

# Multiplism of the Mind and Its Quality: A Solution to the Mind-Body Problem

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## Abstract

Some scholars concluded that mind-body theories had come to an impasse. Trying to include mental phenomenon addressed in Buddhism and other value-seeking philosophies in eastern cultures, this thesis provides a solution based on a recognition of a wider range of the mental phenomena and the differences of their qualities. Through a “census” of most types and constituents of mental phenomena and their qualities, we claim that there are at least four kinds of mind-body relation: the relation between the mind and the body as a whole, between the mind as a whole and constitutive parts of the body, between types of mental phenomena and constitutive parts of the body, and between types of mental phenomena and the body as a whole.

## Keywords

Mind-Body Problem, Mind, Mental Phenomena, Multiplism of the Mind, Ontological Status

## 1. Introduction

The issue of mind and body is the core issue of philosophy of mind, commonly referred to as the ontological issue of philosophy of mind. What distinguishes it from the psychosomatic issues that specific sciences such as psychology are concerned with is that it is a collective term for spiritual and material issues and their relationships. The issue of “mind view” mainly includes the most general issues of the overall composition, structure, operation, and dynamics of the mind. Its main work is to carry out research on the geography, geomorphology, structural theory, motion theory, dynamics, and essentialism of the mind. The problems of material outlook mainly include the composition, structure, func-

tion, and dynamics of substances related to the mind, such as the body, brain, and external world. The issue of mind-body relationship is concerned with the relationship between the mind and the body, especially the issue of psychological causality. That is, if psychological phenomena have an ontological status, does it have any effect on the brain, body, and external world? Is this effect causal? If so, how can it possibly have and play this causal role? When discussing these issues, it is inevitable to involve more general metaphysical questions about causality.

Also, Mind-body problem is a timeless worldwide puzzle, within which the quality of mind is “the most important and difficult question among all of the problems” (Penfield, 1975). Mind-body problem is entwined with many “meta-questions” such how mental and body are related? What is its quality of mental phenomena? Interestingly, mind-body problem has become a controversial research field that brings about many new theories like identity theory, parallelism, and interactionism and so on. The problem of the present discussion is related to the ignorance of the multiplicity of mental phenomena and its qualities by many scholars. Many schools of thought made the mistake to consider the mind as an object or an individual or a monadic existence thus obtaining the one-sided comprehension of its quality (Leibniz, 1991; Churchland, 1988; Margolis, 1984). In fact, just like the body, the mind is a contradictory complex, including diverse types and constitutions of mental phenomena with multiple qualities accordingly. Therefore, various types and tokens of mental phenomena and their qualities are to be examined in the similar way like population census or great geographical discovery; based on that, we can then generalize their commonality and the quality of mind (Foster, 1991). In realizing so, the relations between different types and tokens of mental phenomena and the corresponding body parts are emphasized; meanwhile, the relation between mind and body as a whole should be explored.

However, the above studies have not achieved satisfied or substantive breakthrough. They are more focused on wrong criticism about cognitive “dilemma”. This paper aims to solve the dilemma faces by analytical philosophy of mind in the light of our “diagnosis” and solution. We will focus our discussion only on the following sub-questions: do mental terms like “mind” and “consciousness” have references? If they do, what do they refer to? Do mind and consciousness possess status in natural order? If they do, what kind? How do we conceive their forms and explain their qualities? What are their relations to non-mental objects?

## 2. Methods of Cognition of Multiplicity of the Mind and Its Quality

The breakthrough of mind-body problem might begin with the discussion of methodology of cognitive of the quality of mind and the relevant premises, since one of the main barriers in mind-body problem is the cognition of the qualities of the mind which is also related to the cognitive methods.

The cognitive quality of mind should begin with the linguistic analysis to examine the relation of the “mind” and “consciousness” (Chomsky, 2006). Then it will not be hard to find they are phenomena difference. They are sometimes activities, sometimes objects processed in activities, sometimes subjects, sometimes results of the activities, sometimes experience and so on. The “mind” taken in its common sense, can refer to the heart; in psychological sense, it can refer to the subject.

As a collection, mind is special to be a complex contradictory collection composed of various types of phenomena, different from the collections of human beings within which the individuals share the same type, but quite close to the collection of different types of elements in a house like animals, furniture, artifacts and philosophical thoughts in books. Therefore, the quality of the mind cannot not be revealed by “Mind” under unrestricted circumstances; its references are complicated for each refers to a specific object. So are other mental terms. Besides, it does not seem plausible to go directly to the generalization of the quality of the whole mind before the specific analysis of other individual cases if the realm of mind is a complex composed of many types and tokens of individual mental phenomena (Clapin, 2002).

Further, McGinn’s research study shows that mind is not only a contradictory unity composed of an infinite number of tokens but also has heterogeneity like the family of substances, or in his words, is a chaotic collection of types and tokens of mental phenomena with different qualities (McGinn, 1982). If it is so, attention should be drawn to the study of individual mental phenomena and their qualities in the cognition of the quality of mind. In addition, lessons are learned from the incompleteness of the present mind-body theories that the previous knowledge about mind as a thing and the aim of an answer for the question “What is mind” should be adjusted if we want to fully understand the quality of the mind (Feigl, 1967).

