Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism ()
ABSTRACT
The present paper investigates
the multi-dimensional mechanism design in which
buyers have taste and budget as their private information. The paper shows an easy proof of a two-dimensional optimal
direct mechanism by a one-dimensional
indirect mechanism: A canonical mechanism in the traditional
one-dimensional setting, i.e., function
of one variable, the buyer’s
taste. It also sheds light on where the
difficulty lies implementability of a general direct mechanism—not optimal—by a canonical mechanism.
Share and Cite:
Kojima, N. (2017) Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism.
Theoretical Economics Letters,
7, 187-192. doi:
10.4236/tel.2017.72016.
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