Agent Orange Chemical Plant Locations in the United States and Canada: Environmental and Human Health Impacts

During the Vietnam War, millions of liters of six tactical herbicides were sprayed on the southern Vietnam landscape to defoliate forests, to clear military perimeters and to destroy enemy food supplies. The environmental and human health impacts of spraying these herbicides, especially Agent Orange and those formulated with mixtures that included 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T) which was contaminated with 2,3,7,8-tetracholorodibenzo-pdioxin (TCDD) have been documented over the last 60 years. The dioxin TCDD clean-up efforts at former military bases and other Vietnam hotspots are ongoing. However, the lesser-told story was the environmental and human health impacts on the communities and chemical plant workers who manufactured Agent Orange and other herbicides that became contaminated with dioxin TCDD in the manufacturing processes at seven locations in the United States and one site in Canada. The pollution at these chemical plant sites, adjacent rivers and groundwater is well known within each affected state or province but not widely recognized beyond their localities. In this paper we assess the national long-term effects on land, groundwater and river resources where Agent Orange and other agricultural herbicides containing 2,4,5-T with unknown amounts of dioxin TCDD were manufactured, transported, and temporarily stored. The sites where residual tactical herbicides with contaminated by-products were applied to public lands or disposed of by military and civilian workers within the United States and Canada are identified. After 60 years, these communities are still paying the price for the U.S. Government, DOD and USDA decisions to provide and use agricultural herbicides as tactical chemical weapons during the Vietnam War (1962-1971). How to cite this paper: Olson, K.R. and Speidel, D.R. (2022) Agent Orange Chemical Plant Locations in the United States and Canada: Environmental and Human Health Impacts. Open Journal of Soil Science, 12, 363-426. https://doi.org/10.4236/ojss.2022.128016 Received: August 10, 2022 Accepted: August 28, 2022 Published: August 31, 2022 Copyright © 2022 by author(s) and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/


Introduction
The United States (U.S.) Government passed the Defense Production Act in 1950. This gave the government authority, as a nation at war, to compel U.S. chemical companies to create, produce, and supply tactical herbicides including Agent Orange, to the U.S. military. From 1965 to 1969 eleven wartime government contractors manufactured Agent Orange and other herbicides formulated with mixtures that included 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T) for military use [1]. Post-1969, these companies continued to manufacture very similar commercial herbicide products, containing 2,4,5-T (with unknown quantities of dioxin TCDD) for agricultural use but with different product names [2] [3].
In 1949, an explosion at a Monsanto chemical plant producing 2,4,5-T herbicides in Nitro, West Virginia affected the chemical plant workers (Figure 1) [4] [5]. In 1953, another 2,4,5-T manufacturing explosion occurred at a BASF facility in Europe [3]. However, the cause of the human health impacts (chloracne and cancer) at the Monsanto chemical plant in Nitro took four years or more to determine [4]. There is evidence that by the mid-1950s medical doctors [5], chemical companies and government agencies such as USDA, VA and DOD should have been aware that dioxin TCDD causes chloracne, cancer and other medical issues in workers who are exposed to dioxin TCDD for a significant period of time [3] [4] [5]. Despite this early alarming evidence, harm to human health was not widely shared, seems to have been ignored, and/or was not codified as established medical science.

