How a Country Can Reach the Top World Shipping Position by Creating Leading Companies? The Late John Angelicoussis Case Study

The number of Greek-owned shipping companies achieved a fast growth starting from 256 shipping companies in 1914, 600 by 2017 (within the Greek borders only), and 1057 in 1990. The number of shipping companies and the ships they own (dwt), finally determine the Greek owned fleet. This fleet owns 350.5 m dwt in 2021 (early). Greeks having ship-owning and ship-management in their tradition, and as a way of life, taught carefully these two concepts within their families. Shipowners-fathers cared for their children endowing them with a number of ships, including know-how. The way ship-owning families increased their size, the same way family members found their way towards creating their own, more powerful, shipping company! Moreover, a decade, or so, ago, we considered shipping industry as one dominated exclusively by men, but this is not true anymore. Angeliki Frangou and Anna Angelicoussis are two leading shipping married women, managing both ~27 m dwt. By 2016 we counted 77 leading Greek-owned shipping companies owning/managing almost 300 m dwt (93.5% of total Greek-owned fleet of 321 m dwt). Thus, the main suggestion for Nations wanting to excel in shipping is: “Create ship-owning families”! Leaders we consider those owning ≥1 m dwt each.


Introduction
Greek 1 shipowners pursued all along a specific growth strategy and this way they arrived at top world positions, not only in the distant past, but also in 2021, in a continuous manner for longer than 7 decades (Figure 1).
The Greek-owned fleet increased from 170 m dwt (in mid-2007), to ~349 m dwt (in mid-2018), a double figure in 11 years, owning 4536 ships 2 (av. size 100,000 dwt) and an almost 18% share in global fleet. The growth was fast, especially since mid-2009. A stagnation period, however, of 2 years occurred, due to Global Financial Crisis-GFC in end-2008end- , i.e., from mid-2007end- to mid-2009 Greek-owned fleet operated 32% tankers, and 23% bulk carriers. Interesting is that 30% of Greek-owned ships were "gas carriers", carrying LNG, of which 15% concerned chemical products. Greek shipowners entered into the ownership of LNG ships in 2004 for the first time ( Figure 2).
Greek 3 LNG fleet appeared in 2004, and doubled from 24 units (2012) to 48 (2014), and it is going to reach 104 ships by 2021 (by 28 on order). This indicates the global decisions to use less fossil fuels. Nowadays, due to the climatic collapse, there is a global and European turn, more decisive than hitherto towards Source: UNCTAD, HIS Markit annual report; modified. that the supply for ship services can be influenced by one big charterer, and more so by a number of big charterers (e.g., the 7 oil sisters); the supply of ship services, when massive, can also affect supply and thus freight rates (cases: Sanko 6 ; Eletson). Managers should have this possibility in mind.
For Stopford, a (shipping) company is a technical unit which hires transport services to those having to transport their produced goods from port of production to port of consumption. The shipowner is also the manager, and he/she decides what type, age and size etc. of a vessel to buy or build, judging mainly by her price vis-à-vis her freight rate. The sad fact is that, among shipowners, "the right hand does not know what the left one does", and thus many may build ships, which may not be needed... In 2004, Stopford (p. 84) counted 5518 deep sea shipping companies owning 36,903 ships or 7 units per company (globally). The majority of companies (37%) owned from 10 to 49 ships, while about 4000 owned <5. So, the majority (72.5%) are small companies. Stopford (2009) argued that "a Greek shipowner forms a private company to run a small tight organization under his control, making all decisions personal-ly… He is concerned, rather exclusively, with the sale and purchase of ships, and whether to tie them on long-time charters or not". Surely, Greeks prefer personal, or family management, and ownership, and dislike Stock Exchanges (Goulielmos, 2021), but the size of their companies are not anymore small. Late Angelicoussis J, e.g., owned about 25 m dwt in 2018 (2 nd quarter). 4 Ships owned by Greeks by majority (50%+). 5 Couper et al. (1999) and Harlaftis (1996) defined Greek traditional shipowners as those who-after 2 nd WW-were shipowners during at least two generations.
The literature about "the theory of the firm" is disappointing: Archibald (1971) wrote: "the theory of the firm is neither obvious nor explained" (p. 9)... Scientists spent much effort to establish firm's objective. And the common answer was that a firm "maximizes profits"; more clearly, it tries to widen the gap between total revenue and total cost: Max. Profits = max. (TR − TC) {1}, where TR is total revenue and TC is total cost. As this is a geometrical problem, we know that equation {1} is fulfilled, when MC (marginal cost) = MR (marginal revenue) {2}. Equation {2} can also be written 7 : MC = Freight rate (FR) (1 − 1/e) {6}, where e stands for elasticity of demand 8 . Besanko et al. (2013: p. 27) called equation {6} a managerial way to use MR.