According to the above methodology, the top priority for cognition of the quality of mind is a full-scale descriptive phenomenological study of the tokens and types of mental phenomena and their features in order not to miss any token, especially any type, or else the generalization of the quality of mind might cause fallacy of composition. This paper intends to accomplish four tasks. Firstly, the discussion of distinction of mind and non-mind is taken as the foundation of the other three tasks. We believe that the distinction is a system that comprises multiple properties and features on the surface layer and innate quality on the deep layer rather than one simple property or feature. The fundamental symbol of mind is the initiative and conscious relevancy or correlation based on the biologically and culturally inherited “pre-structure”. Besides, awareness, “*samanantara-pratyaya*” and holistic features can be the auxiliary signs (See Section 4).

The second task is to carry out a “census” among tokens of mental phenomena and their qualities by means of descriptive phenomenological methods or similar geographical discovery methods; through this way, we can pick out as

many modes of presentation of mind as possible, thus establishing the repertoire of all tokens of mental phenomena, or at least finding out the typical types.

Thirdly, mind on the deep layer underneath the surface layer needs even deeper exploration. McGinn et al.'s latest study and the knowledge from Buddhist philosophy of mind reveal that unconsciousness is still not the fundamental layer of mind; deeper inside, there are implicit structure, deeper self and so on, for example, *manas*, *alaya*, *amala*, *tathata*, true mind and so on (McGinn, 1997).

The last task is to focus on the long-sealed treasure of eastern philosophy of mind. With the development of mind cognition and comparative philosophy of mind, many scholars, including the western ones, have realized the indispensable role eastern philosophy of mind plays. As for in this case of descriptive study of tokens and range of mental phenomena, eastern philosophy of mind make complements to western philosophy of mind, for the range and tokens of mental phenomena the former focuses on surpasses its western counterpart. That is due to its discussion of the quality of mind like western philosophy of mind and its achievements on the ideological discussion of governance of the mind. Inevitably, all these discussions require an investigation of all sorts of mental states represented in a human body and the comparison of their merits for people's choice in governing their own minds. For example, the number of mental phenomena Buddhism claimed to have examined is more than 84,000, among which the mere number of desires is 750, many of them unknown to westerners, like inaction mind (*wuwei xin*), precept-receiving mind (*jiexin*), *aksubhita-citta samahita* (the mind focused on an object without scattering, *dingxin*) and so on<sup>1</sup>. Chinese philosophy of mind has achievements in this respect; for example, its exploration and explanation of mind (*xin*), disposition (*xing*), mood (*qing*), will (*zhi*), talent (*cai*), essence (*jing*), pneuma (*qi*), spirit (*shen*), soul (*hun*) and vigor (*po*), though the mental prospect and their qualities based on it worthy of further study, is characteristic. The coining of these words is not for no reason; these words have true and irreplaceable references.

As long as the above methods are applied, the fact of multiplism of mind and its quality is ready to reveal. We use the term "*xinxing*" (mind and its quality) which is related to "*xinxing*" applied in Chinese philosophy but distinctive from it. Here, "*xin*" (mind) refers to all types and tokens of mental phenomena; while "*xing*" (its quality) means individualities, properties and specific qualities besides instincts and commonalities discussed about in Chinese philosophy. "multiplism of mind and its quality" is not only an ostensible category but a proposition, that is, the type and quality of mental phenomena are not unitary but diverse, since whether mental phenomena presented in an individual or all those in the world are a contradictory unity of tokens and types of mental phenomena with various forms and multiple features. Horizontally, those types and tokens of mental phenomena are with infinite number; vertically, they are arranged in hierarchy and gradability, the latter with openness and generativity (for example,

<sup>1</sup>Karuṇāpūṇḍarikasūtra, p. 266, 279.

new mental phenomena will be generated on the previous one with the formation of new relation). Besides, types of mental phenomena are multiple and heterogeneous (some lie in the brain; some have inter-subjectivity; some are the activities of the body; some are second-order, third-order or even higher-order phenomena). In this sense, mind and its quality do not share unitarily or have fixed boundary, range or number (Cunningham, 2000). In order to expound this feature, we are to pick out several common and typical types of mental phenomena and their features from an enormous number tokens of mental phenomena to examine and analyze in the following parts.