Agent Orange Manufacturing on the Passaic River in New Jersey
In the 1950s, the Diamond Alkali facilities on the banks of the Passaic River in Newark, New Jersey ( Figure 2), were used to manufacture Agent Orange. Diamond Alkali workers testified in court that they were exposed to Agent Orange, Figure 2. Passaic River, a 27 km dioxin hotspot near Newark, New Jersey and flows into Newark Bay, Hudson River and the Atlantic Ocean. Published with copyright permission from Editor of Open Journal of Soil Science [6]. Map created by Mic Greenberg. which contained the herbicide 2,4,5-T with by-product dioxin TCDD. These workers claimed that the chemical factory floors in the 1950s and 1960s were slick after Agent Orange was spilled or leaked and it was treacherous to walk on them. The contaminant dioxin TCDD which was in Agent Orange, was washed by poorly protected workers into trenches, drains and pipes, which emptied into the Passaic River [6].
In 1971, Diamond Alkali sold the Lister Avenue, New Jersey, facility. The Passaic River, a tidal river, carried dioxin TCDD upstream and downstream, contaminating a 27 km section of the riverbed in one of New Jersey and New York's most populated areas. The river linked to Kill Van Kull and Hudson River, which flows adjacent to and past New York City [6]. The dioxin-contaminated sediment has reached Newark Bay, which is connected by the Kill Van Kull to Hudson River just north of Staten Island.
The Passaic River (Figure 2), which parallels the near-by Hudson River, was an industrial river, with chemical plants that manufactured Agent Orange for use during the Vietnam War during the 1950s and 1960s [6]. During the manufacturing process, the workers at the New Jersey Diamond Alkali facility were exposed to dioxin TCDD [6] as was the lower Passaic River and Newark Bay. Agent Orange was stored on site at Diamond Alkali in 208-liter barrels painted with an orange stripe, then loaded on ocean-going vessels on the Passaic River, and shipped via the Panama Canal Zone [10] to the South China Sea and the coast of Vietnam.
In 1983, sampling of soils and sediments, by the State of New Jersey and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), near 80 Lister Avenue in Newark and the adjacent Passaic River west of Newark Bay, revealed high levels of dioxin TCDD [6]. There were also high levels of PCBs and Hg because of the manufacture of other chemical products. In 2001, the USEPA, in partnership with New Jersey and other federal agencies, cleaned up the Lister Avenue manufacturing site on the Passaic River in Newark, New Jersey. The buildings were torn down and hauled to a landfill ( Figure 3). The site became a gravel parking lot and the dioxin-contaminated soil was removed and incinerated. Today, only a gravel lot remains as part of an abandoned industrial complex [6]. The remediation actions taken in the Passaic River included a pre-1998 floodwall and subsurface treatment system.
The contaminated sediment in the river originating from the Lister site and neighboring lots was covered to prevent additional release of dioxin TCDD into the river. Occidental Chemical Corporation [11] monitored the site [12].   [14]. Tierra Removal dredged the most concentrated inventory of dioxin TCDD contaminated sediment in the river adjacent to the Lister Avenue site. At river mile marker 10.9 the concentrated inventory of highly contaminated mudflat on the east bank of the river near Lyndhurst was dredged and capped [15] [16]. The Passaic River is one of the most polluted hotspots in the United States and site of one of the largest cleanup efforts ever conducted.
In 2014, the USEPA announced a US $1.7 billion plan to remove 3.2 × 10 6 m 3 of toxic sediment contaminated with dioxin TCDD, PCBs, and Hg [6]. The sediments in the lower 13 km of the Passaic River were found to be a major source of the contamination in other sections of the Passaic River and Newark Bay. In March of 2016, a remedy was chosen for the contaminated sediment of the lower Passaic River which included an engineering cap being installed from riverbank to riverbank.
In an attempt to avoid increasing future Passaic River flooding hazard and to maintain the navigation channel, part of the dioxin TCDD-contaminated sediment had to be removed to make room for the cap. The removed dredge material was dewatered and transported by barge to a sediment permitted processing facility on the banks of Newark Bay for disposal [6] [17] [18]. The estimated cost was US $1.38 billion. The USEPA estimated the cost of the cleanup of the lower 27 km of the Passaic River and Newark Bay to be US $6 billion, in addition to US $6 billion in earlier natural resource damages. Cleanups for the remainder of Newark Bay and lower Passaic River are still being planned [11] [14]. Open Journal of Soil Science Exposure to even low levels of contaminants through crab and fish consumption may have long-lasting health effects on people living along the lower Passaic River. The USEPA alerted the public about the prohibitions and advisories on harvesting crabs or fish in the tidal Passaic River and Newark Bay. The advisories and prohibitions, based on levels of Hg, PCBs, and dioxin in tested crabs and fish, are difficult to enforce.
In 2013, several corporations agreed to pay New Jersey US $130 million for ecological damages related to the Passaic River pollution [14]. After 60 years, U.S. companies, such as Diamond Alkali (now Diamond Shamrock), stopped manufacturing Agent Orange with the by-product dioxin TCDD. However, the contaminant has a very long half-life when attached to sediment under water (anaerobic conditions) and remains an environmental problem in the tidal Passaic River and Newark Bay. To this day, fish and crabs from the Passaic River are too contaminated with dioxin TCDD for human consumption and remain a threat to the food supply and human health [6].