Let company's total average variable cost be AVC, then the contribution (Cont.) of the freight rate to company's profits, is given by: Cont. = (FR-AVC)/(FR) {7}. This indicates that if a shipping company faces a freight rate FR, and if e > 1/(FR-AVC)/(FR) {8}, then company has to lower AVC in order to be profitable. Firms can know their marginal cost, only at equilibrium, as there: MC = AC 9 ! The matter we do not like in the above approach of economists is that the reader takes {1} as achievable, and not as an effort. In a shipping firm we know that freight rate is determined by Supply and Demand, and firm tries always to achieve TC < TR {9}. If a shipping company cannot make TC < TR, then the unit (ship) closes up for a time, till TC < TR. If this continues for say a long time (3 years or over), the unit is sold or scrapped.
Thus, for a shipping firm we have to define its objective as that of determining firm's total cost so that to be below prevailing total revenue (Q × FR = TR {10}), constantly. This is known as a "constrained minimization of total cost, given price exogenously determined". Moreover, a shipping company is a multi-plant firm as ships normally are many in a company. Profit maximization requires then MCi = MRi {11} by all units (where i = 1, 2, 3, , n). Couper et al. (1999: pp. 62-63) described Greek shipowners 10 as many being ex-sea captains. In the past, Greeks owned 1 ship, sailed in command to gain capital, trading reliability and creditworthiness. Then they came ashore and developed their companies with an eye at the 2 nd hand markets. Small companies were created and run by only 1 man.
There were intermarriages between families of company owners, something happening till this day. Offices were staffed by relatives, retaining close business 7 Proof: the elasticity of demand is by definition: e = −p/q dq/dp {3} and MR = p + q dp/dq {4} as the derivative of TR; putting {3} into {4}, we derive: MR = p (1 − 1/e) {5} (Henderson & Quandt, 1958: p. 168). 8 An invention of Alfred Marshall. 9 Let a freight rate be $10 per dwt and firm's AVC = $5 per dwt. Thus, the Cont. is $0.50 (to profits). Profits then may increase if AVC is lowered, but this is possible only if e > 2 (1/0.5). 10 Changes in Greek crew structures occurred: first argument was that Greek labor force, out of only 6 m people then, cannot serve a shipping climbed-up at the top global positions. The 2 nd argument was that many competitive maritime nations used non-nationals, even most of EU members-including Norway-after 1986 (in dual registries). Thus, Greek shipowners tried to reduce nationals on board by reducing the number of ratings first. The third argument, which was similar to the first, was that national officers were fewer than needed, let alone their quality. and family links. They used to contribute cash as shareholders, and seafarers did the same (mutual dependence). The State allowed 11 , in 2000s, Greek shipowners to have on board 6 nationals, out of a maximum number of say 16, no matter their rank, except for the Captain. In our opinion this deprived shipping from shipowners coming from six ex-sea officers. These new crew teams, however, liked by Greek shipowners. Couper et al. (1999)-based mainly on one Greek maritime historian (Harlaftis, 1996)-singled-out 6 features of growth and success of the modern Greek shipping industry (Graph 1).
Greeks admit that, after all, they have only two, as they call them, heavy industries: Tourism and Shipping, forgetting that God gave them "brain-B" to compensate them from a lack of natural resources (coal, oil, iron ore-except lignite)! He gave them also Sea, Sun and Sand. Greeks… do not use B, however, except if they work abroad… Tenold (2015) argued that the success of a shipping company depends on some seemingly unrelated factors: analytical skills, hard work, and luck. Worth noting is that not all Greek-owned shipping companies were lucky. But their failures had a common cause: "they attempted a very rapid tonnage expansion, out of safe limits, helped by abundant finance provided by inexperienced banks…or even insurance companies"! "Adriatic Tankers 12 " (Pan. Zissimatos) e.g., caused a disaster (Stokes, 1997: pp. 113-115). It, till early 1990s, was successful dealing with up to 40 chemical and crude oil tankers. In 1992 its manager decided to expand to 100 vessels fast! And Source: Inspired by Couper et al., 1999: p.  this regardless if freight rates would support company's cash flow, or if ships' off-hire would increase… The amount needed ($240 m, to repay it in 10 years) it was derived from the US bond market over a private placement based only on ships' evaluations. In 1995, the company collapsed, mainly due to not paying crew, bunkers suppliers and ship chandlers; involved was also ITWF (the sea labor union).
Lelakis A, experienced also the collapse of "Regency Cruises" in 1980-1990. This made Stokes (1997 to copy what "Savile G-Marquese of Halifax"-said: "the best way to suppose what may come, is to remember what is passed". Amanatides acquired the "Tidal Marine" in 1966 and turned it into a fast-growing shipping company by 1969, buying 3 ships. An IPO in 1970 provided additional 10 ships in 12 months. In 1972, the company owned 45 ships (0.70 m dwt). Company's budget exploded in 1972, due to a severe cash flow crisis, helped by the 1971-1972 slump.
"Hellenic lines" (Callimanopulos) embarked on a $320 m containership program, in early 1980s, to serve Middle East, but this was not possible by 1983. An unfriendly bank (and leader, who put $80m) arrested a number of company's ships 13 .
Drawing the main conclusion from the above, in shipping business, frequently, we say: "Sky is the limit" … but for a tentative fall from up there, one needs counter-means to avoid catastrophe.

