Author(s)

Michael Perrick

Retired, Berg en Dal, The Netherlands.

Appearances notwithstanding, in this paper we do not discuss the Gettier problem. The question at issue is whether one can be justified in believing a false proposition. So, what is at stake is the relation between justified belief and falseness. In his famous paper, Gettier presupposes explicitly that one can be justified in believing a false proposition (Gettier’s “first point”). He makes essential use of this point in arguing for his well-known Gettier cases. I will prove that this point, in Gettier’s robust reading, is untenable since it leads to incompatible or contradictory consequences. It is only in a much weaker sense than we find in Gettier’s paper that it seems possible to be justified in believing a false proposition.

False Belief, Gettier

Perrick, M. (2016) Justification and False Belief: Gettier’s First Point. Open Journal of Philosophy, 6, 446-454. doi: 10.4236/ojpp.2016.64042.