Agent Blue, the Arsenic Based Herbicide, Manufacturing on the Menominee River
The Menominee River flows into Lake Michigan via Green Bay ( sin [9]. The contaminated surface water and sediments near Ansul manufacturing plant flowed into the Menominee River. The groundwater and the river bottom sediments are heavily contaminated with arsenic, which was released by  2) Construction of an impermeable barrier to bedrock for about 160,000 m 2 of sediment; 3) Cap or remove 17,000 m 2 of surface soils contaminated with arsenic levels above 16 -32 ppm; 4) To pump and treat contaminated groundwater; 5) The total remediation costs were: 1976-1984, $11 million to pump and treat contaminated groundwater at the southern property border and to install a groundwater interceptor trench [9] in 1998-1999, $12.4 million to remove arsenic-contaminated sediment from the 8 th Street section of the Menominee River and; 6) An impermeable barrier system was installed to bedrock near the 8 th Street slip and adjacent salt vault. In 2012-2013, approximately $25 million was spent to dredge and then cap contaminated river sediments due to an EPA order of the removal of 190,000 m 3 of sediment from the main channel. The project cleanup began in July of 2012 after Ansul (Tyco) Company hired Stevenson Environmental Services of New York as the general contractor.
Arsenic toxicity and health effects are complex and the impact of Agent Blue on human health was not well known for many years. Post-Vietnam War, arsenic-based industrial wood preservatives and herbicides with cacodylic acid  [26] about the "manufacturing process contamination problem", the military was asked to make a decision, since they controlled the process, about which manufacturing process should be used in the future. The U.S. Military officers opted for the faster and cheaper manufactured product with higher levels of dioxin TCDD contaminate; they were running out of Agent Orange and key ingredient 2,4,5-T and the U.S. was in a war. The dioxin TCDD by-product was in four tactical herbicides formulated with 2,4,5-T. These included Agent Purple, Agent Orange, Agent Green and Agent Pink (all but Agent White and Agent Blue). Thus the manufacture of these four contaminated herbicides are associated with risks to the environment and the health of chemical plant and transportation workers who handled tactical herbicides with unknown amounts of dioxin TCDD contaminant [23] [24] [25].
In 1970, President Nixon, the Commander-in-Chief, ordered the DOD to stop spraying Agent Orange. The next year, DOD ordered that all other tactical herbicide spraying be stopped including Agent Blue the arsenic-based herbicide used to destroy the rice crop. Soldiers and Vietnamese support workers removed all remaining tactical herbicides from Vietnam military bases. Agent Orange barrels from these Vietnam military airbases were collected at Bien Hoa Airbase Open Journal of Soil Science (located about 32 km northeast of Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City) and shipped to Johnston Island Atoll in the Pacific Ocean as part of Operation PACER HO. Many of the Agent Orange barrels were damaged in shipping, leaked, and had to be re-drummed or resealed. This exposed the barrel handlers, transporters, and site monitors to 2,4,5-T herbicides contaminated with dioxin TCDD, a cancer-causing substance. Many Vietnam Era veterans who worked in the supply chain and/or were involved in the spraying, Operation Ranch Hand and Operation PACER HO have applied for VA benefits because of their exposure to dioxin TCDD. Each case was handled separately, and most often their attempt to qualify for VA benefits failed initially and their potential benefits were delayed for years. Eventually, after the passage of a 1991 Federal Law most Vietnam Veterans, with boots on the ground in southern Vietnam and exposure to dioxin TCDD were awarded benefits [24] [26]. Because of these initial delays, as their health was deteriorating, Vietnam Era veterans filed a class action litigation in 1977, which took until 1984 to resolve [24].

Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation
In 1965, Dr. R. Emmet Kelly, a Monsanto medical doctor based in St. Louis, Missouri wrote that dioxin was "a potential contaminant" and very likely a potential carcinogen that could cause another epidemic [4] [5]. The Dr. Kelly memo was written near the start of the official American-Vietnam War and at the same time when the U.S. military was ramping up requests for Agent Orange. Four years later, the U.S. State Department terminated its contracts with Monsanto's Nitro Chemical Plant [4] [5]. During those 4 years, the U.S. military exposed thousands of U.S. Vietnam veterans and millions of Vietnamese citizens to dioxin while both Monsanto and Dr. Kelly knew about the dangerous consequences of exposure to dioxin. Monsanto's legal team claimed that Monsanto made improvements at the Nitro Chemical plant (in the 1950s) that reduced worker's exposure to explosion residues. According to the Monsanto legal team, the "systematic residue exposure problems disappeared". However, the workers kept reporting health problems for the next 30 years and long after the 1949 Nitro explosion and subsequent cleanup [5].
On January 8, 1979 Victor J. Yannacone, filed a class action suit, RE: Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (1979)(1980)(1981)(1982)(1983)(1984) [24] [26] on behalf of all the Vietnam Era veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange containing unknown quantities of dioxin TCDD and other tactical herbicides. By the end of the year, Yannacone and associates represented 8300 Vietnam veteran clients in a lawsuit against 11 chemical companies including: Dow Chemical, Thompson-Hayward, Diamond Shamrock, Hercules Inc., Monsanto, Ansul Company (the manufacturer of Agent Blue), Riverdale Chemical Company, Uniroyal (Canada), Occidental Petroleum, Hooker Chemical Company and N.A. Phillips [1].
These chemical companies testified in Federal Court that the U.S. Government was responsible for the injuries claimed by the Vietnam veterans and their families [24] [26]. In addition, the companies argued that the U.S. Government, were manufactured and sprayed during the Vietnam War [24]. This specific collection is unique, as it represents the years of document and material collection in preparation for the landmark, "Agent Orange" legal action with regard to its contaminant dioxin and could include information and records about other tactical herbicides, including Agent Blue.
The resulting out-of-court settlement was of crucial importance in providing countless Vietnam veterans and their families exposed to dioxin and perhaps arsenic with much needed financial support and restitution [24]. The settlement also resulted in the temporary storage of nearly 1000 boxes of printed materials

