OJPP> Vol.3 No.4A, November 2013

Quantification is Incapable of Directly Enhancing Life Quality through Healthcare

ABSTRACT

Quantification, the measurement and representational modeling of objects, events and relationships, cannot enhance life quality, not directly. Illustrative is Sydenham’s model of disease (Sydenham, 1848-1850) and its spawn: the checklist quantification that is contained in the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, now in its fifth edition) and ICD (International Classification of Diseases, now in its ninth edition). The use of these diagnostic catalogs is incapable of directly enhancing health, a component of life quality; because health is not the control or absence of disease, and practitioners do not think in checklists. Healthcare practitioners have adopted the methods of the airline industry in imposing checklists that are unnatural to nonlinear cognition. At first instance and finally, the subjectivity of experience and the intersubjectivity of communication create the diagnostic and therapeutic relationship that enhances health and life quality. Health is the capacity to cope and to adapt to the experience of suffering, regardless of its cause or context, and to pursue salutary experience. Society will effectively develop, implement and “reform” healthcare only when it accepts positive, noncircular definitions of health and “Quality of Life.” The ethical obligation of the practitioner is to honor and trust the patient’s narrative of illness, the story of suffering.

KEYWORDS


Cite this paper

Moskovitz, P. (2013). Quantification is Incapable of Directly Enhancing Life Quality through Healthcare. Open Journal of Philosophy, 3, 18-23. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.34A004.

