Implications of rare neurological disorders and perceptual errors in natural and synthetic consciousness

Allen D. Allen

Medical Research Division, New Terra Enterprises, Los Angeles, USA.

DOI: 10.4236/wjns.2013.34031                

Abstract

Recent theories on natural and synthetic consciousness overlook the geometric structure necessary for awareness of 3-dimensional space, as strikingly illustrated by left-neglect disorder. Furthermore, awareness of 3-dimensional space entails some surprisingly tenacious optical illusions, as demonstrated by an experiment in the text. Awareness of linear time is also crucial and complex. As a consequence, synthetic consciousness cannot be realized by simply intercomnecting a large number of electronic circuits constructed from ordinary chips and transistors. Since consciousness is a subjective experience, there is no sufficient condition for consciousness that can be experimentally confirmed. The most we can hope for is agreement on the necessary conditions for consciousness. Toward that end, this paper reviews some relevant clinical phenomena. 

Keywords

Human Brain; Consciousness; Artificial Consciousness; Clinical Neurology; Fractal Cortex; Perceptual Errors; Neurological Time; Emotional Precognition; Artificial Sociopath; Quantum Mechanical Measurement

1. INTRODUCTION

Advances in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have made it possible to observe the reaction of the human brain to a given stimulus during both waking consciousness and deep unconsciousness, e.g., due to the administration of propofol [1-11]. During waking consciousness, but not otherwise, a stimulus generates integrated global activity all across specialized regions of the brain. This has led to the conjecture that such an information-processing methodology may be a sufficient condition for consciousness and thus admits to the possibility of synthetic or non-biologic consciousness. However, this theory is contradicted by rare neurological disorders that provide empirical evidence as to which conditions are, and are not, necessary for consciousness. The oversight is no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that only a small number of clinical neurologists have ever seen the disorders in question. Also, there is a bias that only large controlled studies provide reliable information. While this is true for clinical trials of therapeutic and diagnostic methods, the first law of information theory tells us that rare events are precisely the ones that provide the most information [12,13].

Since consciousness is a subjective experience, there is no sufficient condition for consciousness that can be experimentally tested. To the contrary, the mimicking of conscious behavior by an artificial brain would only tempt us to assume it is experiencing consciousness based upon, say, an analog for the Glasgow Coma Score [14, 15] when there is no scientific basis for this assumption. The most we can hope to achieve is agreement on the characteristics of the human brain that are necessary for consciousness. We could then assume that an artificial brain satisfying all of these criteria would be capable of consciousness under the general rule that like causes produce like effects. Toward that end, the present paper reviews the implications of some real clinical phenomena as a guide to recognizing the necessary conditions for consciousness.

2. AWARENESS OF 3-DIMENSIONAL SPACE

2.1. Cerebral Geometry

The rare condition known as left-neglect disorder is caused by a lesion on the right hemisphere of the brain [16-18]. Patients with this condition cannot perceive anything to the left of a reference point, including but not limited to, the left side of their own bodies. Indeed, they cannot even conceive of leftness (see Figure 1). In other

Figure 1. Wall clock drawn by a patient with left-neglect disorder who was asked to draw a wall clock without any particular time being specified. These patients cannot conceive of leftness. 

words, the anatomy of the cerebral cortex must be intact in order for a person to be aware of 3-dimensional space. Moreover, the anatomy of the human brain contains fractal structures [19]. This is to be expected since the cerebral cortex packs a large surface into a small volume by being convoluted. Hence, it is unlikely that synthetic consciousness can be achieved by simply interconnecting a large number of chips and transistors. Rather, realizetion of the geometric structure needed for consciousness suggests a need to grow out biologic materials. This raises a question as to just how “synthetic” a synthetic brain could be.

2.2. Optical Illusions

Information processing by the human brain is not intended to be accurate nor is it. Rather, the human brain evolved to be biologically adaptive. As a consequence, waking consciousness necessarily includes such errors as optical illusions [20-23], pareidolia [24-26], change blindness [27-32] and plastic memories [33-36]. Indeed, even blind people experience optical illusions [23]. Some surprisingly tenacious optical illusions arise as part of an awareness of 3-dimensional space. This is illustrated below by a simple, do-it-yourself experiment well known to psychologists. Because there is a big difference between learning something by reading about it and by actually experiencing it, the reader is encouraged to take a few minutes to conduct the below experiment.

In looking at Figure 2 it is obvious that the square labeled A is much darker than the square labeled B. Now

Figure 2. Illustrates the tenacity and purpose of optical illusions.

conduct the following experiment.

1)    Print two copies of the page containing Figure 2.

2)    Use one copy to cut out the two squares labeled A and B.

3)    Place the cutout squares labeled A and B next to each other. It will be seen that, despite appearances that seem certain, they are exactly the same color.

4)    Place the cutout square labeled B over the square labeled A in Figure 2 on the intact page. When you do so, the cutout square labeled B will suddenly become much darker. 

Even after you have learned that the two labeled squares are the same color, and moving one to the position of the square labeled A makes it appear much darker, you will not be able to see Figure 2 with the correct colors. The brain changes what you are seeing so that you can navigate through 3-dimensional space using shadows to determine the shapes and locations of objects.

3. AWARENESS OF LINEAR TIME

3.1. Waking Consciousness

Orientation in linear time is limited to waking consciousness [37-40]. Indeed, when awake, a person is only conscious of the neurological present. From a neurologic standpoint, “nowness” can be defined as that which is perceived when a person is awake (although the physical definition is different). A person may remember the past and can anticipate the future by remembering that tomorrow is a holiday or that he has an appointment next week. But these recollections are not perceived in the same way that the present is perceived when a person is awake.

Figure 3 illustrates the flow of time in relation to the flow of exogenous and endogenous information in the fully awake human brain and is based upon a large body of interdisciplinary knowledge from psychology, psychiatry, and neurology.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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