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Dynamic Moral Judgments and Emotions

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DOI: 10.4236/psych.2015.68090    3,805 Downloads   4,334 Views   Citations
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ABSTRACT

We may experience strong moral outrage when we read a news headline that describes a prohibited action, but when we gain additional information by reading the main news story, do our emotional experiences change at all, and if they do in what way do they change? In a single online study with 80 participants the aim was to examine the extent to which emotional experiences (disgust, anger) and moral judgments track changes in information about a moral scenario. The evidence from the present study suggests that we systematically adjust our moral judgments and our emotional experiences as a result of exposure to further information about the morally dubious action referred to in a moral scenario. More specifically, the way in which we adjust our moral judgments and emotions appears to be based on information signalling whether a morally dubious act is permitted or prohibited.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

Cite this paper

Osman, M. (2015) Dynamic Moral Judgments and Emotions. Psychology, 6, 922-931. doi: 10.4236/psych.2015.68090.

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