The Gap between Mind and World in Mind and World Remains

Chung-I. Lin

Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University, Taipei city.

DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2013.32044                

Abstract

In Mind and World, McDowell endorses: empirical thoughts should be justified, ultimately, by things they are about; and, that empirical thoughts are immediately about their ultimate justifiers. But, it also holds two other views: first, as we relate our empirical judgments to their credentials, we ultimately rely on experience, despite its fallibility; second, our empirical judgments are about things in the external world. These views appear inconsistent with one another. McDowell’s way of accommodating the seeming inconsistency appeals to the idea of conceptuality of experience and the holism of the conceptual. Mainly by an argument from false experience, I demonstrate that the conceptual resources relevant to McDowell’s idea of the conceptuality of experience fall short of delivering the accommodation he promises.

Keywords

McDowell; Objectivity; Conceptuality of Experience; False Experience

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

[1]	McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[2]	McDowell, J. (1995). Knowledge and the internal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 877-893. doi:10.2307/2108338
[3]	McDowell, J. (1998a). Précis of mind and world. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58, 365-431. doi:10.2307/2653515
[4]	McDowell, J. (1998b). Having the world in view: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality. The Journal of Philosophy, 95, 431-490. doi:10.2307/2564576
[5]	McDowell, J. (2000). Experiencing the world. In M. Willaschek (Ed.), John McDowell: Reason and nature (pp. 3-18). Münster: Münsteraner Vorlesungen zur Philosophie.
[6]	McDowell, J. (2002a). Reponses. In N. H. Smith (Ed.), Reading McDowell on mind and world (pp. 269-303). New York: Routledge.
[7]	McDowell, J. (2002b). Knowledge and the internal revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64, 97-105. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00144.x
[8]	McDowell, J. (2006). Conceptual capacities in perception. In G. Abel (Ed.), Kreativitat (pp. 1065-1079). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
[9]	Halbig, C., Hansberger, A., & Quante, M. (2000). Secondary qualities or second nature: Which reality for values? In M. Willaschek (Ed.), John McDowell: Reason and nature (pp. 85-88). Münster: Münsteraner Vorlesungen zur Philosophie.
[10]	Sellars, W. (1956). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. In H. Feigl, & M. Scriven (Eds.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (pp. 253-329). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.