Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions

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DOI: 10.4236/tel.2013.35A2001    3,708 Downloads   5,827 Views  Citations
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ABSTRACT

I study contests in which two asymmetric players compete with each other by expending irreversible efforts to win a prize. I consider three types of games, which are distinguished by their different timing assumptions: the simultaneous-move game, the sequential-move game, and the game with endogenous timing. I compare the outcomes obtained under the different timing assumptions.

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K. Baik, "Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 3 No. 5B, 2013, pp. 1-4. doi: 10.4236/tel.2013.35A2001.

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