Instability in the Hotelling’s Non-Price Spatial Competition Model ()
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ABSTRACT
This note analyzes a slightly modified Hotelling model in which two firms are allowed to choose multiple store locations. Each firm can endogenously choose the number of stores while opening a store incurs a set-up cost. We show that the principle of minimum differentiation, i.e., both firms open a store each on the center, never holds when the set-up cost is decreasing in the number of stores. Under general cost functions that include non-linear and asymmetric set up costs, we characterize the conditions under which the principle holds. General payoff functions that are non-linear in the market share are also considered.
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