2,4,5-T Product Liability Litigation
Liability litigation for 2,4,5-T products post-Vietnam war continues to gather evidence of the toxic effects associated with the herbicide manufacturing processes. In 1976, there was an explosion at a 2,4,5-T manufacturing plant in Seveso, Italy. More than 170 workers and residents had chloracne and thousands of animals died providing additional evidence that dioxin associated with 2,4,5-T is extremely toxic. In the 1970s, Caro Van Strum, a mother of five living in Riv- workers, an event that occurred more than 30 years before and the workers continued to be ill [5]. They assumed that their health issues related to the, 2,4,5-T product production conditions which continued until 1985 while they worked there. Many of these workers did not work in the Nitro Chemical plant during the explosion nor participated in the clean-up the explosion chemical residues.
Monsanto feared a negative verdict in the 2,4,5-T case and tried to keep Nitro worker's health problems, associated with 2,4,5-T production with the by-product

Results and Selected Agent Orange Manufacturing Study Site Findings
After an extensive literature search, North America herbicide manufacturing sites where 95% of the Agent Orange with 2,4,5-T and unknown amounts of the dioxin TCDD contaminate was produced were identified and evaluated. Authors collected data on seven chemical plant sites in the United States and one in Canada ( Figure 1) to assess environmental impacts and current mitigation and monitoring conditions. The EPA has identified many of these same sites and some are designated as EPA Superfund sites.

Case 1. Monsanto in Nitro, West Virginia
The city of Nitro, West Virginia (WV) ( However, agricultural researchers realized the potential of herbicides to control weeds in crop production could be a game changer by reducing/eliminating weed pressure thereby improving crop access to water and nutrients needed for increased yields. In 1945 the USDA approved the use of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T as herbicides for the domestic market. These chemicals were highly effective, reduced labor-intensive weed management, and were quickly adopted by farmers to control weeds in their cropping systems and by homeowners seeking dandelion-free lawns and productive home gardens with less hand-weeding. American Chemical Paint Company sold 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T mixtures in the 1950s using the name "Weedone." This is the first known use of these two herbicides in combination (10 years before the decision to use Agent Purple in the Vietnam War and 15 years before Agent Orange). The company claimed the product would kill over 100 different kinds of weeds and woody plants. Suburban homeowners could easily wipe out unwanted weeds and shrubs in their gardens and create weed-free green lawns. American Chemical advertised that it was "harmless to people and pets" and that claim was not evaluated or challenged by public agencies [26]. Environmental and medical studies on herbicides with dioxin contaminated by-products were not well known at that time and the US Environmen- Chemical manufacturing in Nitro, West Virginia has had environmental and worker health impacts and contentious histories. The Kanawha River water and groundwater in the alluvium have been adversely affected by industrial activities [31]. The Fike/Artel Chemical site was determined to be environmentally impaired and placed on the EPA National Priority List of Superfund sites ( Figure   9). The site is a former WWI chemical munitions plant where subsequent chemical manufacturing, including Agent Orange, reclamation and waste disposal occurred.
Dioxin was recognized as a health risk nationally and internationally in 1949 workers were ill because of their own "lifestyle" choices (many were smokers and drinkers). The jury trial lasted for almost one year. The Calwell legal team, which was partially funded by the U.S. Steel Workers Union, had to prove that Monsanto "knowingly exposed its workers to chemical contamination" at its Nitro plant. Monsanto was less than forthcoming about health risks when working at the 2,4,5-T chemical plant in Nitro. Dr. R. Emmet Kelly did not inform 2,4,5-T chemical plant workers of potential "health risk" since the "risks were only suspect". A lot of money was on the table; a judgement against Monsanto would have meant billions of dollars, not millions, in liability and the company could not afford to lose such a high profile case.
After 5 days of deliberation, the jury, having a moral dilemma, emerged with a verdict and a "consensus statement of our feeling" to be read into the court record after the verdict was announced [5]. The jury admitted that a "preponderance of the evidence showed dioxin contributed to some of the health effects the plaintiffs now exhibited". However, the jury could not find in favor of the plaintiffs because "Monsanto did not show a willful, wanton, and reckless attitude towards its workers health and safety," a legal bar established by the Mandolidis precedent (greatly expanded a worker's right to sue an employer even if covered by workers' compensation program). The jury did chastise Monsanto for not trying to determine the full impact of dioxin on the health of its workers.
However, the Monsanto workers must also exercise reasonable judgement in insuring their own good health and they should also have asked safety questions of Monsanto when the health problems became commonly recognized. of Nitro workers came from company-financed labs." It was impossible for the jury make such a determination [5].
The jury members said later that not enough evidence was available to convince them that Monsanto had been reckless in handling of chemicals. However, the evidence did exist. In 1983, the EPA had produced a map of the area sur-

