The Benefits Distribution of Tri-Networks Convergence Chain

Tibin Liu, Yingjin Lu, Lu Jiao

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.[phone]                

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the characteristic function of all the coalitions of the Tri-networks Convergence chain and research on the benefit distribution of Tri-networks Convergence chain based on Shapley value. We find that the broadcasting and the telecommunication operator can achieve cooperative and turn a win-lose situation into a win-win situation of reduced costs and increased revenues for the Tri-networks Convergence chain.

Keywords

Tri-Networks Convergence Chain, Benefit Distribute, Shapley Value, Mini-Max Theorem

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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