Author(s)

Theophilus Azungah¹, Adombilla Baba Blonch^1*, Joana Rita Tembil²

¹Department of Management Studies, Bolgatanga Polytechnic, Sumbrungu, Ghana.
²Office of the Registrar, Bolgatanga Polytechnic, Sumbrungu, Ghana.

The financial crunch of 2008/9 occasioning the collapse of companies and financial institutions worldwide, sparked calls for transparency and accountability in the dealings of corporate bodies. It engendered more interests on issues concerning corporate governance among researchers, academicians and practitioners. It is worth noting that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are usually appointed and entrusted with the responsibility of managing corporate affairs on behalf of shareholders. Dual interests consequently emerge following the appointment of a CEO comprising the interest of shareholders and that of the CEO with a probability that the self-interests of CEO might run counter to the general interest of shareholders. As a result, many firms are actively incorporating into their corporate governance provisions, strategies to control executives’ performance. A strategic tool used in influencing the performance of chief executives towards the desired goals of an organisation is performance appraisal, yet there is little consideration for executive appraisal in the academic literature. This study seeks to complement the dearth of scholarly conversation on executive appraisal using a qualitative single case study approach drawing on an interview with a Chief Executive Officer of an international bank based in New Zealand. Employing stakeholder theory as a theoretical lens, the findings suggest that appraising CEOs can be instrumental in building good relationships, sustain organisation’s performance and enhance their career advancement.

Chief Executive, Performance Appraisal, Bank, Board of Directors, Auckland

Azungah, T. , Blonch, A. and Tembil, J. (2019) Appraising the Performance of Chief Executive Officers of Banking Institutions in Auckland. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 7, 478-487. doi: 10.4236/jss.2019.77038.