TEL> Vol.2 No.2, May 2012

Impact of Sex on Worker’s Effort within Efficiency Wage Setting

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ABSTRACT

We provided a simple equilibrium model where both the wage paid by firms and the sexual frequency of their workers are determined in equilibrium. The analysis is carried out within an efficiency wage model where the worker’s effort is influenced, in addition to wage, by the willingness to work. The concept of equilibrium used in this paper is that of Nash.

Cite this paper

P. Loureiro, J. Orrillo and T. Moreira, "Impact of Sex on Worker’s Effort within Efficiency Wage Setting," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2012, pp. 130-132. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.22024.

References

[1] R. Solow, “Another Possible Source of Wage Stickiness,” Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1979, pp. 79- 82. doi:10.1016/0164-0704(79)90022-3
[2] G. Akerlof and J. Yellen, “Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Markets,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.
[3] L. Weiss, “Efficiency Wages: Models of Unemployment, Layoffs and Wage Dispersion,” Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
[4] D. Romer, “Advanced Macroeconomics,” McGraw-Hill, 1996.
[5] A. Mas-Colell, “The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium: A Differentiable Approach,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

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