JSS> Vol.1 No.7, December 2013
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Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions under Corporate Governance Perspective

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on corporate performance. This article selects 36 M&A cases of China’s listed real estate companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2009. Regarding the corporate value in 2011 as the measure of the long-term performance, we will explore the relationship among check-and-balance Ownership Structure, board size, and institutional investors impact the performance. This paper concludes a positive impact ownership structure on the M&A performance. In addition, the empirical analysis reveals that that the board size has a significant negative effect on the performance. Additionally, the results of the paper indicate that the CEO-Chairman duality has a significant impact on the long-term performance. Besides, institutional investors have positive effect on M&A performance.


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Cite this paper

Liu, Y. and Wang, Y. (2013) Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions under Corporate Governance Perspective. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 1, 17-25. doi: 10.4236/jss.2013.17004.

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