Case 2. Dow Chemical Company in Midland, Michigan
The Dow Chemical 770 ha facility adjacent to the Tittabawassee River ( Figure   11) in Midland, Michigan ( Figure 1) began operating in 1897 ( Figure 12). Past waste disposal practices at the Midland Chemical Plant have resulted in both onand off-site contamination. Contamination has been exacerbated by flood events ( Figure 13) when contaminated sediment settled on the floodplains and created natural levees along some riverbanks ( Figure 14). Elevated dioxin levels downstream, in and along the river, have been primarily attributed to particles in liquid wastes that were historically discharged into the river from the Dow Chemical facility during the manufacturing of chlorine-based products in early 1900s [32]. Dioxin attaches to eroded soil particles [1] and sediment and was transported over 80 km downriver through the Tittabawassee and Saginaw Rivers and into Saginaw Bay and Lake Huron.
From the 1950s until the early 1970s, the Dow Chemical company produced Agent Orange at their Midland plant [33]. In 1978, Dow Chemical posted advisories warning that fish in the river had high levels of dioxin. In 1981, President Ronald Reagan appointed Valdus Adamkus to Regional 5 office of the USEPA with the task to study how dioxin pollution was leaking into the Great Lakes [32]. The Adamkus report found that the Midland "Dow Chemical plant was   responsible for some dioxin pollution and a cancer risk". The media reported that Dow Chemical called the USEPA report "trash". In 1983, Congressional hearings were held and Adamkus revealed that Dow was allowed (by USEPA) to help rewrite the report on dioxin contamination in the waterways [34]. Adamkus testified that, "It was unusual, unethical, and unprofessional to get the internal document approved by an outside private company." In 1985, Dow denied it was the source of high dioxin levels found in fish.  Mary Gade was forced to resign to avoid being fired. A Dow spokesperson told the public that, "The Environmental Report" Michigan and the USEPA were using was "bad science" and that "dioxin is not as dangerous as the public thinks".
The American Chemistry Council asked EPA to withdraw the Dow dioxin report from interagency review, since the EPA did not consider the "economic impact of the report" and therefore the assessment was flawed. Starting in 2013, EPA had a plan for cleaning up soil and sediment contaminated by dioxin [31].
Dioxin has a long half-life (over 100 years) when attached to sediment and under water (anaerobic conditions) [1]. The cleanup plan called for the project to be

Cleanup of Tittabawassee River and Dow Facilities in Midland, Michigan
In 2009, Dow and the EPA reached an agreement about cleaning up dioxin [35].
Over the years, Dow selected specific dioxin hotspots to clean up. Besides fish, it was determined that people should not eat chickens they raised or eggs because the birds pecking in the contaminated soil could result in the consumption of dioxin and could be introduced into the human food chain. Hunters were warned not to eat any game killed along the Tittabawassee and Saginaw Rivers due to the potential for bioaccumulation of dioxin [1].
Dow is implementing site cleanup under EPA oversight. To effectively manage the cleanup effort, the Tittabawassee River was divided into 7 segments ranging in length from 5 to 6 km. Work was done in stages starting at the Dow facility and working downstream [35]. Approximately 2 km of riverbank were stabilized to keep contaminated soil from eroding back into the river [35]. Segment 3 is a 6 km stretch of river, which starts 10 km below the confluence  Energy) and Dow to inspect and evaluate all previously constructed areas and determine which areas require additional maintenance [35].

Middleground Island on the Saginaw River
In early 2020, EPA proposed a cleanup plan for the residential properties on Middleground Island in the Saginaw River. Middleground Island is located 11 km upriver from Saginaw Bay. About 6 ha of the 71 ha island was anticipated to require cleanup, soil removal and replacement. Not every home will need a cleanup. At residential properties where soil tests show dioxin levels above 250 ppt the dioxin-contaminated soil will be removed, replaced with clean soil, and

Case 3. Agent Orange Manufacturing at Elmira, Ontario, Canada and Use at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Gagetown, New Brunswick, Canada
Naugatuck This is the only known site, outside the United States, that formulated and manufactured Agent Orange [37] [38]. However, there were other sites, including    Minister of Natural Resources, David Orazietti, apologized to Canadian workers who handled the 2,4,5-T herbicide with unknown amounts of dioxin TCDD [37]. Hydro path, forestry and road workers in Ontario were likely exposed to Agent Orange, the same weed-killing, disease-causing chemical used during the Vietnam War, and/or a similar commercial version. Jeanne Stellman commented regarding findings from a 219-page report commissioned by the province in 2011 and released in 2013, "These are conditions that just would not be tolerated today… And it is not surprising that some people are going to be sick" [41].
Stellman was a co-author of the long awaited, independent, report on the use and impact of the herbicide 2,4,5-T by the provincial agencies from 1947 to 1979. The committee report was delayed several times after receiving more records that expected. Approximately 4700 of the records were used in the national report, which was posted on the Ministry of Natural Resources website [41].   Starting in 1971, after an inspection by KDHE, THCC, planning to install a liner for the process waste aeriation lagoon was started, environmental discrepancies are recorded. In January, 1975 the chemical company management requested an Independence, Missouri landfill service to contract to remove 11,356 liters per week of waste, described as hazardous brine and a statement that every precaution must be taken to prevent runoff into streams. The service, Rumble Services Company, after two months reached out to KDHE for approval to inject, 11

