taking place for the public and philanthropies. This will prevent a situation of some disciplines receiving more money they know what to do with, also known, while other disciplines being neglected and undertreated. The most popular example for this is Harvard University that enjoys an abundance of donations while post secondary education for underprivileged populations needs to be improved.

### 7.2. Sharing and Cooperating

A second standard that is associated with a healthy relationship is sharing and cooperating. Three basic forms of

sharing are discussed in the literature (Coston, 1998) [34]: Sharing information, sharing resources and joint action. Information sharing refers to replying to informal requests for information, providing reports, and summaries from meetings, organizing conferences and establishing committees. Resource sharing means that each side will be able to enjoy and utilize the resources of the other side. By joint action each side brings its own knowledge and resources and together they work to achieve a certain goal. Yet, beyond the three basic types of sharing, a more advanced type of sharing is collaboration (Coston, 1998) [34] in which the government shares its own authorities with philanthropies. This type of sharing is very hard to implement because it requires bridging interests, managing styles, and funding methods and values, but it will ultimately lead to positive results.

### 7.3. Leadership

Often times, managements and leadership are being confused. Therefore, to frame the discussion of the leadership standard, I will first define both terms. I use the general distinction Hickman (1992) [42] suggests to distinguish the managerial from the leadership roles. Claiming that leadership and management represent two ends of a continuum, Hickman (1992) [42] suggests five sets of characteristics that help distinguish between leaders and managers both on the decision making and operational levels. Hickman explores this idea by indicating that a manager tends to signify the more analytical, structured, controlled, deliberate, and orderly end of a continuum, while a leader tends to occupy the more experimental, visionary, flexible, uncontrolled, and creative end. Moreover, manager is a person who brings the thoughts of the mind to bear on daily organizational problems, whereas the leader brings the feelings of the soul to bear on those same problems (Hickman, 1992) [42].

The fundamental aspect of the leadership is transparency of actions on the part of the philanthropies. Transparency means that to prevent the public from blaming the government for rewarding philanthropists by giving them tax benefits, an open public discussion is necessary. Any attempt to cover up this information in the era of internet and facebook will not work, and those philanthropists who have earned their money with dignity have an interest to promote such dialogue.

### 7.4. Management

Each project should have an executive managerial body that should take care of implementing that policy and strategy set by the roundtable of the project. The personnel required to operate this executive managerial body is a director, an Information Manager (IM), an associate director, a secretary and volunteers to when needed. The director would be responsible for maintaining a relationship with the government, the coordinating agency, the roundtable of the project, and other significant community resources. The director is also responsible for managing funding. The IM would be responsible for maintaining the official communication with the public, including maintaining correspondence with all who contact the project for information. The associate director would be responsible for research and evaluation recruiting/coordinating/training volunteers. The secretary will perform all administrative duties.

### 7.5. Ethics

First and foremost, both sides need to adopt a respectful attitude toward the other side. Philanthropists must acknowledge the government legitimacy to rule, lead and assume responsibility. The government must acknowledge the tendency of philanthropists to make an impact on the public sphere despite their illegitimacy to do so. Clearly, the public sphere is the sole responsibility of the government which needs to cope with the tendency of the philanthropy to enter the public arena by clarifying the relationship, setting boundaries for the interaction, and allocating assignments (Frumkin, 2006) [41].

To maintain ethical decision making, the American Society for Public Administration Code of Ethics can be adopted (Geuras and Garofalo, 2002) [44] in which the following guidelines are provided: 1) Serve the public interest; 2) Respect the law; 3) Demonstrate personal integrity; 4) Promote ethical organization; 5) Strive for professional excellence.

### 7.6. Evaluation

The effectiveness of the process has to be evaluated every step of the way in an attempt to constantly improve the strategies and make ongoing decision. Indeed, the parameters for success are different in each project and

sometimes difficult to evaluate because social investment, customer satisfaction, community benefit and social return of investment are not statistically easy to be compiled. Still, formative evaluation is required for leadership and managerial roles to make choices and decreasing risks.

It is proposed that the evaluation method of social project will be collaborative. Hence, experts in the field including the director of the project will jointly assess the success of the project in meeting social goals. The agenda is to make recommendation for improving the operation of the project rather than “grading” people and assignments.

## 8. Conclusions

The study of the interaction between governments and philanthropies is of utmost interest to scholars in the field of third sector studies, social policy, and leadership for two reasons. First, the protest in Israel of Summer 2011 demonstrated that the public’s expectation is that philanthropist will support social projects in a larger scale. Second, the common consensus on such interactions, public and philanthropist, played an important role in promoting social issues.

There is very little research with regard to such interactions in Israel. This may be due to the confidentiality of philanthropies and lack of transparency of such organizations. However, a theory that aims at explaining the interaction between governments and philanthropies needs to account for the standards that should direct the mutual conduct of such organizations and take into consideration the interests and motivation of each power. I believe that the model suggested here offers a view of interaction which is different from more traditional models. It is more complex, yet contextualized, by taking into account the social, cultural, political and ideological dimensions.

Since the interactions between government and philanthropies don’t exist in a vacuum, interactions cannot be properly understood without reference to the context. For that reason, the natural continuation of this paper would be to examine the American case and the European case. I presume that because the American philanthropy is family-based which doesn’t rely much on governmental funds, and because the European case is mainly dominated by the government, the findings, *i.e.* the standards that should direct the interaction, will be different. But these remain empirical questions that need to be answered based on field data.

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