ABSTRACT
This paper argues that a neglected, in fact a barely noticed, concept in
Hume’s
A Treatise of Human Nature plays a crucial role in understanding
his philosophy. The crucial concept arises in connection with the difficulty
that Hume encounters in referring to the “external world.” Indeed, as Quine
observes concerning Hume, if all that can be thought are our own ideas and
impressions (viz. perceptions), then it is unclear how we can possibly think of
objects that are not our own ideas and impressions. Hume writes: The farthest we can go toward a conception of external objects, when supposed
specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of
them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking,
we do not suppose them specifically different; only attribute to them different
relations, connections and durations (Hume, 17401, 1, 2, 6.19, 20 p. 49). The first purpose of this paper is to
explain what Hume means by “relative ideas.” The second purpose is to explain
their importance in Hume’s ontology, that is, his understanding of what there
is. The third purpose is to consider Quine’s argument against Hume in his
seminal paper “On What There Is.” Finally, the fourth purpose of the paper is
to assess the role of relative ideas and in particular the relative idea of
external existence in Hume’s ontology.
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