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Psychology as an Associational Science: A Methodological Viewpoint

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DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.22023    3,721 Downloads   5,626 Views   Citations
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ABSTRACT

Unlike the sciences (physics), psychology has not developed in any of its areas (such as perception, learning, cognition) a top-theory like Newtonian theory, the theory of relativity, or quantum theory in physics. This difference is explained by a methodological discrepancy between the sciences and psychology, which centers on the measurement procedure: in psychology, measurement units similar to those in physics have not been discovered. Based on the arguments supporting this claim, a methodological distinction is made between the sciences and psychology as an associational science. It is suggested that that these two kinds of science generate two different classes of technologies. The possibility that in psychology there is a connection between the issue of measurement and the unsolved consciousness/brain problem is discussed.

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Rakover, S. (2012). Psychology as an Associational Science: A Methodological Viewpoint. Open Journal of Philosophy, 2, 143-152. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2012.22023.

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