Author(s)

Hsi-Mei Hsu, Zi-Yin Chen

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In this paper we consider a two-stage ordering problem with a buyer’s minimum commitment quantity contract. Under the contract the buyer is required to give a minimum-commitment quantity. Then the manufacturer has the obligations to supply the minimum-commitment quantity and to provide a shortage compensation policy to the buyer. We formulate a dynamic optimization model to determine the manufacturer’s two stage order quantities for maximizing the expected profit. The conditions for the existence of the optimal solution are defined. And we also develop a procedure to solve the problem. Numerical examples are given to illustrate the proposed solution procedure and sensitivity analyses are performed to find managerial insights.

Two Stages Ordering, Commitment, Bayesian Information Updating

H. Hsu and Z. Chen, "Two-Stage Ordering Policy under Buyer’s Minimum-Commitment Quantity Contract," American Journal of Operations Research, Vol. 1 No. 3, 2011, pp. 84-99. doi: 10.4236/ajor.2011.13012.