Part I: The Conditions in the International &
Greek-Owned Shipping Industry, 1979-1985 There was a temporary market improvement in 1979-1980. The previous boom in dry cargoes reversed (March 1981). The Panamax vessel had an income of $5500/day less in 11 months, out of $14,000 she earned before; and in 1982 she lost a further $4200/day. Figure 5 presents the world fleet in lay-up 14 (unemployed). As shown, in 1982 the world laid-up fleet was 85 m dwt (top; about 16% of World fleet). The situation improved after 1987, showing then 18 m dwt laid-up (~4% of World fleet). It seems that 5 m dwt was a minimum for that period (1% of global fleet) to be a normal lay-up amount. This case tells us that the choice of a banker has to be made very careful so that bankers to support a shipowner especially at the low phase of the cycle. 14 Laid-up tonnage is a main indicator of how much profit can be derived from freight markets.    tors, but in 1985 this proved to be disastrous, as both sectors hit -one after the other. Table 2 summarizes the changes in 1985-a crisis year occurred to the Greek-owned fleet.
As shown, 276 ships sold and 286 scrapped in one year (=562) by Greek shipowners, but these ships were smaller than the 254 ones bought (economies of scale). The total fleet, however, did not grow this time as it finally lost ~6 m dwt.
Greek shipowners-as optimistic personalities-from the 2 nd half of 1982 to the 1 st half of 1983-ordered 153 ships of ~7 m dwt and bought 4 -5 2 nd hand ships per week, having a fleet of 47 m GRT (85 m dwt) or 12.5% of world fleet! Flagging-out noted in 1982-3, intense for the first time, as well about 15 m dwt high was in lay-up in 1983 (Jan.) (or 764 ships) (Goulielmos, 1998(Goulielmos, , 2000.

Part II: The Legal Framework Prepared to Repatriate
Greek-Owned Foreign Shipping Companies to Greece,

1953-1994
The above is a topic rarely investigated. Its coin has two sides (Graph 2).

History
The number of shipping offices established by Greeks (Harlaftis, 1996: pp. 270-271) in 1914, were 256 worldwide, and mainly in London, New York and Piraeus. These companies increased, between 1958 and 1990, 3 times, from 352 to 1057. By 1975, Piraeus obtained 16 the lion's share with 76%. Surely, it is not only the number of shipping companies that matters, but also their fleet (consolidation).

