[1]
|
K. Loague and D. L.Corwin, “Point and Nonpoint Source Pollution,” John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, 2005, pp. 1427-1439.
|
[2]
|
J. Suter, C. Vossler, G. Poe and K. Segerson, “Experiments on Damage-Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, No. 1, 2008, pp. 86-102.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01055.x
|
[3]
|
G. Poe, W. Schulze, K. Segerson, J. Suter and C. Vossler, “Exploring the Performance of Ambient Based Policy Instruments when Nonpoint Source Polluters Can Cooper ate,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86, No. 5, 2004, pp. 1203-1210.
doi:10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00665.x
|
[4]
|
K. Segerson, “Uncertainty and Incentives for Non-Point Pollution Control,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1988, pp. 87-98.
|
[5]
|
A. P. Xepapadeas, “Environmental Policy under Imperfect Information: Incentives and Moral Hazard,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1991, pp. 113-126.
|
[6]
|
A. P. Xepapadeas, “Environmental Policy Design and Dynamic Non-Point Source Pollution,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1992, pp. 22-39.
|
[7]
|
A. P. Xepapadeas, “Observability and Choice of Instrument Mix in the Control of Externalities,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1995, pp. 485-498.
|
[8]
|
W. Baumol and W. Oates, “The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment,” Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 73, No. 1, 1971, pp. 42-54.
doi:10.2307/3439132
|
[9]
|
W. Baumol, “On Taxation and the Control of Externalities,” American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 3, 1972, pp. 307-322.
|
[10]
|
M. Weitzman, “Prices vs. Quantities,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, 1994, pp. 477-491.
doi:10.2307/2296698
|
[11]
|
J. Harford, “Firm Behavior under Imperfectly Enforce able Pollution Standards and Taxes,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1978, pp. 26-43. doi:10.1016/0095-0696(78)90003-7
|
[12]
|
M. Stimming, “Capital Accumulation Games under Environmental Regulation and Duopolistic Competition,” Journal of Economics, Vol. 69, No. 3, 1999, pp. 267-287.
doi:10.1007/BF01231162
|
[13]
|
T. Requate, “Pollution Control under Imperfect Competition: Asymmetric Bertrand Duopoly with Linear Technologies,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 149, No. 2, 1993, pp. 415-442.
|
[14]
|
T. Requate, “Pollution Control in a Cournot Duopoly via Taxes or Permits,” Journal of Economics, Vol. 58, No. 3, 1993, pp. 255-291. doi:10.1007/BF01235250
|
[15]
|
US Department of Commerce, “Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE): 2005,” US Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, US Census Bureau, 2008.
|
[16]
|
S. Ganguli and S. Raju, “Perverse Environmental Effects of Ambient Charges in a Bertrand Duopoly,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2012, pp. 289-296.
|