Reciprocity in Repeated Emotion Game Experiments: Analyses of a Game-Theoretic Econometric Model - Open Journal of Social Sciences

JSS > Vol.8 No.3, March 2020

Reciprocity in Repeated Emotion Game Experiments: Analyses of a Game-Theoretic Econometric Model ()

HTML XML

Download as PDF (Size: 272KB) PP. 135-145

DOI: 10.4236/jss.2020.83013 404 Downloads 940 Views

Author(s)

Zhi Fan^1,2, Keqiang Li¹, Ya Zhou^1*

Affiliation(s)

¹School of Systems Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.
²Department of Basic Courses, Beijing Union University, Beijing, China.

ABSTRACT

We conducted three treatments of human-computer repeated emotion game experiments and set up a game-theoretic econometric model to measure the impact of emotional reciprocity on behavior at the group level when self-interest is impossible. We found that the subjects still gave feedback in response to the opponent’s friendliness (unfriendliness), even if their behaviors could not change their expected payoffs. The subjects’ willingness to be altruistic increased in the level of altruism in the environment. However, when the opponent did not respond to their behaviors, the subjects’ willingness to be altruistic was lower than their opponents, especially when the opponents behaved more altruistically.

KEYWORDS

Reciprocity, Emotion Game, Experiment, Game-Theoretic Econometric Model

Share and Cite:

Fan, Z. , Li, K. and Zhou, Y. (2020) Reciprocity in Repeated Emotion Game Experiments: Analyses of a Game-Theoretic Econometric Model. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 8, 135-145. doi: 10.4236/jss.2020.83013.

Journals Menu

Follow SCIRP

	+1 323-425-8868
	customer@scirp.org
	+86 18163351462(WhatsApp)
	1655362766

	Paper Publishing WeChat

Journals Menu

Home

About SCIRP

Service

Policies