State's Privileges Granted to Foreign Shipping Companies
The Greek state prepared, in 1953, a legal framework to repatriate about 300 Greek shipping companies, established abroad, to Greece. This was the 1 st and most clever attempt with law 2687 . In 1968, the Greek dictators also decided to offer certain privileges 17 to shipping companies so that to Source: author.
Graph 2. Greek-owned shipping companies. 16 Harlaftis (1996). The return of Greek-owned shipping companies from NY and London to Piraeus coincided with the return of the country to parliamentary democracy in 1974. The return of Greek-owned ships to Greek flag coincided with year 1957 and 1980-1981. 17 Re-located from Middle East to Greece, in 1967, due to the crisis there. Already given to commercial/industrial foreign companies in 1967 (law 87). This triggered a series of subsequent laws to amend the previous ones. As a result of the above, Greeks (Shipping Ministry) started to register-down the number of foreign shipping companies acting in the State, controlled by Greeks (by majority), which transferred their domicile from abroad to Greece, under the special legislation 21 ( Figure 6) and they had to import a certain amount of $ into the country.
Moreover, the Greek state focused its interest on the amount of foreign exchange imported 22 by the attracted companies-separated in administration cost and in the remaining one-and the personnel employed (local-foreign). In 1992 Greece joined the EU monetary system, and thus the $/€ parity mattered 23 thereafter. The number 24 of shipping companies and the amount of $ imported Source: Data from Greek Ministry of Merchant Marine; Athens Center of Planning & Economic Research, 1988Research, -1992Research, plan, 1990PETROFIN Research, 1998-2017 Figure 6. The number of Greek-owned Marine companies, 1980-2017 The privileges extended to Greek shipping companies already in Greece on the principle of "fair treatment". 19 The taxation on ships provided between 1989 and 1993 $~73m. As declared by the 1974 Prime Minister of Greece "the tax collection from ships was not the objective of his Government". 20 So that in "shipping" companies to be included and the "companies" managing "tugs/rescue ships" under foreign flags. Including also laws: 1892/1990; 959/1979 legislating the "Special Shipping Company"; 2859/2000. 21 Laws: 89/1967Laws: 89/ , 378/1968Laws: 89/ , 27/1975Laws: 89/ , 814/1978Laws: 89/ and 2234Laws: 89/ /1994 The foreign exchange was important for Greeks having a trade deficit all along since the modern Greek state established (in 1830). 23 Crew wages for Greeks, since a long time, were paid in English pounds instead in drachmas given frequent devaluations of national currency, especially in 1980-1990. 24 Worth noting is that 1/3 of the number of companies presented above do not deal with ship management per se (based on 1992 data). So, 572 were exclusive shipping companies managing 2,961 ships (5 ships on average). were affected by the 1981-1987 depression (Goulielmos, 1997). Between 1982 and1987, the shipping companies imported $4.53 b, while between 1988 and 1993 this was $6.2 b.
The number of "marine" companies, during 1981-1987 depression, reduced. They fell from 742 to 598 between 1981 and 1987. So, during the depression, 144 marine companies became rather bankrupt. For this we used the indirect criterion that these 144 marine companies were unable to import into Greece the minimum required by the law amount of $50,000 per annum (originally $30,000)! From this we concluded that about 100 (70%) shipping companies became bankrupt…