Case Study 6
The  Figure 24). In addition, 585 mt of contaminated sludges, liquids, and solids were found abandoned in approximately 100 of the 190 production tanks that had been used in the manufacturing process. Hercules, one of the largest U.S. producers of Agent Orange for the DOD, manufactured more than 6.36 million kg of herbicide at this plant [51]. The public health impacts of Hercules Powder Corporation production processes were very high. After Arkansas health officials found, in June 1979 that 13 of 74 current employees had indicators of chloracne, the company requested assistance. A 25-member team of medical specialists began on July 25, 1979 to seek clues to this dioxin Vietnam War legacy starting with 150 past and current employees [52]. The investigation became part of "the nation's poster child for industrial negligence" and led to the 1980 passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as the Superfund law. Created to deal with abandoned sites of industrial pollution, CERCLA was authorized to tax and fine companies to recover clean-up costs [53]. Hercules sold the operation to Vertac in 1976, but the sale was protracted and not concluded until after 1999 [54].   [56]. Sediment was sampled for dioxin at over a dozen sites across the Spring River, which bisected the Hoffman-Taff Verona plant, after dioxin was found in fish tissue. EPA well monitoring was considered only a precaution since dioxin was thought to be immobile in groundwater. Monitoring found chlorobenzene, the same chemical family as toluene currently manufactured at the plant and also 1,4-dioxane, a colorless liquid substance which can easily leach from soil into groundwater [57] [58] [59].
Although the of quantity was small and the time period short that contaminated Agent Orange herbicide was manufactured at this plant compared to other sites, there is much to be learned from the consequences of human fallibility and mismanagement of waste storage. Four plant employees were responsible for waste disposal. Two senior plant officers, a foreman and an employee allowed at least 85 barrels of waste to be dumped on the employee's Barry County farm in July 1971. Earlier that year a St Louis based firm, Independent Petrochemical Corp, brokered a deal with the NEPACCO company president to have a private waste oil hauler between February and October 1971 haul at least 66,240 liters of still bottoms using a 13,250-liter tanker truck. Still bottoms are the thick sticky layers of solids that accumulate at the bottom of the chemical reaction tank during manufacturing at high temperatures. Not all of the waste products were mixed with used crankcase oil from 1000 to 2000 service stations and delivered to refineries for disposal. Instead, the hauler used the mixed oil waste and applied it at thirty different locations to control dust in horse arenas and on dirt roads in the town of Times Beach, Missouri. Nearly 100 horses, hundreds of birds and wildlife died. Children, adults, arena owners and others were sickened. Homeowners in Times Beach reported illnesses which Missouri Health, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and US EPA determined to be dioxin based.
This determination was made one month before the Merrimac River flooded the entire community with 3 m of water. This caused closure of the town with a 2500 population in December of 1982 due to dioxin contamination. Earlier in October 1979, an anonymous tip was made to the USEPA regarding hazardous wastes that had been dumped on a Verona farm. Much earlier, in 1973, before either of these discoveries, one horse arena owner working with a 23-year-old state health department veterinarian provided documentation of dioxin contaminated waste oil spraying linked to the animal's sickness [59]. However, Missouri state agency leadership did not act on this report [ landfills of concern, but the report does not list the superfund site at Verona even though the Spring River divides the superfund site [55]. The decision to use company employees to dump barrels was likely a cost saving decision since the DOD was no longer paying for the tactical herbicide products and/or for their proper disposal [67] [68]. Why did it take so long for workers, waste disposal contractors and health departments to recognize and act on reports of animal and human health problems and the connections to the disposal of dioxin contaminated waste materials? Verona now has an action committee which has obtained a grant to conduct a community cancer related health study [69]. former employees, was often already addressed by the company before the complaint reached the authorities. For example, one such complaint resulted in the search for buried metal production kettles that summer, but the State received the complaint in September. This almost a hand-glove relationship between the company and the state is found in the voluminous records created. One good illustration is a unique map the consultants proposed in January 1984 of restricted and unrestricted zones for worker safety. This and other consultant products were used in the KDHE Dioxin TCDD containment plan that summer [47]. The 1984 draft covenant for Thompson-Hayward had a restriction clause not to disturb the soil by digging. This clause was set to expire in 1990 [45]. Whether this clause was ever or will be filed with the Wyandotte Kansas County is not known, but it does show the advantages of establishing a close working relationship. Thus, in Jacksonville, Vertac used the Jacksonville Municipal Landfill ( Figure   27) and also the private Rogers Road Landfill to dispose of a small amount of the stored 208-litter drums of still bottom byproduct. How much would have been disposed of is unknown, since the State of Arkansas did not renew the landfill permit in 1974 due to high water table caused by the nearby Metro Bayou [70].