### 2.1. SELF

Self is an essential type of mental phenomenon; it should be faced squarely if we are to reveal the quality of mind and to establish a mind-body theory. That is why the study of self is persistent warming and returns to the focus of philosophy of mind, which some people believe benefits from the spread of Buddhist self-theory in the west. The difficulty of the issue is not to support it empirically, but to scientifically verify and explain it and to philosophically reveal its quality and mechanism (Lester, 2010). There are a lot of facts to show that one's cognition is eventually unified, though the information he receives before obtaining the result is ensuing in the diachronic procedure (Locke, 1970). Nonrecognition of the unity or unified function inward may lead to difficulty in explanation of the transition from diachronic to synchrony and from dispersibility to unity. As A. Damasio points out, all the mental activities and procedures are my activities and procedures completed by me; self is a constant, peaceful and elusive presence (Damasio et al., 2001). We claim, firstly, the mystery of self should be dispelled: neither should self be regarded as an autonomous "humanoid" entity in the human body as dualism and folk psychology propose, nor should human be denied of self or subject like in no ownership view. The constitutive relation between self and human is similar to that between the flame and burning wood and water and stream flow: it is impermanent, arising and passing away; it comes and goes; it remains successive like flame and water flow. The relation is neither identical nor absolutely heterogeneous, but a continuous existence with both *samudaya-vaya* (arising and passing away) and *anutpada-anirodha* (neither dying nor being born). From its relation to other types of mental phenomena, self is the subject of mental activities, procedures and states and possessor of mental content and objects and experiencer of qualia, thus the center of all types of mental phenomena. From its constitution and quality, self is a holistic mode that is based on evolved organic substances and synthesizes the complex social, cultural and mental elements. Consequently, self as a complex type of mental phenomena, should be considered in the exploration of the quality of mind.

### 2.2. Mental Action or Activity

This type of mental phenomena, that needs our special attention too in the ab-

straction of the quality of mind, is composed of two elements: action pattern (for example, perception, emotion, association, judgment and so on) that decides the type of mental activity and intentionality or denoting role of action that decides the content of mental activity. Mental action owns a wide range; all the mental phenomena are presented as mental activity at first, for mental activity is the basis of other types of mental phenomena; however, it can only be denoted with mental verbs like “think” or “decide” (O’Brien & Soteriou, 2009). From its relation to relevant items, mental action has a close relationship with capacity form (thinking, perception, emotion, will and so on), substrate or subject (the brain, human or heart), and mental products or representation; as long as mental action appears in reality, these items ensue. Besides, the subject and substrate of mental activity are not spiritual substances, but collective action of neural activity and nerve cells and their relevant molecules in the brain.

### 2.3. Mental Process

By process we mean the realized formal structure in the physical structure with time variation (Brown, 1996). Mental process, a special type of mental phenomena, is the extension of mental activity and contains more components than the latter (for example, as the process unfolds, mental experience and content become richer); therefore, mental process can be regarded as a high-order phenomenon based on mental activity through acts like experience (Strawson, 2010). The high-order phenomenon has gestalt properties; compared to low-order phenomenon or basic condition, high-order phenomenon does not exist when the corresponding basis is not sufficient or relevant. Once the basic condition is ready, a new mode of being will emerge from the previous low-order being and then combines with other factors to form new relation and derive higher-order phenomena. If the previous high-order phenomenon is first-ordered, then the second-order phenomenon emerges from it and derive the third-, fourth- and even nth-order phenomena.

### 2.4. Mental Content

This is a type of mental phenomena usually ignored in many previous mind-body theories. To have mental activities, one must have mental content; but the latter does not equal to the former, and is not possible to be included into other types of mental phenomena, since mental activity can not appear in a form of pure activity but relate to certain mental material, process or operate on a certain thing which is content (McGinn, 1989). Different from external objects, mental content is internal to mind and functions as the presentation of the object; it has various types, like information content, conceptual content, empirical content, and representational content and so on. Mental imagery is a type of mental content that belongs to the level of perceptual cognition. It reproduces the cognition obtained by perception rather than directly perceives things, which makes it connected with but distinct from perception, since imagery is endogenous, ori-

ginating autonomously, in no need of actual stimuli. It relies on mental capacities like imagination and associative power, not thinking (Gengerelli, 1939). The affirmation of the mental content is essential to the cognition of the quality of mind; if there is mental content, we cannot generalize the quality of various types of mental phenomena simply as a function, activity, capacity or property, but the wording that covers the mental content as one type of mental phenomena.

### 2.5. Mental Object and Intentional Object

There are two meanings of “intentional object”: one refers to the external things pointed to by mental activities or the manifestation of external things in consciousness; the other means intentional object presented in pure mental form by mind or inter-subject. Consequently, they can be either relevant to external objects (for example, the red apple or car that we think of and so on), or irrelevant to them (say, the case that we think of square circle); they are not external object in itself but the object pointed and presented in mental activities (Coliva, 2012). As for its relation to mental content, mental content is the material of mental activities, the bridge that connects the intentional object, the denoted, in reality. The intentional object that points to non-being best reflects the ontological status and independent individuality of intentional object (Searle & Willis, 1983). For example, there are no gold mountains in the world, but they are different from pure nothing when we think about them. Then it is natural to think that mind of the object non-being is different from mind of nothing to think about and mind of thinking of the actual existing objects. Mou Zongsan said that God to him exists, God an internal truth and a self-truth, if he believes in God, though he does not admit the existence of God. Such truth does not have external universality, but true to the party involved and to the self that decided at that moment (Mou, 1997). From above statement it appears that intentional objects need to be considered in the exploration of the quality of mind.