Part III: The Creation of the 22 Leading Greek-Owned Shipping Companies, 1970-1985
The 1970s was a period of a fair orderbook of ships, and the tanker rates were heading to an all-times high. The larger crude carriers, for a period of over 10 years, enjoyed a high ("Worldscale") freight rate index (  25 Greeks used to have ships in lay-up for 3 years before considering scrapping them! Ships with heavy needs of repairs and maintenance, so that to retain their class, being also of certain advanced age, and of a smaller size, they are scrapped by Greeks. Depending on the liquidity problems that a shipping company may have, scrapping-given modern large sizes of ships-may provide a serious amount of dollars given also the price of scrap iron ($126-$138 in this period per ton of steel).
As shown, the larger tankers used to rest in lay-up (75% in 1983; red columns) and in slow-steaming (blue columns), ranging from 40 m in March 1980 to 100m in 1983 26 and 42.5 m in 1988. This was the revenge of the Super tankers… Goliath was beaten…by David once more.
Colocotronis 27 M, who invested in 2 VLCCs in end 1972, learned a bitter lesson. His case was one of bad timing of economies of scale… He built 400,000 dwt (or 14% of his fleet), but market fell down between order and delivery, in 1976 (May)…This is why we stressed elsewhere that economies of scale is a good thing, but it depends on the fact that demand for goliath ships has been se-cured… He used to buy cheap ships and to charter them in period. Finance was obtained on ships' mortgages plus the assignment of earnings. This was, and perhaps still is, the financing practice in Greek shipping. He was accused for a not careful manner of maintaining his fleet (Stokes, 1997: pp. 43-44). The lending banks (Deutsche; Grindlays and European-American syndicate) finally arrested his vessels… The 19 (8 + 11) Greek-owned leading shipping companies, of this period, will be classified in 2 main classes (Graph 3): existing (1970) and newcomers (1985).
The 8-leading shipping companies were: Onassis; Goulandris P & Sons ("Orion"; "Capeside"), owning more than 4 m dwt each; Niarchos Graph 3. The 2 main classes of the Greek-owned Shipping Companies, 1970-1985 It is estimated that in 1983 the world fleet of oil tankers was 263 m dwt. 27 In late 1975 "Colocotronis" faced severe liquidity problems and by end 1978 came to an agreement initiated by a consortium led by the "European American Banking Corporation". He is not the only example: "Lemos & Pateras", & "Tsavliris" were obliged to reduce their fleets by the banks in 1987, in their endeavors to build ships using a bank loan. The banks got it all wrong to finance shipping companies during a boom (Goulielmos, 2021a 1970-1976-1985. growth, due to their size of over 200,000 and over each! A depression is a sad event, no doubt, but while a boom forgives many mistakes, a depression reveals them, and shipowners try hard to survive by policies that they ought to adopt them before! Livanos G (of Stavros) sold 0.5 m dwt, since 1976; Onassis 2 m; P Goulandris & Sons 28 3.2 m; Niarchos 1.54 m and Goulandris N J 1.9 m (9.14 m dwt total from these 5). Thus, the leaders, as a result of the depression, sold 1/2 of their fleet. It is true that a crisis puts into a trial capable managers. Moreover, proactive shipowners are something rare.
Interesting is the C. M. Lemos' case because of his drastic downsizing policy: • He faced the 1981-1987 shipping depression by selling ships heavily, starting in 1983. He sold 44 out of 50 ships (about 90%) of a total of 3.4 m dwt out of 4.6 m (74%)! He believed that shipping depression was going to deepen. From the 44 ships he sold, 16 were scrapped, collecting $45 m. Moreover, 2 of his vessels (1973-built, 150,000 combis (bulk-oil)), and 3 (mid-1970s-built, VLCCs), were laid-up already for at least 3 years...
• He, and other Greek shipowners, were preoccupied with the question: "How to face a depression"? Some, in late 1970s, reduced shipping exposure, from say 80% to 25%, by switching ship funds to real estate (popular among Greek shipowners, and Onassis), and buy blue chips, overlooking fleet renewal!
Greek shipowners sought to invest in sectors 29 which were up, when shipping was down -known as "anticycling policy" (Thanopulu, 1996). 28 By 1993 the 5 sons passed company's shipping management to Petros (of John G) & Petros (of George G). 29 This policy found also in the case of "Sanko Shipping Co of Japan", but somehow different. Sanko invested heavily and exclusively in tankers in 1970s, but it derived heavy losses. Then it decided to invest heavily in dry cargo ships in 1980s to counter the previous losses. But timing was wrong (Stopford, 2009: p. 126;Couper et al., 1999).
The above policy conforms with the popular saying: "do not put all eggs in one basket", especially if this basket gets smaller at times and larger at others... Bacolitsas 30 argued that "despite the doom and gloom that the shipping market experienced during 2011-13, and especially during 2012, Greek shipowners placed newbuilding orders…" He admitted that there were low prices in various shipyards, close to historical lows, and new designs more efficient in emissions and fuel consumption… Goulielmos (2020b) described the growth policy of Greek shipowners. This implies that opportunities, par excellence, do arise during a depression, but only liquid 31 companies grasp them… A depression (and not capitalism) seems to make rich people richer and poor people poorer, as experience taught us and them. Finally, a shipowner cannot ignore what is "legal obsolescence" as far as CO 2 emissions are concerned. Whether a shipowner protects the environment or not, it is the Charterer (customer) who will make him/her to comply with IMO regulations! • Further, one may downsize one's fleet, say to 10 -12 ships, or to that size where losses are tolerated, retaining the essential expertise and the feel of the market, watching-out there when market is going to improve 32 … • Downsizing applied frequently in non-shipping companies, especially after end-2008. This is the successor of the "laying-off". Downsizing is the planned elimination 33 of jobs (Robbins & Coulter, 2018: p. 466). For this, an economic recession is one cause, the too many employees, and the failure of management, etc., are the 2 others. In shipping, owning no ships, or managing a reduced number of ships, are the main reasons for downsizing (Thenamaris in 1990s). The eleven "newcomers" (Figure 9) appeared stronger out of the [1981][1982][1983][1984][1985] Source: as in Figure 5.  Table 3 illustrates closer these 11 newcomers who-among a crisis-joined the leading ones in 1985.

