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Two Myths of Psychophysical Reductionism

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DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.22011    4,697 Downloads   6,717 Views   Citations


This paper focuses on two prominent arguments claiming that physicalism entails reductionism. One is Kim’s causal exclusion argument (CEA), and the other is Papineau’s causal argument. The paper argues that Kim’s CEA is not logically valid and that it is driven by two implausible justifications. One is “Edward’s dictum”, which is alien to non-reductive physicalism and should be rejected. The other is by endorsement of Papineau’s conception of the physical, immanent in Papineau’s causal argument. This argument only arrives at the physical property-property identities by using a conception of the physical that licenses anything to be reductively physical, including putative core anti-physical entities; thus, leaving Papineau’s causal argument and Kim’s CEA without a reductive physicalist conclusion of philosophical interest.

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Restrepo, R. (2012). Two Myths of Psychophysical Reductionism. Open Journal of Philosophy, 2, 75-83. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.22011.


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