### 2.6. Qualia

This is the “new continent” contemporary philosophy of mind discovered in the deep exploration of mind (Wright, 2008). Referring to the non-physical and phenomenological features or properties (different from neurophysiological process and mental process) we perceive in experiencing a mental state, qualia is neither experience itself, nor the perception of external objects that bring about experience, but the feeling of features of the quality presented by experience. They are subjective features of experience due to their mere perception by the subject, but different from such types of mental phenomena, occurring in experience processes like feelings, perception, emotions and thinking, since they are high-order experience accompanying such basic mental activities. This is the type of mental phenomena that was missed and caused problems about the quality of mind.

## 2.7. Nonuniversal Mental Phenomena

These are mental phenomena almost everyone encounters; of course, there are many mental phenomena that do not share such universality and appear in an individual or a colony of people with specific conditions. Many examples support this idea: “peak experience” mentioned by many psychologists like A. H. Maslow, “the vast *qi* (*haoran zhi qi*)”, “saints mind (*shengxin*)”, “ataraxia (*jingxin*)” and “great heart (identifying the matter as the same and seeing nothing in the world not me, *great heart*)” in Chinese philosophy, and “true mind” and “*dhyana*” in Buddhism. They are a member of the mental family, so they are also individuals that need attention in abstraction of the quality of mind, or else the theory cannot be called a universal theory of philosophy.

Finally, we need to focus on mental terms’ feature of one-name-multiple-entities. Take “consciousness”, “thinking” and “emotions” as example, they can be regarded as independent. Actually, every word has several references; the various references of the same word differ in quality, or rather, the denoted are different types of mental phenomena (O’Shaughnessy, 2003). For example, the word “consciousness” means multiple types of mental phenomena in diverse uses: firstly, it means the common features of all the conscious mental phenomena; secondly, it refers to all mental phenomena; thirdly, it means sober and aware states; fourthly, it denotes the gaze, attention and high-order thinking; fifthly, it refers to “consciousness” in phenomenology, that is, the residue after phenomenological suspension; sixthly, it means human beings’ active but irrational experience or “qualia”. Besides, it has the specially signified, like Edmund Husserl’s “consciousness of internal time”, Sartre’s “pre-reflective *cotigo*” (a phenomenological self-study), Kant’s transcendental self-consciousness (an objective unity) and so on. Consciousness is a complex that includes types of mental phenomena like conscious activities, conscious content, experience or qualia and so on; moreover, the other mental phenomena like thinking, will, moods and emotions also are polymorphous (Husserl & Brough, 1991). Therefore, in cognition of the quality of mind, instead of simply putting what consciousness is or is not, we not only should focus on those polymorphous tokens of mental phenomena, but also examine various types of mental phenomena they contain in order not to be “one-size-for-all”.

With very restrained number of but very typical types of mental phenomena, the argument is sufficient to show that mind is not a unitary or monadistic existence, but a contradictory unity composed of polymorphous types and tokens of mental phenomena with diverse features, only superficial and loose unity lying between them. Types of mental phenomena have different qualities: some are the brain’s faculties or properties, some products of mind, some brain activities; some are physical, some physically derivative, some non-physical; some lie in the brain, some embodied or extended; some are commonly seen, some not yet discovered and generating new types of mental phenomena with life evolution. In a word, mind not only has static multiplism, but dynamic generativity and openness (Dardis, 2008).

### 3. Projection of Multiplism of the Mind and Its Quality on Ontological Status

In the probe of mind-body relation, scholars are to come across “ontological status question”, so it is part of the mind-body problem. The ontological status question arises naturally, since almost all of the mind-body theories admit that mental phenomena are invisible, impalpable, intangible and formless thus without existent status or ontological status: does mind have status or exist in the nature? If it does, in what way? What is the difference from the existence of objects, brain and body? Strictly speaking, only philosophy of mind must be or is able to concern with such questions, so the ontological status of mind becomes the most individualizing controversy among the mind-body problems in philosophy of mind (Steward, 1997). For example, eliminativism argues against dualism: the former insists deflationary ontological standards, believing only physical existence has existent status and mental phenomena like beliefs and desire do not exist for not being such an existence and will be eliminated like phlogiston sooner or later; while the latter holds a flexible ontological standards, thinking that all the existence with forces exist (even if they are intangible and extensionless) and spiritual substances and immortal souls both have ontological status because of this.

We do not accept dualism’s argument for this problem: its admission of mind’s independent ontological status and even substantial or original status violates the economy principle of ontology; the mental picture it establishes makes the “ontological population explosion” mistake. Meanwhile, our rejection of the dualist view in this issue does not mean a denial of ontological status of mental phenomena or a swing to eliminativism. On the contrary, we are against eliminativism, for the reason that tangible physical things do exist but they are not all that exist in the world. The intangible things like magnetic field, electric wave and X-ray exist for real. So are mental phenomena; though intangible, they can obtain their own existent status in the nature by their relation to physical things. The point is their existence are not the same (as the previous theories claimed), but presented as various ways and in diverse degrees due to polymorphous existence in different degrees. This view is different from the previous ones in its discovery of the existing ways that occupy space or extension and endowment with existent status of both things with primary qualities and others.

