Game-Theoretic Analysis of Renouncing Membership of a Party to Announce Candidacy

Jue-Shyan Wang, Mei-Yin Lin

Department of Economics, Shih Hsin University, Taipei, Chinese Taipei.
Department of Public Finance, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Chinese Taipei.

DOI: 10.4236/me.2012.35084                

Abstract

A game model is established to analyze the interaction in strategy when there is a candidate who renounces membership of a party to run for a position. We use the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss two models in which the candidate without nominations moves first or the decision maker of the other party moves first respectively. The main finding is that the equilibrium strategy of the decision maker of the other party is identical when the opponent runs for a position, regardless of who moving first. However, the probability of the candidate without nomination to run for a position is larger when he moves first.

Keywords

Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Sequential Equilibrium

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

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