References

[1] Agency of Health Care Policy and Research (1996). Using computers to advance health care. Research in action fact sheet. AHCPR Publication No. 96-P014. Retrieved from Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/computer.htm
[2] American Psychiatric Association (2005). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—Fourth Edition (Text Revision). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
[3] Baars, B. N. (1998). Neuronal mechanisms of consciousness: A relational global workspace framework. In S. K. Hameroff (ed.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The second Tucson discussions and debates (pp. 169-278). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[4] Blashfield, R., & Draguns, J. (1996). Evaluative criteria for psy-chiatric classification. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 83, 140-150.
[5] Buck, C. J. (2013). International classification of diseases, 9th Revision, clinical modification. St. Louis: Elsevier Saunders.
[6] Casebeer, W. (2003). Natural ethical facts: Evolution, connectionism, and moral cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[7] Cassell, E. (2004). The nature of suffering and the goals of medicine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195156164.001.0001
[8] Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[9] Charon, R. (2006). Narrative medicine: Honoring the stories of illness. New York: Oxford University Press.
[10] Churchland, P. (2007). Neurophilophy at work. Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498435
[11] Costanza, R. (2008). An integrative approach to quality of life measurement, research, and policy. S.A.P.I.EN.S. 1 (1).
[12] Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1990). Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. The Neurosciences, 2, 263-275.
[13] Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam.
[14] Damasio, A. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making of consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
[15] DePinto, J. (2012). Public opinion of the health care law.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57462689/public-opinion-of-the-health-care-law/
[16] Edelman, G. (1989). The remembered present: A biological theory of consciousness. New York: Basis Books.
[17] Engel, G. (1997). From biomedical to biopsychosocial: Being scientific in the human domain. Psychosomatics, 38, 521-528.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0033-3182(97)71396-3
[18] Eshaghian-Wilner, M. (2007). Emulation of Neural Networks on a Nanoscale Architecture. Journal of Physics: Conference Series, 61, 288. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/61/1/058
[19] Groopman, J. (2007). How doctors think. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
[20] Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal aualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127-136.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2960077
[21] Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
[22] Kahneman, D., & Deaton, A. (2010). High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 16489-16493.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1011492107
[23] Kelso, J. S. A. (2006). The complementary nature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[24] King, L. (1970). Empiricism and rationalism in the works of Thomas Sydenham. Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 44.
[25] Kleinmann, A. (1988). The illness narratives: Suffering, healing and the human condition. New York: Basic Books.
[26] Lehrer, J. (2007). Proust was a neuroscientist (p. 187). New York: Haughton Mifflin.
[27] Llinas, R. (2001). I of the Vortex. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[28] Markram, H. (2006). The blue brain project. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7, 153-160. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn1848
[29] McDowell, J. (1994). The content of perceptual experience. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 190-205.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219740
[30] Meyerfield, J. (1999). Suffering and moral responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
[31] Morowitz, H. (2002). The emergence of everything: How the world became complex. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[32] Moskovitz, P. (2011). Shifting realities: Myths, models & morality— The myth of health as the absence of disease.
http://www.nourfoundation.com/media-gallery/videos/Shifting-Realities-Myths-Models-and-Morality/The-Contingent-Nature-of-Reality/Peter-A-Moskovitz-MD.html
[33] Moskovitz, P. (2011). Understanding suffering: The phenomenology and neurobiology of the experience of illness and pain. In J. Giordano (ed.), Maldynia (pp. 33-64). Boca Raton: Taylor and Francis Group.
[34] Moskovitz, P. (2013). Randomness does not occur in nature: Philosophical assumptions at the boundary of knowledge and certainty. Synesis.
[35] Oberman, L., & Ramachandran, V. (2007). The simulating social mind: The role of the mirror neuron system and simulation in the social and communicative deficits of autism spectrum disorders. Psychological Bulletin, 133, 310-327.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.2.310
[36] Random House (2013). Random house webster’s unabridged dictionary: Indexed. New York: Random House.
[37] Reiser, S. (2009). Technological Medicine: The changing world of doctors and patients. New York: Cambridge University Press.
[38] Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2005). Mirror neuron: A neurological approach to empathy. In J. Changeux, et al. (ed.), Neurobiology of human values (pp. 107-124). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-29803-7_9
[39] Rossiter, L., Langwell, K., Wan, C., & Rivnyak, M. (1989). Patient stisfaction aong ederly erollees and disenrollees in medicare health mintenance oganizations: Results from the national medicare competition evaluation. JAMA, 262, 57-63.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.1989.03430010069033
[40] Scadding, J. (1988). Health and disease: What can medicine do for philosophy. Journal of Medical Ethics, 14, 118-124.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jme.14.3.118
[41] Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173452
[42] Sedler, M. (1994). Foundations of the New Nosology. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 19, 219-238.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/19.3.219
[43] Shirtcliff, E. A., et al. (2009). Neurobiology of empathy and callousness: Implications for the development of antisocial behavior. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 27, 137-171.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bsl.862
[44] Singer, W. (2001). Consciousness and the binding problem. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 929, 123-146.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05712.x
[45] Singer, W. (2005). How does the brain know when it is right? In P. Changeux, et al. (ed.), Neurobiology of human values (pp. 125-136). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-29803-7_10
[46] Siu, R. (1993). Panetics and the Dukkha: An integrated study of the infliction of suffering; The Panetics Trilogy II. Washington, DC: The International Society for Panetics.
[47] Stengel, E. (1959). Classification of mental disorders. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 21, 601-663.
[48] Svenaeus, F. (2010). The Hermeneutics of medicine and the phenomenology of health: Steps towards a philosophy of medical practice. Dordrecht: KluwerAcademic Pub.
[49] Sydenham, T. (1848-1850). Medical observations concerning the history and cure of acute disease. In R. Latham (ed.), The Works of Thomas Sydenham (p. 15). London: Sydenham Society.
[50] von Goethe, J. (1917). Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Classics.
[51] Wang, S., et al. (2003). A cost-benefit analysis of electronic medical records in primary care. American Journal of Medicine, 114, 397403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0002-9343(03)00057-3
[52] WHO (1946). Preamble to the constitution of the World Health Organization. In Official Records of the World Health Organization 2 (p. 100). New York: World Health Organization.
[53] Xiao, H., & Barber, J. (2008). The effect of perceived health status on patient satisfaction. Value in Health, 11, 719-725.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1524-4733.2007.00294.x

comments powered by Disqus

Copyright © 2014 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc.

Creative Commons License

This work and the related PDF file are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.