“Existing ways” are the ways existence presents or shows itself: tangible things appear as an individual in mechanic order with space-time boundary; microscopic particles entwine and inter-filter in the implicate order in the microcosmos; some things supervene on physical things; some exist in high order; etc. “Existing degree” is the degree of existence’s independence and truth. Some things can exist independently; some can only attach to other existences to exist. Even within the latter, the existing degrees vary subtly in quantity due to different types’ relations to the basic existence; for example, existences assume different existing orders like first order, second order, third order and so on, the ex-

isting degree descendant with the rising of existing order. These existences with different existing orders all have their own existent status, however low order they are in, because they will ensue to happen as a fact as long as the lower orders it attaches to happen and interact with each other. Aristotle pointed out that the existing degree of individuals is the highest; other things' existing degrees depend on their distances to the individual, the closer, the higher, and vice versa. A. Meinong categorized objects into three, existent, subsistent and non-being, according to truth and substantiality. Existent is the truest, existing in the time-space as an individual; subsistent is truer, like abstract existence, numbers, universals, theoretical existence, concepts and propositions; non-being has the lowest existing degree, which is exemplified by intentional objects, contradictory objects and fictional objects like "gold mountains" and "square circle", existing as "the given". Marxist philosophers admit the differences of existing degrees, saying that matter is "primary", which is the truest existence with original function, while not denying spirit is "secondary" or "derivative" existing status. Besides, Marxism admits not only "existence in itself", but also "personified existence", i.e. phenomenological existence, a high-order existence. For instance, a man is presented as various existence in different relations; he or she can be either a biological man in himself or herself, or a socialized man in social relations as a new existence, a high-order existence<sup>2</sup>.

Based on the above analysis, we can say that mental phenomena have ontological status once appearing as facts, though they are intangible and formless. In terms of their existing degrees, most types of mental phenomena are not direct presented as primary or existent, but secondary or subsistent, and different in degrees and ways. Mental activity is a special brain activity thus enjoys a high-order existent status; in this sense, the identity theory that claims mental activities identical with brain activities is reasonable. Some types of mental phenomena which are physical phenomena themselves, or equal to physical phenomena can be described both in mental language and physical language, for example, natural gifts that have not be transformed into reality, knowledge seeds and so on. The recent study results of cognitive science reveal that due to acquired inheritance and evolution, inside the brain are gifted mind, or at least gifted mental capacities and implicit cognitive structure like programs; they originated with the brain. Mental content is a high-order existence, but its existing way is subsistent not existent, that is, existing as abstract object or existing metaphysically; it is relatively independent though relies on the dynamic system of the brain and mental activities that realize it, so it is a high-order subsistent attached to basic existent. Intentional objects are not only external objects mental activities point to, but also the objects that present in front of mental activities. The ontological status of the former depends on that of the signified; while that of the latter is relative non-being, since they are neither members of the spatial-temporal world nor the absolute nothing. Take an intentional object like the square circle in

<sup>2</sup>Marx, 2004, p. 86.

mind as example: the square circle is definitely not pure nihility once it is thought of, thinking of nothing diverse from not thinking about anything, though it does not exist in the external world.

In a word, mental phenomena have incontrovertibly ontological status: they exist in a secondary or derivative way; but their qualities are multiple in existent status, existing ways and degrees, since various types and tokens of mental phenomena have their respective fundamentals, origins and formation. For instance, some type of mental phenomena is a form of physical movement; some is second-order existence; some has blend existing forms; mental content, existing ways of sense and intentional objects (especially the intentional objects of non-being) are more complicated. Moreover, third-order type of mental phenomena can be generated in the joint force of the brain, environment, truth-conditions and mental activity due to the openness and generativity of mind; so are the fourth-order, fifth-order and even-higher-order types of mental phenomena.

#### **4. The Probe of the Quality of Mind Based on Multiplism of Mind and Its Quality**

If we can commit the ontological status of mind, then we immediately come across the question “what is the quality of mind”. Obviously, it is the key question among the mind-body problem; it is the most difficult to answer but unavoidable, thus taken as the “crux” of the mind-body problem. In the context of multiplism of mind and its quality, its content can be expressed as follows: do mental phenomena with huge differences in qualities have common properties and features (commonalities)? Among these properties, is there fundamental and sufficient distinction or the quality of species differences? If there is, how to reveal it? What is it, or what are they?

Why is the quality of mind revealed by the present mind-body theories which emphasize the discussion of the quality of mind and make a lot of achievements still secondary, but not first or universal quality that covers all of the types and tokens of mental phenomena? The reason is that they failed in the necessary analysis of the tokens, types, specific configuration or structure of mind, so the theories about the quality can at most be applied to one or some types of mental phenomena. The cognition of individualities and specific quality and of the specific tokens and subclasses of quality are necessary and important to the cognition of the quality of mind; however, it is logically incorrect to be satisfied with this or mistake the cognition of secondary quality for the cognition of the whole mind. For example, functionalist theory of mind quality (mind is a function of the brain, like a computer program) only applies to the type of mental capacities; identity theory of mind quality (mental activity is brain activity) goes for types like mental activity and process; it is not appropriate to extend it to all the tokens and types to make it the first-order nature.

