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Updating the Turing Test Wittgenstein, Turing and Symbol Manipulation

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DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.23029    3,605 Downloads   5,766 Views   Citations
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In this paper I present an argument against the feasibility of the Imitation Game as a test for thinking or language understanding. The argument is different from the five objections presented by Turing in his original paper, although it tries to maintain his original intention. I therefore call it “the Sixth Argument” or “the Argument from Context”. I show that – although the argument works against the original version of the imitation game – it may suggest a new version of the Turing Test, still coherent with the idea of thinking and understanding as symbol manipulation. In a new form, the main idea which lies behind the original Imitation Game remains untouched by the criticism of Searle’s Chinese room argument and suggest a possible implementation which avoids some of the shortcomings of the original Turing Test.

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Penco, C. (2012). Updating the Turing Test Wittgenstein, Turing and Symbol Manipulation. Open Journal of Philosophy, 2, 189-194. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.23029.


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