Part IV: How the Greek-Owned Shipping Companies Survived from the 1981-1987 Depression
Years 1986-1988 brought 12 fundamental changes (!) in the post-depression Greek-owned shipping companies, which are worth noting. This we consider to be a new era for Greek-owned shipping (since end 1987).
• They played with assets.   • They faced finance problems.
• They improved their relations with shipyards.
• Certain owners were in disadvantage as far as the $ parity with shipbuilding currencies is concerned, especially with Yen. The comeback of Greek owners to very large tankers, and to Suezmax (1 m barrels), increased the Greek-owned shipping to 85 -88 m dwt (March, 1988), or 14% of world shipping, reaching Japan and staying ahead of USA (68 m dwt) and Hong Kong (48 m). Graph 4 outlines the 3 major changes.
Moreover, the crisis deteriorated the relations between shipowners and shipyards, because shipowners tried to: postpone ships' delivery; cancel it; refuse… to pay; ask for a reduced price and… abandoning ships to shipyards… The self-interest has prevailed. A bad parity between $ and Japanese Yen wounded certain Greek shipowners ignoring to buy Yens forward.
Greek shipowners are always ready… to help either shipyards, or banks, to get rid of ships abandoned by their original owners (e.g., as happened in Korean & Brazilian yards). Greeks emerged as a… "Salvation Army" for the Shipyards, and banks, including bankrupt shipping companies. Greeks always sought-after opportunities worldwide.
An asset play played in mid-1985-autumn-1987 by Greek shipowners. They paid $29.5 m in 1985-1987 to buy 7 ships and sold them against $72.2 m deriving almost $43 m profit (ships from 4 -17 years of age and from 32,680 dwt to 123,247 dwt each, to Chinese and Norwegians). In a depression finance becomes rare, but Greeks continued to have the support of the banks.
It is remarkable, and we have to underline this here, that almost 12 beneficial" effects within only 3-years provided by the depression. The depression created or restored 22 Greek-owned shipping companies by owning 45 m dwt (plus 4 m dwt in 3 years).

Part VI: The 2004 Year
As shown in Figure 11 Table 6

Part VII: The 2009-2018 Period
This period is summarized in Table 7.  In 2016, as shown in Table 8, 25 additional companies became leaders, since 2009. Making a total of 77 companies owning 301.5 m dwt from 142 m dwt (more than double); the 1389 ships became 2971! This was a great leap forward.

History
The Angelicoussis family created by Anthony A.-a radio operator; having a profession for which his wife Maria was not proud of, and she was pressing him to become a shipowner. She was a Papalios nee, (a ship-owning family), and her

Anthony as a Shipowner (1918-1989)
Anthony started a shipping company with friends, and small ships, as common among Greeks. In early 1960-1970, A bought certain Liberty ships. Thanks God, for Greek-owned shipping, partners-friends split-off. A in 1987 impressed shipping community by a joint float with American Express Bank in NYSE for the first time in history. A established the company "Anangel American S L" (AASL) 40 , which survived 2 depressions in 1970-1990. A was absent in 1970, by dwt, among the 8 leaders. In 1976, A owned 28 ships of ~761,000 dwt; by 1985 owned 48 ships of 1.33m dwt; by 1988 owned 1.30m dwt against 0.98 in 1986 and from 43 ships he arrived at 47. In 1989 he passed away.
The characteristic of A was his total committed to new-buildings 41 , in Japan (IHI), in cooperation with them for over 18 continuous years, and for a certain range of tonnage! For Greeks this was a paradigm shift, being traditionally 2 nd handers! A specialized: in "Freedoms", "F" series (15,000 dwt), "Freedoms Mark II", "Fortunes" and "Friendships" (bulk carriers 22,500 dwt), providing trading 40 AASL company grew out of an entrepreneurial association between "Angelicoussis ship holding group", "American Express bank" and "Lehman Bros". In end-1986 formed a joint venture company by the 1st 2 of the above, to buy 2 young bulk carriers. By 1987 3 m A shares at $10 offered to public, 3 m for >$10 and 1.5 m of 11% cumulative non-voting preferred shares at $10. Angelicoussis subscribed for 3 m B ordinary shares at $9.5 using a loan from AMEX for the 75% of this. AASL followed a no-debt policy. All vessels bought were <7 years old! 41 Greeks out of necessity, and strategy, used to enter into the shipping markets via 2 nd hand ones, where tonnage was older, cheaper and thus competitive in certain items of costs. With the exception of Onassis, Greek-owned shipping companies grew through past years' profits and thus it was slow and cyclical. Greek shipowners had also a number of cases where large loans, large ships, and low freight markets, brought-in bankruptcies (e.g., Colocotronis M). Apropos is a Greek saying: "the size of the quilt you have is going to determine what part of your feet will be not covered". This is what I say to my students: "estimate the freight market when a newbuilding will be delivered, i.e., in 2 -3 years ahead" not when one places the order! Also, estimate how supply is going to increase by the orders of all other shipowners including your own. flexibility able to survive during a shipping crisis, because a minimum volume of seaborne trade has to be served…

