Stackelberg-Walras and Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Mixed Markets: A Comparison

Abstract

In this note, we compare two strategic general equilibrium concepts: the Stackelberg-Walras equilibrium and the Cournot-Walras equilibrium. We thus consider a market exchange economy embodying atoms and a continuum of traders. It is shown that, when the preferences of the small traders are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the Stackel-berg-Walras and the Cournot-Walras equilibria can coincide only if 1) the endowments and preferences of atoms are identical and 2) the elasticity of the followers’ best response functions are equal to zero in equilibrium.

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L. Julien, "Stackelberg-Walras and Cournot-Walras Equilibria in Mixed Markets: A Comparison," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 1, 2012, pp. 69-74. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.21013.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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