We argue that whether mind is unitary and whether it has common quality should depend on the specific conditions and contexts. When types of mental

phenomena are compared, emphasis being on the differences of modes of presentation, existing degrees and operating ways, mental phenomena are not unitary, so that the biased view of oneness or unity can be rectified. Mental phenomena have blurry boundary but clear hardcore; the commonalities of the mental phenomena can be seen when they are a collection, though they are different or heterogeneous. Like when we are analyzing a contradictory unity, it is possible and necessary to emphasize the distinction (opposition) of its parts in quality, and to admit the identity of the two sides; it is logically and realistically correct to say there are heterogeneity with specific meanings and unity and common quality. The unity of mental phenomena is rooted in the above-mentioned self or “the varying invariant” (Edleman calls it “dynamic center”, a varying subject with certain cognitive functions formed by many neural groups’ completion of specific cognitive missions). Due to such a center, subject of self, a human body manifests various kinds of contradictory unity like personal identity, unity of meaning and understanding, unity of cognition and so on.

As is known to all, the distinction of a concept and the revealing of the quality of a thing are two expressive ways of the one and the same topic. The revealing of the common and unique quality of mind is to define the mental concept; the revealing of the quality of mind is to look for the typical distinction between mind and non-mind. Therefore, one essential standard to measure a theory of the quality of mind is whether such a distinction is found in it. The reason of our objection to the previous theories of the quality of mind that simply take the mind as function, the state of the brain, spiritual substance and so on and whether it has a form or extension as the mind-and-non-mind distinction is that they capture the secondary nature of part of or individual types of mental phenomena rather than the distinction between all mental and non-mental phenomena. Instead, our view is that the distinction is not one simple property or feature, but a system of various superficial properties and features and inner deep qualities; that is the reason why we emphasize the commonality of all mental phenomena as the beginning in the exploration of the deep quality of mind. Now let us examine the common properties and features of all superficial mental phenomena.

Firstly, all the mental phenomena have self-controlled self-witness and awareness. Because we believe that the mental phenomena evolved in the long biological evolution and existed in the form of modules, it has the characteristics of both dependence on the brain and the external world, as well as its relative independence, and thus has the essential characteristics of self-control and autonomy. Here, “self-control” means that the subject possesses the capabilities of initiative manipulation and adjustment; whereas “awareness” means when one has a mental phenomenon or experience a mental event, he or she not only knows it did happen, but also can understand its process, form, properties, features and so on as long as he or she is willing to. It has two forms: one is the “self-witness” and “original witness” of the mind, “witness” being the quality of the mind, part of it, in no need of arousing another awareness activity. In other words, it wit-

nesses anything that happens to the mind. The other is introspective awareness, i.e. the “witness” that depends on the mental actions; it is the empirical self-consciousness or introspection in philosophy. It never escapes from the relationship between the subject and the object; as long as the “witness” appears, there is definitely intentionality objectized and intentionality subjectized. Meanwhile, it has two sides of features: on the one hand, it is the dichotomy of the intentionality objectized and intentionality subjectized; on the other hand, it is the change of thoughts, for instance, as long as a mental activity happens, and attention is drawn on this activity, the first activity is intentional or aware. This intentional act is based on the first one, so there will be second-level awareness if another activity is aroused to be aware of this introspection itself; so on and so forth. In a word, when one of the above two “intentionality” appears phenomenologically, it can be regarded as a mental phenomenon.

Secondly, mental phenomena also have holistic features. Unlike holistic features of some non-mental events, those of mental phenomena have their unique trait: necessarily, if only one thought occurs, the subsequent thought would occur simultaneously. That is to say, any mental phenomenon appears as an element of the mental system; it disappears upon its departure from the system. More importantly, the holistic properties of the mind have the liberation, initiative and subjectivity that non-mental things lack.

Thirdly, mind has successiveness or “*samanantara-pratyaya*” (continuity) and the dual-structure of diachronic and synchronicity between which minds can shift freely. Successiveness refers to the inductive, introductory and causal effect the previous mental phenomenon has on the successive one, there being neither ceases between the two nor other things’ intervention, like the water flow. In structuralist terms, mental phenomena can manifest itself in diachronic structures. The present concept of “stream of consciousness” noticed this feature of mind, but it failed in revealing the dialectic features of mental phenomena of being both continuous and intermittent. We believe that the mobility of mind has a dual character: on the one hand, the previous and successive mental phenomena are intermittent and discontinuous due to their asynchrony and non-continuum; on the other hand, they are successive and continuous because of their *samanantara-pratyaya*. Other things may have the mobility or diachronic structures, but they do not have the mental awareness or self-witness that accompanies the mobile process. The uniqueness of mental phenomena also lies in its diachronic structure’s shift into synchronic one in the cease of awareness when life is still on; in other words, all types and tokens of a man’s mental phenomena are stored in the brain. One can freely change the mind from diachronic to synchronic state as needed; such a shift may happen in other things, but it will never be a “free” one.

