Theoretical Economics Letters

Vol.5 No.3(2015), Paper ID 57437, 10 pages

DOI:10.4236/tel.2015.53048

 

Worker Recruiting with Favoritism and Bribery

 

Gen Chen, Jun Tang

 

School of Economics & Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
School of Economics and Trade, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou, China

 

Copyright © 2015 Gen Chen, Jun Tang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

 

How to Cite this Article

Chen, G. and Tang, J. (2015) Worker Recruiting with Favoritism and Bribery. Theoretical Economics Letters, 5, 415-424. doi: 10.4236/tel.2015.53048.
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