Disposal of the Still Bottom Byproduct, the Hazardous Waste Tetrachloro-Dibenzo-Para-Dioxin, or TCDD by Two Decades of Dumping, New Incineration Technology, Landfills, and Environmental Covenants
In the early 90's over 152 cubic meters of dioxin contaminated soil was removed from Rogers Road Landfill and transported 10 km across Jonesville, AR to the incinerator at the Vertac plant [71]. In Missouri, transport of dioxin waste and contaminated soil to and from dumps was more extensive.  The Blue Goose had proven its capacity to destroy hazardous wastes ( Figure   26). However, it was limited to smaller sites and did not lead to the exceptional environmental damage that Times Beach, Missouri experienced [70]. The MIS was not completely mobile as the one hectare support infrastructure demonstrated. Thus the Blue Goose did not always protect the public from hazards of transporting waste through populated areas. US EPA MIS were installed on existing infrastructure. For example, the Vertac Plant in Jacksonville, Arkansas mobile incinerator treated 9000 mt of still bottom waste, soil, and debris in 1992-94. After public outcry due to worry of ash drift exposure, the remaining Vertac Superfund waste was moved to Coffeyville, Kansas for incineration [72].
The last recorded use of the "mobile" EPA incinerator was the 1996-1997 disposal of 400 mt of soil and material from the Bliss Tank Farm, Frontenac, Missouri, a St. Louis suburb located along Deer Run creek. Soil was excavated four feet below the six waste oil storage tanks Russel Bliss used to store recycled oil and mixed in 1971 with dioxin TCDD contaminated sludge from the Hoffman-Taff Corporation. The tarp covered dump trucks drove down Lindbergh Blvd to the incinerator to dispose of the soil. The incinerator for Times Beach cleanup, was set up in mid-1990s for visitors to view at the Route 66 State Park [73].
Maintenance of the superfund landfills was planned as part of each hazardous waste cleanup. Maintenance of superfund sites has been dependable when large corporate owned chemical plant or municipal ownership ensures a source of funds, labor and equipment. However, where there is private ownership, reliable quality maintenance is problematic. A tale of two consent maintenance agreements illustrates this. One is funded and staffed; the other orphaned.
The Vertac Superfund site in Jacksonville, Arkansas is maintained and staffed by the Terracon Consultants, Inc. The Jacksonville Municipal Landfill Superfund site is maintained by the city which is directed to maintain the privately owned Rogers Road Landfill Superfund site [71] [72] [74] [75]. The Denny Farm had a consent agreement with Syntex drawn in 1980. Today with dioxin waste still detectable in the trench used to dump drums of waste the site is neglected ( Figure  25). In spite of a letter from Missouri to Syntex in 2020, the invasion of trees and animal damage to critical sections has not been corrected [66] [76]. During the inspection in 2022 the Missouri DNR staff stated the owners of the private land Open Journal of Soil Science could not be found [77]. Apparently, the chemical company Syntex, because they never owned the land, did not accept the responsibility of maintaining the superfund landfill; first a private dump and then used by EPA as the incinerator site. Other dumps which are also private appear similarly neglected which indicates a systemic problem [70] [76].
Both superfund site inspections found animal damage with different outcomes. Inspectors were accompanied by a company maintenance supervisor and the damage was repaired the same day ( Figure 27). Material, gravel base rock, tools and labor were funded and available. The damage observed in 2018 and letters sent to the private company in 2020 had no affect ( Figure 28 and Figure   29). Concern for the integrity of the plastic liner, only 50 to 75 cm below grade, from animal damage and also tree root penetration has not been addressed [74] [75] [76] [77].
Recognizing that remediation to remove public health hazards from waste disposal sites could be a perpetual problem the EPA wrote initial agreements as the basis for eventual land use restrictions or environment covenants to be rec-   East, the BCP Inc. plant in Verona, Missouri restricts only soil disturbance and ground water use. In 2022 two covenants for Syntex North, restrict groundwater use, and Syntex West restricts not only groundwater but also residential development, agricultural, forestry, recreation, and general access. The groundwater concern is due to a new contaminate, 1,4-dioxane found in 2016 [78].

Agent Orange Transportations from United States and Canada to the South China Sea via Railroads to the Gulf of Mexico and Ocean-Going Ships Which Traveled through the Panama Canal
It appears that Agent Orange was stored in 208-liter barrels at the manufactur- All these sites had good rail service to Gulfport, Mississippi or Mobile, Alabama. There is good documentation, that these Agent Orange barrels and crates were off loaded from railroad cars using cranes and stored on the Gulfport Navy base ( Figure 31) or Mobile and Gulfport docks for loading onto ocean-going ships ( Figure 32). However, the Gulfport base commander claims that the records about Agent Orange storage on the base before 1982 (including the Vietnam War years from 1962 to 1971 when tactical herbicides were sprayed) were virtually non-existent [81].   Mississippi required the temporary storage of Agent Orange barrels and crates on the port and harbor docks, which were insufficient to meet military needs. While in temporary storage some of the barrels leaked. As environmental concerns increased over time, federal agencies tracked the pollution in the soil and water including the groundwater. However, the residents of the nearby neighborhood suggested in a U.S. Navy sponsored survey that human health issues did not receive sufficient attention. Surveyors and civilians hired by the Navy walked the streets around the base to talk with the residents [81]. What they discovered left some of the surveyors with "significant emotional stress". Suzanne Collum, who grew up a block north of the Gulfport Navy base lost her father to cancer and had an infant daughter diagnosed with leukemia. Her neighbor had two learning disability children. Her own children suffered re-occurring reproductive problems. Collum said the neighborhood had a lot of heart problems, liver problems, and especially kidney problems. The neighborhood, a few blocks from the Gulfport Navy base had 13 disabled children in a five-block area.