Mental phenomena share other features in common too. For instance, they are intangible and invisible whatever form they are presented in. Master Zhizhe said, “it is hard to perceive the constituents” of the mind; nonetheless, we cannot claim that the mind is nothing because of this, but “say it has something to some

extent” (*Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sutra*, p. 685). The “something” in this sense is not the primitive or independent one that dualism mentions, but secondary and dependent. What is more, mind can come into being and perish naturally and artificially or freely. Mind does not come from nothing, but its own origin, *karma* or conditions; therefore, it never arises when its origin and condition are eliminated. This feature is obviously not possessed by non-mental phenomena.

Based on the knowledge of the above explicit properties and features of the mind which are distinct from non-mental things, our discussion on the quality of every token and type of mental phenomenon will eventually discover the fundamental quality of all mental phenomena, the “pre-structure”-based (accumulated by biological and cultural evolution), initiative and conscious relevance and correlation. This property seems to be analogous to intentionality or aboutness in western philosophy but differs dramatically; because it is found in the exploration of the mind and inspired by the probe of “quality” in Chinese philosophy of the mind. From ontogenic point of view, every one of us is endowed with something by nature when we first come to this world (were newly born), this “something” decides the range and degree of what we are able to and what we are not able to acquire, and even the differences we have from others, distinctions between human and inhuman. Based on such a pre-structure, every mental phenomenon we experience has the property that correlates us to other mental phenomena, non-mental phenomena; men’s correlation to other things is initiative, subjective and conscious due to the apriori and postapriori effects, though such a property is also possessed by other creatures. The “subjectivity” we apply here is the same as the one in contemporary western philosophy of mind, i.e. men always see a problem or action with their own view without which even the simple feeling does not occur. Because of these features, the correlation of men’s mind is the highest level up till now. Beavers’ use of tails to splash and bees’ dance are not purely innate enclosed activities; they have aboutness, “correlating to” external states of affairs like danger here and flowers here. However, men have even higher, more complicated and fantastic correlation. For example, compared with “smoke means fire”, the correlation based on men’s explanation, some of the states in a human body means initiative and autonomous correlation to the states of affairs external to it. Even more surprisingly, as a relation property, men’s correlation has many features that other relations do not possess, like the correlation between mental states and things that do not exist, which is hard to imagine in the case of a physical object. For example, one can imagine there is a unicorn; while any physical objects cannot have anything to do with a unicorn. Moreover, men’s mental states can lie in the correlations with things that do not exist, that will not happen, that have passed and that have not happened yet; whereas physical relations lie only in real things. In a word, the correlation of mind is a transcendental feature that enables men to go beyond the activity itself and to relate to some other things; thus human becomes the special existences that can go out of themselves, relate to other things and have the properties like

dispersivity, diffusivity, penetrability and are not radically independent.

In conclusion, mind, as a contradictory unity, has various commonalities and shared qualities as well as multiple forms and different properties.

## 5. Mind-Body Relation in Multiplism of the Mind and Its Quality

In terms of the mind-body relation, we have both negative and positive points. On the one hand, we believe that most of the present theories about mind-body relation simplified the relation subject to one type of mental phenomenon and the body as that between all types of the mental phenomena and the body, or as the only mind-body relations for all. Firstly, there is categorical error in the mind-body and mind-matter dichotomy in all forms of mind-body dualism. Secondly, the non-dualistic theories of mind-body relation failed to reveal the multiplism of the mind and its quality: they are restricted in the discovery of the unitary relation between the mind and body in the explanation. For example, the identity in the identity theory and the realization, reduction, emergence, supervenience, epiphenomenon (epiphenomenism), same reference (bilingualism), interpretation relation (interpretationism), etc. in other corresponding theories discuss the relation between one type of the mental phenomena and the body, not that between all types of the mental phenomena and the body. However, our denial of the mind-body dichotomy schemata does not mean to neglect this relation or thus withdrawing the construction of mind-body relation theories. Even the belief of the only existence of the matter in the world, the mental phenomena produced in the physical procedure of the body, or the claim that no parallelism exists between them has to accept the idea that there is some relation between the mind and matter, since non-parallelism is itself a relation, not to mention some other more complex and implicit relations.

On the other hand, the positive point mind-body relation has is its specific discussion of mind-body relation. According to it, there are at least four types of relations between the mind and the body: the relation between mind and body as a whole, the relation between the mind and constitutive parts of the body, the relation between various types of mental phenomena and constitutive parts of the body, and the relation between types of mental phenomena and the whole body. Take the relations between various types of mental phenomena and constitutive parts of the body and between those and the whole body as an example, as long as the token and type of mental phenomena appear and exert their influence, they relate to the corresponding parts of the body and even the whole body in one way or another. For one thing, no types of mental phenomena occur without the body's role. For another, mental phenomenon itself does not own substance or power or exert its role independently; they have to ask the body for "a favor" to draw on its resources. Therefore, the type of mental phenomenon is confirmed to enter a certain relation to the body if its previous or present effects on other matter or itself are confirmed. However, the specific mind-body relations are complex and multifarious, for the types and tokens of them are diverse

and variable, the degrees, patterns and roles of whose existence are thus respectively characteristic. For instance, the quality of mental ability is a dispositional phenomenon; disposition means the natural endowment or mechanism that comes into play when certain resources and corresponding conditions are satisfied. Salt is dispositional to resolve in the water; when the condition is met, it does so. Analogically so is mental ability: when it is realized, it presents itself and the other relevant types of mental phenomena successively. Meanwhile, it has to resort to the physical body and its resource to achieve that.

