Author(s)

Brent D. Boyea¹, Paul Brace², Kayla S. Canelo¹

¹Department of Political Science, University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, TX, USA.
²Department of Political Science, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA.

Consistent with elections throughout the United States, the majority of contributions in gubernatorial campaigns come from individuals. Understanding the incentives for why individual donors give money in varying political environments is essential for understanding the influence of political donors. Using contribution data from 2009 through 2015, this paper considers whether state campaign finance reform has had unintended effects for how incumbent and non-incumbent candidates raise money. This study demonstrates that individual donations vary in theoretically driven ways. Few factors, however, affect donor generosity more than the relationship between a candidate’s incumbency status and the severity of state contribution laws. Consistent with Jacobson’s early concerns, restrictive contribution laws appear to strengthen the position of incumbents and place non-incumbent candidates at a disadvantage. Where states apply less restrictive limits, however, the advantage held by incumbents among donors largely disappears.

Campaign Finance, Gubernatorial Elections, Elections, Political Participation, Political Behavior

Boyea, B. , Brace, P. and Canelo, K. (2023) Giving to Governors: State Contribution Limits and the Incumbency Advantage. Beijing Law Review, 14, 1432-1455. doi: 10.4236/blr.2023.143078.