Top Management Change, Succession Source and Enterprise Risk Decision Tendencies ()
ABSTRACT
Based on Anomie theory and actual revenue management theory, this paper explores the relationship between R&D investment and short-term investment after administrative change/mandatory change. It is found that administrative change/mandatory change can significantly reduce R&D investment, and executive change can be significantly changed. Increasing short-term investments and mandatory changes in executives can significantly increase short-term investments. In addition, mandatory changes in executives can significantly reduce a company’s R&D investment. Successful sources can mitigate this relationship between administrative changes/mandatory changes and corporate R&D investments, and short-term investments in companies with executive change/mandatory changes. External successors will weaken changes/mandatory changes to R&D investments, while internal successors will enhance the impact of change/mandatory changes on R&D investment. At the same time, external successors will reduce the positive impact of change/mandatory changes on short-term investments, and internal successors will enhance the positive impact of change/mandatory changes on short-term investments.
Share and Cite:
Wang, X. (2019) Top Management Change, Succession Source and Enterprise Risk Decision Tendencies.
Open Journal of Social Sciences,
7, 215-233. doi:
10.4236/jss.2019.711015.
Cited by
No relevant information.