Theoretical Economics Letters

Vol.2 No.3(2012), Paper ID 21507, 7 pages

DOI:10.4236/tel.2012.23059

 

Incentives in Public and Privatized Firms under Incomplete Contracting Situations

 

Takeshi Miyazaki

 

Department of Economics, Meikai University, Urayasu, Japan

 

Copyright © 2012 Takeshi Miyazaki et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

 

How to Cite this Article

T. Miyazaki, "Incentives in Public and Privatized Firms under Incomplete Contracting Situations," Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 2 No. 3, 2012, pp. 323-329. doi: 10.4236/tel.2012.23059.
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