John and Anna as Shipowners (1949-)
John and Anna took over after A's death. In early 1990s company moved into Capes, VLCCs and Suezmaxes. It took 11 years after their father's death, in 2000, for John and Anna to split off -for the great benefit of Greek-owned shipping! John learned shipping business from his father, since 1974, as this was common among Greeks. Maria took-over by herself in April 2021 after John's death.
In 2001, "Anangel ASL" turned private, and John left the Stock Exchange, perhaps forever… He did not regret it. In 2004 entered into LNGs, having 30 units by 2018. Thanks God again, in 2008 Maria-his daughter-took over jointly … and though 2 Greeks, they agreed to everything…In 2018 "Anangel" owned 102 ships (24.5 m dwt) and soon it will reach 131. Family's whereabouts are presented in Table 9. The reader must pay attention as to the number of partners involved in Angelicoussis' case-study, which gradually, and eventually, all established their separate shipping companies! The more people-Greeks-are involved in shipping owning and management, the more spins-off are about to be created! This is the way to create a great shipping belonging to Hellenes. "Strength is achieved by unity and progress is achieved by setting-off"! The research so far has been concentrated in national fleets and the way they have grown over time. This paper started from the fact that a national fleet is made-up by a number of individual companies and by their way of adding ships and tonnage to their ownership. We showed the best practices adopted by Greek shipowners to create new companies and also to expand them by leaps and bounds, perhaps by setting-off, but not exclusively. This analysis may be useful to those managers who want to know the ways new companies are created or how existing companies have expanded so that to follow their example. This research has been facilitated by the availability of detailed data at companies' level, which we have nowadays even at a cost.
A further research may take-out the issues we raised one by one and provide a deeper research for each, like e.g., the role of tradition, the family culture, the trend to create a new company by each family number, the intermarriages and so on. This way we will see the trees that make-out the forest. Stopford (2009) characterized shipping business wrongly as unattractive, while we admit it to be extremely cyclical. Greeks being shipowners by tradition, and having it as a way of life, are not anymore, the small, unimportant, ones, as used to be, pursuing all their opportunities in the 2 nd hand market. Neither shipping markets are purely competitive at times, where supply can influence price as it did in the past.

Conclusion
Maximizing profits cannot be taken for granted. Total cost must be minimized given prevailing freight rate. To this effect Greek state has helped shipping by providing reduced national crew requirements, by excluding a number of ratings and a number of Greek officers from being on board, except Cap-tain… Greek ship-owners were blessed by having large families, where the characteristic example is Petros Goulandris 43 . We underlined out the cases most frequently, among Greek shipowners, of "appointing" their children as their successors. In addition, most of the time, companies were formed with brothers, or many partners, which eventually were prone to set off. Moreover, intermarriages continued. The Greek mentality that where there are 2 Greeks, there are 4 different opinions, also helped to establish many new shipping companies! 43 Traditional, from Andros, having 5 children: Basil, Nikos, John, George and Costas! We cannot support the opinion that large families were made on purpose to…create successors-shipowners, but the infant mortality perhaps played its role along with religious considerations and the fact that husbands stayed away from home for a number of months or years.