Theoretical Economics Letters

Vol.4 No.9(2014), Paper ID 52319, 8 pages

DOI:10.4236/tel.2014.49112

 

Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment in a Mixed Duopoly

 

Yasuhiko Nakamura

 

College of Economics, Nihon University, Tokyo, Japan

 

Copyright © 2014 Yasuhiko Nakamura et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

 

How to Cite this Article

Nakamura, Y. (2014) Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment in a Mixed Duopoly. Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 889-896. doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.49112.
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