Transport and Fate of Agent Orange and Commercial Herbicides 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T
A recently released report of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) focused on the actions needed to improve the accuracy and communication of information regarding storage and field-testing locations of Agent Orange outside of Vietnam [87] including Kelly Air Force Base in Texas [88].
This GAO report confirmed that the Military Sea Transportation Service directly chartered merchant vessels to carry tactical herbicides [89] through the Panama Canal during the Vietnam War ( Figure 6). These tactical herbicides, including  Figure 37). This would have been in addition to the Agent Blue barrels shipped from South Vietnam directly and from Johnston Open Journal of Soil Science

Summary
The human health impacts on the chemical plant workers who manufactured Agent Orange at seven locations in the United States and one site in Canada have been documented. More than 1600 civilian workers who were exposed to dioxin TCDD have become ill and many died prematurely. The pollution at these chemical plant sites adjacent rivers and in groundwater is well known within each affected state and location. In this paper we assessed the long-term effects on land, groundwater, and river resources at the sites where Agent these chemical weapons, who were exposed to dioxin TCDD during and after the Vietnam War and treatment of their offspring.

Discussion
In After USAID funded studies, the DOD contributed $330 million to Vietnam to help clean up the dioxin TCDD hotspots, including Bien Hoa. Nine senators traveled to Vietnam in 2019 to provide $30 million (USAID has contributed funds) to help address the Vietnamese health issues from exposure to dioxin TCDD and arsenic during the Vietnam War. In addition, the VA, over time, has made it easier for U.S. Vietnam Era veterans to qualify for benefits if they were exposed to dioxin TCDD or arsenic. Both the United States and Vietnam environments and people were harmed.
An overlooked group was the U.S. civilian workers, including chemical plant workers, transport workers, railroad workers, dockworkers and herbicide applicators and disposal workers, who were exposed to dioxin TCDD and arsenic while manufacturing, transporting, applying or disposing of tactical herbicides during and after the Vietnam War. The U.S. Government as in past conflicts, mobilized its industrial sector, but this time a niche commercial sector to produce the tactical herbicides. These chemical plants, located at the transportation junctions of rail lines, rivers and ports exposed a wide sector of our chemical and agricultural industry's workers to carcinogen agents. The workers, then, were both loyal and patriotic. Today, many of those still living and their families are asking questions. What happened during those years working on the "Government Project"? Are the "Brownfields" of dioxin-tainted production buildings and parking lots, loading docks and treatment lagoons, the pastures and woodlands covering the remaining dioxin encased clay sediments, and streams and lakes with dioxin in fish tissue safe for re-use? What must yet be done to make them safe?
Clearly more research on these questions is needed. One critical concern is the level and funding of on-going site monitoring and maintenance programs necessary to ensure remediation efforts are effective and public health is protected.
Covenants on titles will inform prospective land buyers of superfund properties, but only where recorded and only transactions requiring searched titles. Neighboring land sales, next to superfund sites, are and will remain uninformed sales unless maintained fences have visible signs indicating a superfund site is next to the property line. Action groups to study carcinogen impacts are a positive action, but ineffective without local County and State Health guidance. The business-government relationship model needs study. To achieve socially responsible desired outcomes, it is not enough for government bureaucracy to only deny actions of contracted business without fuller understanding by all parties of the remediation and necessary maintenance required to ensure safe land uses. Business-sociological studies of ethical methods and business model relations with Open Journal of Soil Science government contracts (between private businesses and the military) will better prepare our nation in times of war for better future outcomes.

Conclusions
During Unfortunately, six years later, U.S. government and military ignored the findings that 2,4,5-T with unknown amounts of dioxin TCDD was a carcinogen. In the early 1960s using the War Powers Act of 1950, President Kennedy and his administration decided to require 11 American chemical companies to manufacture, using a pre-determined formulation, tactical herbicides containing 2,4,5-T for the Vietnam War. In addition to U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers on the battlefield, American civilian chemical plant and transport workers were also exposed to 2,4,5-T with unknown amounts of dioxin TCDD, a known carcinogen, at manufacturing facilities at seven sites in the United States and one in Canada. After more than 60 years, the human health and environmental consequences of the manufacture of tactical herbicides, a military and environmental chemical weapon, on United States civilian workers and local environments persists and still requires education, remediation, and mitigation.