Thus the relation between mental ability and the body can be regarded as the relation between the realized and the realizer, and the relation between the faculty and its physical vehicle. There are a lot more relations between types of mental phenomena and the body, such as hetero as well as identical relation, constitutive relation, emergence relation, interpretative reduction relation, interpretative relation, two-side relation and so on. They respectively explain the relations between one or some types of mental phenomena and the body, but not those between all types of mental phenomena and the body. The mind-body relation or relations are so complicated that it is almost impossible to establish one relation model for all the cases. For one thing, the mind does not parallel to the body; for another, with many complex and even heterogeneous components inside, the mind is not unitary but a infinitely vague collection filled with “multiplicity”.

Besides, we admit that there is mind-body relation as a whole or a contradictory unity, though we are not for the idea that the mind and the body can be used to generalize everything in a human body or the dichotomy of the two is logically correct or distributed. Mind-body relation can serve as the focus of the discussion even if there are more than two parts, the mind and the body, in a human body; such a discussion never violates the logic, since it is reasonable to have only two aspects selectively analyzed with the concurrence of many components. This is like the situation when there are many people in a room at the same time, we choose only two or three of them to discuss their relations.

In discussion of the mind-body relation as a whole, the first controversy we encounter is whether they are homogeneous in nature. The identity theory takes the mind and body as identical as the water and  $H_2O$ ; in linguistic expressions, the one and the same thing is a mental event if it is described in mental language, but a physical event if in physical language. On the contrary, most of the other mind-body theories maintain that the mind and the body are heterogeneous, though they diverge in explaining the manifestations of the quality. Among them, the most commonly accepted explanation of the difference is that the body has a form and extension while the mind does not. Therefore, we argue that the mind and the body have both differences as well as similarities, though the difference is not necessarily whether they have a form. We insist that intangibility is not a specific feature to the mind; many physical forms including the body feature in intangibility, such as the field and gravity center. Buddhism has long ago realized that *Rupa*, the matter, has many forms; there are *Rupa* that

shows but does not have a form (such as colors and the shadow of things), *Rupa* that has a form but does not show, *Rupa* that both has a form and shows, *Rupa* that neither has a form nor shows (for example, the mote) (*Vijñānakāya*, p. 583). We think the major differences between the mind and the body are as follows: many mental phenomena are high leveled, compared to physical phenomena in the body; the mind has awareness and can be changed, transformed and eliminated artificially. As for the sameness of the two, we believe that there are parts of substances in the body that are formless and unextended. Because “We believe that the mind does not exist in the form of immaterial entities as mentioned in dualism, but in the form of modules or theoretical reality. Therefore, of course, it does not have extensibility, physique, and is not a specific tangible physical reality. However, the mind and matter are not incompatible with water and fire, but have identity with matter, because in addition to the existence of tangible substances”, There are also forms of substance such as the force field and electric field, for example, the force field and electric field in the body. Ontologically, the mind and the body are both a member of the existence family and a form of being, though they lie in distinct levels and degrees. Or phenomenologically, they are both facts and the given.

## 6. Conclusion

From the above discussion it appears that mind and body enter into a complex and dynamic relation. That is why different philosophies encounter their specific interest in mind-body relation problem with diverse understanding. For example, proponents of idea that the mind is inseparable substance, like Leibniz, regard mind-body relation as two independent problems. For the believers of identity theories or bilingualism, the mind has nothing to do with the body. On the contrary, philosophers who claimed that the master or owner of the mental phenomenon is not the brain or body, but the human as a whole argue that all the theories about the mind-body relation made the mereologic mistakes, which is, attributing the property to one part instead of the whole. The latter criticism points out the dualistic error by neuroscience’s explanation of the mind in terms of the brain. According to Hacker & Bennett, the achievements of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century cognitive neuroscience, though experimentally extraordinary, are mainly influenced by Descartes. They are trapped in brain-body dualism, though free from mind-body dualism. From the perspective of the philosophy of language, such dualism made wrong attribution of the mental language like “thinking” to the brain, one part of the human body. This claim has obvious defects, like there is no scientific basis for asserting an independent, immaterial mind, and secondly, there is no way to explain the actual connection between the mind and the body.

We conclude as researcher that the mind-body relation exists in a complex form due to the multiplism of mind. From our understanding, most of the schools of thought deal partly with the question, ignoring some areas. For example as it was mentioned in the discussion, dualism as well as eliminativism or

reductionism failed into a kind of simplification in their analysis instead of seeing mind-body relation as a holistic matter. Our target in this research was just to point out the riches of mind as entity and the complexity of its relation with the body. So to understand the mind-body problem fully, there is a need to take into account multiplism view of the mind and its quality.

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### Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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